


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
THE
CAMPAIGN OF PLATAEA

(SEPTEMBER, 479 B.C.)

BY

HENRY BURT WRIGHT, PH.D. (1897 -)

*Instructor in Greek and Latin
in Yale University*



A Thesis presented to the Philosophical Faculty of Yale University
in Candidacy for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy




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


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THE SERPENT-COLUMN

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HENRY BURT WRIGHT

PREFACE

A discussion of the Campaign of Plataea in the Yale Classical Seminary of 1900-1901 suggested this monograph. To Professor Perrin's lectures at that time and to his frequent suggestions since are due in largest measure the spirit and method of the work. Macan's admirable critical examination of the battle of Marathon (*Herodotus Bks. IV-VI*, Vol. 2, Appendix 10) has been freely consulted and followed in many details; but in general his plan of treatment has been more adapted than adopted. Writing from the standpoint of a student of Herodotus rather than of ancient history (p. 150), he has taken the Periclean revision of Herodotus as his starting point. While this is perhaps a perfectly safe way to approach an Athenian battle like Marathon, it would manifestly give Athenian tradition an unfair advantage in the case of a Spartan victory like Plataea. The documents which preceded the Periclean revision of Herodotus are therefore taken as the starting point in the present discussion. In the critical study of the evidence, both literary and monumental, Langlois and Seignobos' *Introduction to the Study of History* (translated by Berry) and Wachsmuth's *Einleitung in das Studium der Alten Geschichte* have been invaluable guides. The collection of the documents which preserve the tradition of the campaign has been greatly facilitated by the many source-references in Busolt's *Griechische Geschichte*, Vol. 2, pp. 600-745, Meyer's *Geschichte des Alterthums*, Vol. 3, Heermann's *Materials in the Attic Orators for a History of the Persian Wars* (unpublished doctor's thesis), and Perrin's *Plutarch's Themistocles and Aristides*. The investigations of Hunt (*Papers of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens*, Vol. 5, pp. 271 ff.) and Grundy (*The Great Persian War*, Chapter 11) with reference to the

topography of the campaign, have made it possible for one who has not visited the battlefield, to discuss the evolutions of the opposing armies with some degree of confidence. Topographical references throughout the book follow Grundy's designations. Summaries of ancient documents, excepting Herodotus and Plutarch which are readily accessible in English, and a bibliography of modern critical discussions of the campaign, will be found in the appendices. In these I have aimed at completeness. References in the book to modern historians are always to pages in the editions mentioned in Appendix B. Delbrück's earlier volume is referred to as Delbrück, *Per.*; his later volume as Delbrück, *K.* The topical and chronological chart of the ancient testimonies was inspired by Bauer's *Plutarch's Themistokles für Quellenkritische Übungen*.

Besides my special indebtedness to Professor Perrin, I am under obligation to the members of the Yale Classical Faculty as a whole for invaluable suggestions and kindly criticism. Dr. Robert K. Root of Yale University and Dr. Charles H. Weller, Rector of the Hopkins Grammar School, have read the proofs with care, and their thorough review of the book places me under a debt of lasting gratitude to them. Mr. Andrew Keogh of the Yale University Library has also rendered most timely assistance in the completion of the bibliography.

HENRY BURT WRIGHT

YALE UNIVERSITY

June, 1904

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τόσος γὰρ ἔσται πέλανος αἵματος φαγῆς
πρὸς γῆ Πλαταιῶν Δωρίδος λόγχης ὕπο

—Aeschylus, *Persians* 816, 817.

καὶ νίκην ἀναιρέεται καλλίστην ἀπασέων τῶν ἡμεῖς ἴδμεν
Πανσανίης ὁ Κλεομβρότου τοῦ Ἀναξανδρίδew

—Herodotus 9. 64.

ὁ Πανσανίας . . . ὦν καὶ πρότερον ἐν μεγάλῳ ἀξιώματι ὑπὸ τῶν
Ἑλλήνων διὰ τὴν Πλαταιᾶσιν ἡγεμονίαν

—Thucydides I. 130. 1.

Πανσανίας γὰρ ὁ Κλεομβρότου, Λακεδαιμόνιος, ἐλευθερώσας τὴν Ἑλλάδα
ἀπὸ τῶν Μήδων μετὰ Ἑλλήνων

—Thucydides 2. 71. 2.

Πανσανίαν τὸν Κλεομβρότου . . . τὸν μὲν τὰ ὕστερον ἀφείλετο
ἀδικήματα εὐεργέτην μὴ ὀνομασθῆναι τῆς Ἑλλάδος

—Pausanias 8. 52. 2.

Will man in all' diesem Zusammengreifen nur Zufall, in den Prophetensprüchen und Opferzeichen nur Einwirkungen blinden Aberglaubens sehen? Zu widerlegen wäre eine solche Ansicht nicht, aber ich traue dem Themistokles und Pausanias zu, wie die Griechen sie uns schildern, daß sie wußten, was sie thaten. Neben dem Miltiadas und Leonidas was für Männer, die den strategischen Blick und das Selbstthum mit der Verschlagenheit und Feinheit des überlegenen Geistes zu verbinden wissen, von fern her die Dinge überschauen und zu den äußersten Mitteln, dem Schein des Verraths, der Ausnützung des Aberglaubens der Menge greifen, um zu ihrem hohen Ziel zu gelangen!

—Delbrück, *Geschichte der Kriegskunst*, S. 85.

THE CAMPAIGN OF PLATAEA

In these days of careful and exhaustive investigation of ancient history, one who attempts to re-open discussion on any part of a theme as familiar as that of the Persian War, is surely called upon to give reasons for a step apparently as unpromising as it is presumptuous. And this is doubly necessary, if the task is approached from no new point of view made possible by archaeological or topographical discoveries, and if the best that the investigator can offer is a re-examination of literary evidence. Aside from the fact that no one has hitherto attempted to bring within the compass of a single volume the scattered allusions to, and discussions of, the Campaign of Plataea in ancient and modern literature, three considerations are here advanced in justification of the present study.

The tradition of the final land battle of the Persian War may properly be said to be still a legitimate field for investigation because of the increasing recognition of the importance of the victory. Grundy (p. 510) characterizes Plataea as the greatest and most interesting of the Hellenic battles of the fifth century. Scholars at present are much more agreed regarding the part it played in settling the destinies of Europe and Asia than they were a hundred years ago, when all that was necessary in writing certain chapters of Greek history was to reproduce Herodotus.¹ No other theory of the campaign was then possible than that which made the victory the fortunate and wholly undeserved outcome of a disorganized Spartan retreat. Small wonder, then, that it was overshadowed by the brilliant Athenian naval victory at Salamis. The assertion of Plato² that Plataea and not Salamis was the completion of

¹ Curtiss, pp. 345-352.

² *Laws* 707 C.

the deliverance of Greece might, it is true, have found striking confirmation in a statement of Herodotus himself¹ that the victory of Pausanias was the most signal of all which that writer knew. Yet strangely enough, this was persistently overlooked, no doubt in part because the assertion was so inconsistent with the rest of Herodotus' account of the campaign. In recent years the increasing number of those who regard the history of Herodotus as a completed whole² would seem to give added support to the contention that the importance of the campaign is proved artistically. The history begins with the glory of Persia and ends with her humiliation. The story of Plataea is the climax. It is elaborated at greater length than any other single act or scene in the entire work of Herodotus.³ Mycale and the events which follow the close of the land campaign in Book 9 may properly be compared with the occurrences which take place after the slaying of Hector in the *Iliad*, or with those occurring after the vengeance on the suitors in the *Odyssey*. Like the conclusion of the Greek oration and the *exodos* of the Greek drama, their evident artistic purpose is to heighten by contrast the greater and more climactic event which has preceded.

Wholly aside from the question of its importance, however, the complicated nature of the campaign further justifies repeated examination of the evidence. Munro (p. 153) observes that Plataea must rank after the Scythian expedition and the Ionian revolt as the most difficult of Herodotus' detailed military narratives. Many recent scholars believe with Delbrück (*K.* pp. 82-83) that the evidence at hand is wholly inadequate to solve the problem. Much of what took place on the battlefield during the long hours while the armies faced one another was never written down. Even if all the evidence, non-extant as well

¹ 9. 64.

² Macan, *Herodotus Bks. IV-VI*, Vol. I, p. xi; E. Meyer, *Forsch.* 1. 189 f., 2. 217, 218.

³ Grundy, p. 457.

as extant, which commemorated the subject were at the disposal of investigators, it is doubtful whether scholars could agree as to the details of the puzzling manœuvres. How necessary, then, a thorough mastery of the little which is known becomes, if much must be conjectured regarding what is lost!

But most important of all, Sparta's right to be fully and fairly heard in a discussion of the Campaign of Plataea, a consideration which has been quite consistently neglected by scholars, in itself is sufficient to call for a re-examination of the evidence. This last consideration furnishes the starting point as well as the final justification of a new critical discussion.

The unprejudiced investigator will never overlook the fact that the commonly accepted version of Plataea was written by a lover of Athens for Athenians¹ when civil war between Athens and Sparta was at its height, and when Sparta, the nation without a literature, stood silent with no advocate to plead her cause.² He cannot fail to notice that in the Herodotean account of the campaign the Athenians always do the right thing and are never reproached.³ Hence, in fairness to both parties, he cannot, as a majority of historians have done, accept unchallenged the account of Herodotus as the starting point or even the framework of his discussion of the campaign. If an Athenian battle were under consideration, the case would be different.

It is highly improbable, to be sure—granting the possibility of perversion in details and in the estimates of party leaders—that, in the general trend of its estimate of

¹ Hdt. 7. 139.

² Paus. 3. 8. 2. 'It seems to me that in all the wide world there is no people so dead to poetry and poetic fame as the Spartans. For, bating the epigram that somebody concocted upon Cynisca, and another which Simonides wrote for Pausanias to be graved on the votive tripod at Delphi, there is never a poet that sang the praises of the kings of Lacedaemon' (Frazer's translation).

³ See Wecklein, pp. 32-33, and Rudolph, p. 19, for illustrations of this favoritism.

Athenian battles like Marathon or Salamis, the account of Herodotus can be intentionally guilty of more than exaggeration. It is in itself entirely Athenian. The process of pruning, though exacting, is comparatively easy. When, however, this Athenian tradition discusses a Spartan engagement, there is always danger of deliberate perversion as well as of exaggeration; and this, starting at the root, and tainting the whole growth, cannot be removed except by the much more fundamental operation of eradication. It is therefore imperative, before discussing the details of the tradition of Plataea, to state clearly some general features of the battle which may be regarded as established by primary evidence and military science. From these the investigator will not depart in the study of details except for very convincing reasons, and then only to return to the established principles for the study of the next step.

1. *In the Campaign of Plataea an army of 20,000 to 30,000 allied Greek hoplites, attended by an equal number of light-armed troops, faced a slightly superior force of Asiatics.* A statement of the numbers engaged, though anticipating the later discussion, is necessary at the start. As Delbrück (*K.* pp. 86-88) has demonstrated, the position which one holds regarding the numbers of troops engaged must constitute the starting point in any study of the battle. Neither Hauvette nor Grundy has satisfactorily answered Delbrück's contention (*Per.* p. 164) that, if Mardonius the Persian general possessed such an overwhelming advantage in numbers as Herodotus states, he would certainly have despatched some of his mobile detachments to the south of the Cithaeron-Parnes Range to cut off all Greek communication with, and retreat to, the Peloponnesus. He certainly had unimpeded access to the plain of Attica, from which he had nothing to fear, since, according to Herodotus (9. 13), he himself had destroyed Athens.

2. *The battle was won by the prowess and discipline of the Lacedaemonian troops, and, in the decisive engagement, the Athenians played a subordinate part.*

The extant primary evidence, both literary and monumental, is conclusive on this point. Aeschylus (*Pers.* 817), before an Athenian audience within seven years after the battle, characterized Plataea as won beneath the Dorian spear. Pindar asserts (*Pyth.* 1. 77) that Plataea was as truly Sparta's victory as Salamis was that of Athens. On the memorial column, which is still extant, the name of Sparta stands first on the list of victorious states. If the serpent-column commemorates both Salamis and Plataea,¹ this would seem to imply that Sparta's victory at Plataea was more deserving of honor than that of Athens at Salamis. Furthermore, Herodotus, writing a little more than a generation after the battle, both by direct statement on one point, and by silence on another, confirms the primary evidence. Pausanias, the Spartan, is said to have won the most signal victory of all time (9. 64). Of Aristides, the Athenian commander, for whom Herodotus has an evident fondness, no mention is made in all the story of the battle, except the mere statement that he commanded the Athenian hoplites (9. 28). Such an omission cannot be due to carelessness. It is essential that the parts which the two leading states played in the battle be established before conjectures regarding details are made. There are several places where we should be glad to give prominence to the Athenian troops in order to explain certain difficulties. It is apparent that such a procedure would not be warranted by the facts.

3. *The underlying cause of the brilliant and complete Spartan victory was the consummate generalship of Pausanias.* To hold with Duncker (p. 354) that the victory at Plataea was the chance and wholly undeserved outcome of miserable manœuvres of a hesitating and feeble commander-in-chief, or with Grundy (p. 427) that Plataea was won in spite of an ill-devised plan, is to ignore utterly the direct testimony of the greatest scientific historian of the battle, who pronounced his verdict with all the evidence at

¹ Cf. Hdt. 8. 82.

his disposal, and in the face of the disgraceful subsequent career of the hero. The testimony of Thucydides, recorded within three-quarters of a century after the battle, has no uncertain ring (I. 130. 1). He asserts that Pausanias acquired a high reputation for generalship among all the Greek contingents, not before or after the battle, but while in command at Plataea. The Greeks at Plataea are the best judges of the generalship of Pausanias, and their unanimous verdict when reported by Thucydides is practically as good as first-hand evidence. It has been noted above that Herodotus cannot refrain from paying a wholly unexpected tribute to the generalship of Pausanias (9. 64), in spite of his deliberate reflection on Spartan courage as a whole. It should also be noted that, in the Herodotean account, Pausanias is absolute master of affairs after the battle, which is difficult of explanation unless he dictated and carried out a successful plan of action on the field. It is unfortunate that the discreditable subsequent career of Pausanias, which was so eagerly seized upon by the Athenians and exploited by them to the discredit of Sparta in the negotiations which immediately preceded the Peloponnesian War (Thuc. I. 128 f.) during the very years when Herodotus was writing, and which no one now attempts to excuse, has so frequently been allowed to overshadow the brilliant deeds of his earlier years.¹ That the siren charms of Persian life should have mastered him is a misfortune; but this fact should no more be allowed to cloud the memory of Plataea than the subtle workings of the same civilization on Alexander the Great and its final mastery of much of the Greek in him, should cause us to underestimate the Granicus, Issus, and Gaugamela.

But it may be objected that Thucydides himself states (I. 69. 5) that the Persian miscarried in Greece chiefly through his own errors. Granted that this is true,² it

¹ Cf. Paus. 8. 52. 2.

² The phrase is in a speech made by the Corinthians in the Spartan assembly.

applies no more to Plataea than to Marathon and Salamis. It is a mark of consummate generalship to make a worthy adversary—and this Mardonius surely was¹—commit errors. No great general exposes his troops for display of reckless bravery. It has been aptly said that the charge of the Light Brigade at Balaclava was grand, but that it was not war. The stratagem through which Mardonius was trapped by Pausanias into engaging battle at Plataea, can be shown to have been one subtly calculated to make the Persians miscarry, and to have been every whit as brilliant and as creditable to its originator as those employed by Miltiades at Marathon, and by Themistocles at Salamis.²

¹ Grundy, p. 450 n.

² See E. Meyer, *Forsch.* 2. 209. Meyer compares the tactics of Pausanias with those of Blücher and Gneisenau at the Katzbach.

THE LITERARY TRADITION FOR THE
CAMPAIGN OF PLATAEA

CHAPTER I

The General Nature of the Evidence with an Examination of the Sources of Herodotus and Pausanias

The existing records in classical literature which preserve the literary tradition of the Campaign of Plataea are unfortunately in many cases fragmentary, so that we do not, and probably never shall, possess all that dealt with the subject. They range from an inscribed fragment of the actual monument erected by the Greeks soon after 479 B.C., to commemorate the victory, to a notice in a lexicographer of the tenth century A.D. A glance at the analytical chart of the evidence in the appendices reveals at once several marked characteristics. Aside from the three detailed accounts of Herodotus, Ephorus-Diodorus and Plutarch, much of the rest consists of isolated indirect references, dealing with single events in the campaign. Again, the strict chronological order in which the evidence has come down to us is not always the order of its original composition. For example, writers like Ephorus and Ctesias must be reconstructed from late historical compilations and excerpts, and there is necessarily more or less uncertainty in such work.¹ Yet in a critical discussion all of these must be reconstructed as far as possible and studied in the setting of the age which produced them. It is also apparent that much of the material in the late documents which are still preserved is simply duplication of earlier sources, notably Ephorus-Diodorus and Herod-

¹ Imbedded in the existing documents, generally in the form of quotations, are direct and indirect references to the battle, more or less extended, from lost works of Simonides of Ceos, Timocreon of Rhodes, Ctesias, Hyperides, Clidemus, Ephorus, Theopompus, Timaeus, Clitarchus, Demetrius of Phalerum, Idomeneus, Pompeius Trogus and Nymphis. Pausanias and others preserve record of much monumental evidence of early date.

otus. Several authors whose names are significant in the chronological order of the extant evidence, assume no further importance when traced back to their sources, being simply repositories of earlier testimony and contributing neither variant, accretion nor inferential addition to the tradition.¹ Finally, if the evidence be compared with that for Marathon as collected by Macan, there are several important differences. We possess the entire account of Ephorus-Diodorus for Plataea, while the account for Marathon in that author is fragmentary. The references to Plataea in the Orators, in Aristotle and in Nepos are meagre and general. There is not a single reference in the comedies of Aristophanes to the campaign.

Aside from the direct and restorable testimonies in the existing records, there is another body of evidence not to-day accessible, but none the less a force to be reckoned with in an attempt to reconstruct the successive stages through which the tradition passed. There are certain writers of whom not even fragments relating to Plataea remain, to whom we can with reasonable assurance assign a place in the development of the literary tradition of the campaign.² For example, although we do not possess a

¹ Xenophon, Aeneas Tacticus, Aristotle, Isocrates, Dicaearchus, Cicero, Diodorus, Polyaeus, Athenaeus, Helladius, Theon, Photius, Palatine Anthology, and all lexicographers and scholiasts except Schol. Ael. Arist., Vol. 3, p. 191 (*Dind.*).

² Evidence of value concerning Plataea probably existed in the following lost works:

(a) Charon of Lampsacus, *Persica*, composed in the first half of the fifth century.

(b) Phrynichus, *Phoenician Women*, produced in 476 B.C. This drama dealt with the battle of Salamis and exalted the services of Themistocles. It undoubtedly had some reference to Plataea, certainly to the motives of the king's retreat (Grote, p. 138 n. 1).

(c) Aeschylus, *Glaucus Potnieus* and *Prometheus Pyrcaeus*, produced in 472 B.C. The first of these plays may have dealt with Plataea. Wecklein connects the second with the Euchidas incident in Plutarch, *Aristides* 20 (Teuffel-Wecklein, *Aesch. Pers.*, pp. 39-40).

(d) Stesimbrotus of Thasos wrote a slanderous pamphlet at Athens about 431 B.C., which was directed especially against

single fragment of Hellanicus bearing on Plataea we can safely infer that he touched upon the battle, inasmuch as he discussed with some detail certain phases of the battle of Salamis,¹ and other existing fragments prove that his work extended as far down as the Peloponnesian War. What the specific influence of these writers upon the tradition was, cannot now of course be ascertained. But in a thorough study of the campaign, the fact that it may have been of weight must not be overlooked.

In the introductory chapter an attempt was made to show the unfairness of taking the account of Herodotus as it stands as the starting point and frame-work for a discussion of the campaign. In justice to Sparta it was insisted that we start from documents which preceded the bitterness of the Peloponnesian War.² A review of the extant testimonies at once suggests a difficulty. Five at the most of these remain—the serpent-column fragment,

Themistocles and Pericles. The Periclean tinge of the Herodotean narrative may have been heightened by this pamphlet.

(e) Hellanicus wrote annalistic records of Athens during the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides' estimate of his review of the Pentekontaëtia (Thuc. i. 97) is probably correct for the Persian War history which he is known to have recorded (see above).

(f) Choerilus of Samos wrote in hexameter the story of Athens' part in the Persian Wars during the last half of the fifth century. Tradition ascribes to him great success with the poem, hence it was probably intensely Athenian. Niebuhr (p. 372) regards this poem as a chief source of Herodotus.

(g) Ion of Chios, prominent at Athens during the age of Pericles and the Archidamian War, recorded the conversations of the great men of his day. His influence is possible in one or two personal anecdotes preserved in the tradition.

(h) Old Athenian comedy outside of Aristophanes, possibly Chionides and Pherecrates (Teuffel-Wecklein, *Aesch. Pers.*, p. 38) may have touched upon the battle.

(i) The Atticides and Periegetes are probably responsible for much late material. Aside from those mentioned by Plutarch, however, it is impossible to be more definite.

¹ Cf. Plut., *Mor.* 869 A.

² I cannot agree with Rudolph (p. 7) that 'no writer before Herodotus has described the battle through whom we can control him.'

and four meagre literary documents; Aeschylus (*Persians* 803-822); Pindar (*Pyth.* 1. 75-81); a restored Simonides (Bergk, *Poet. Lyr. Gr.*, Vol. 3, (Third edition) pp. 1146 (No. 84), 1151 (No. 100), 1154 (No. 107), 1164 (No. 137), 1165 (Nos. 138, 139), 1166 (No. 140), 1172 (No. 143); and a restored Timocreon (Plut., *Them.* 21. 2). Their concurrent testimony, of the utmost value and consistency throughout, is nevertheless very general in character. While it makes unmistakably clear the nature of the tradition before the age of Pericles, it supplies practically no details, so that it is evident that these must be sought elsewhere if at all. Must we despair of ever regaining these? State documents and official records are alike out of the question. All the literature, both annalistic and poetic, between Pindar and Herodotus which embraced details of Plataea has perished.

Yet the case is by no means as hopeless as it seems at first sight. Later tradition, though often a perverted echo, is nevertheless still an echo of the earlier. There are at least two documents which we can affirm with certainty contain many exact details of this earlier pre-Periclean tradition. The problem is to separate the pre-Periclean from the Periclean, or later, elements. These documents are Herodotus and Pausanias. A critical study of the sources of Herodotus, and some decision as to the genuineness of certain so-called pre-Periclean monuments mentioned in Pausanias, is necessary before proceeding further.

(A) The Sources of Herodotus' Account of Plataea

(Hdt. 8. 100-103, 107, 113-114, 121, 126-144; 9. 1-89.)

The history of Herodotus is a document in which oral tradition of contemporaries, or immediate descendants of contemporaries, of Plataea may have had a very large place. Even granting the improbable extreme that the historian did not start to gather his materials for the story of the campaign till 430 B.C.,¹ there must still have been living at

¹ Hdt. 7. 137.

Athens and in other parts of Greece at that date, men who had been actual participants in the battle. Aged veterans they would have been, it is true, but for that very reason no less jealous or communicative of their own versions of what took place. If, on the other hand, as is much more probable, Herodotus began to collect his material as early as 449 B.C., the great majority of the population of Greece would at that time have been either contemporaries or sons of contemporaries of Plataea. The question at once arises whether a division between oral and literary sources, or between earlier and later literary sources, is possible in the account of Herodotus.

No one can fail to notice, in studying attentively the Herodotean version of Plataea, that it contains startling inconsistencies,¹ especially regarding the part played by the Spartans. Nitzsch (pp. 249 ff.) in the earlier days of Herodotean higher criticism, noting this fact, thought he detected a dovetailing of two rival accounts of the battle, and assigned Hdt. 9. 7-10 to a Spartan source, Hdt. 9. 17-61 to an Athenian source, and Hdt. 9. 61-82 to a Spartan source with three insertions in this latter group of chapters from Tegean and Athenian sources.² In his general contention that we have a blend of two different stages of the tradition he was entirely correct. But in his somewhat mechanical assigning of large sections of material to two rival contemporary traditions he was led astray by his theory of the object of Herodotus' history—that it attempted to give an impartial account of the war by blending both the Spartan and Athenian traditions. Seventeen years later, Nissen³ carried this now generally rejected idea a step farther. He held that the history was written with the hope

¹ For a summary see E. Meyer, *Forsch.* 2. 205-207; Rudolph, pp. 11 ff.

² Delbrück, *Per.*, p. 112 n. 1, added to these a Boeotian and a Macedonian source.

³ 'Der Ausbruch des Pelop. Krieges', *Hist. Zeit.* N. F. 27 (1889). 419.

of reconciling Sparta and Athens, who had just entered upon civil war, by recounting the heroic deeds of the ancestors of both parties. In recent years, Meyer's conclusive essay, 'Herodots politischer Standpunkt und seine Behandlung der Perserkriege',¹ would seem to have established beyond a doubt, that what Nitzsch and Nissen regarded as the rival Spartan tradition, instead of being Spartan and contemporary with the so-called Athenian, was in reality the current Hellenic tradition of the battle in the age of Cimon²; and hence that Nitzsch's so-called Athenian tradition is amplification and accretion, the coloring and perversion of the original account under the stress of the opening years of the Peloponnesian War, to justify Pericles' policy of war against Sparta—in other words, the Periclean redaction of the earlier tradition. That Herodotus at least revised the account of the Campaign of Plataea in the opening years of the Peloponnesian War is proved internally.³ That he began to collect his materials for the story of the Persian War many years earlier in the age of Cimon seems reasonably established by Macan.⁴

These points, once established, make the application of Meyer's theory to the battle of Plataea possible; and the latter is reinforced by the fact that Nitzsch's so-called rival contemporary Spartan source as reproduced by Herodotus will be seen to be by no means controversial in character, but to consist in great part of simple narration of plain facts, free from digressions, colored anecdotes and speeches. Finally, the application of Meyer's theory will go far to explain the lack of symmetry in the Herodotean story of the campaign, and the undue emphasis and amplification of historically trivial details. One need only recall the events

¹ E. Meyer, *Forsch.* 2. 196 ff.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 209 f.

³ Hdt. 9. 73.

⁴ Macan, *Herodotus Bks. IV-VI*, Vol. 1, pp. lxx f. Note also that the direct references to events which took place after Plataea in Bk. 9 are all to events either before 450 B.C. (9. 35, 9. 64, 9. 75) or else after 431 B.C. (9. 73).

of the opening years of the Peloponnesian War as related by Thucydides, and apply with reasonable caution the historical commonplace that rhetorical speeches, digressions, and episodes with an apparent purpose, are the result of the working over and revision of material, to assign with certainty many parts of the Herodotean narrative to the Periclean revision or redaction. In each instance I have given my reasons for so doing. A word of caution should, however, be added. It should not be inferred that because a phase of the Herodotean tradition in its present form is classed as Periclean it is therefore *ipso facto* a fabrication. Every Periclean item has undoubtedly some basis of fact, and it is the duty of the investigator to show what the fact probably was and how the perversion arose. Each statement of Herodotus must be studied separately, and weighed in the light of many considerations. For that very reason it is necessary to separate the story into its Periclean and pre-Periclean (or Cimonian) elements.

1. Periclean Elements

Hdt. 8. 136-144. *The attempt to win over the Athenians through Alexander of Macedon.*

In the year 424 B.C. Macedon was won over to the Spartan side by Brasidas (Thuc. 4. 78 f.), but in a short time the alliance was renounced (Thuc. 4. 128. 5). It seems probable that from 430 to 424 B.C. a burning question at Athens was, 'Will Macedon declare for Sparta or Athens?' The digression on Alexander's ancestry in this passage, and the courteous treatment of the king, betray the influence of patronizing contemporary politics. The sarcastic reply to the Spartans breathes the atmosphere of the Peloponnesian War.

9. 1-3. *Aid furnished to Mardonius by Thessalians and Thebans.*

The statement of Herodotus that the Thessalian leaders, and not the people as a whole, were at fault for medizing

betrays the Periclean standpoint (Thuc. 4. 78. 2 f.).¹ The branding of the Thebans as traitors reflects Thuc. 2. 2-6; 3. 52-68.²

9. 4-5. *Second attempt to win over the Athenians.*

The stoning of Lycidas seems to indicate a partisan Athenian tradition. While perhaps true, it probably did not receive emphasis till the Periclean age.

9. 6-11. *Delay of the Spartans in sending aid after the embassy arrived.*

The inconsistencies in this section betray a working over of the material to glorify Athens. The bitterness towards Sparta is Periclean. The delay reflects the delay of Sparta in entering upon the Peloponnesian War.³

9. 12. *The Argives as informers.*

The leniency with which Argos is treated for this serious offense, in contrast to the attitude toward Thebes, betrays the hope of Athens in the Archidamian War that Argos might be won over from neutrality.⁴

9. 15b-16. *Attaginus and Thebans as boon companions of the Persians.*

The same bitterly hostile attitude toward Thebes as in 9. 1-3.

9. 17, 18. *Patronizing praise of the Phocians.*

It is true that these people were officially listed as allies of the Spartans in 431 B.C. (Thuc. 2. 9. 3); but they were never regarded as enemies to Athens (Thuc. 3. 95. 1).⁵ This episode betrays the Periclean attitude toward Phocis.

¹ E. Meyer, *Forsch.* 2. 212.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 210-212.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 205-207, 210.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 213-217.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 212-213.

9. 26-28. *Dispute between the Athenians and Tegeans.*

This debate has been shown to contain stock material from the Periclean funeral orations over the dead (Thuc. I. 73; 2. 36. 3).¹

9. 38. *Timagenides the Theban betrays the pass.*

Cf. above, 9. 1-3.

9. 40. *The Thebans incite the Persians to attack.*

Cf. above, 9. 1-3. (Note especially 'μηδίζοντες μεγάλως.')

9. 44-45. *Visit of Alexander of Macedon.*

Cf. above, 8. 136-144.

9. 46-48. *Cowardice of Spartans. Shift of wings. Taunt of Mardonius.*

The epic taunt of Mardonius is plainly a literary creation which like the shift of wings so vigorously attacked by Plutarch (*Mor.* 872' B) has the deliberate purpose of belittling Spartan bravery, and indicates Periclean atmosphere.

9. 52. *Cowardly retreat of the Greek center.*

When the significant fact is noted that of the 20,700 troops said by Herodotus to have composed the Greek center at Plataea (9. 28) 19,300 represented states allied with Sparta in the Peloponnesian War,² it is apparent that reflections on the valor of these troops would not be unwelcome to the Periclean circle at Athens.

9. 53-57. *The delay of Amompharetus.*

This episode bears the very evident earmark of the Periclean antagonism toward Sparta (c. 54. 'The Lacedaemonians who purpose one thing and say another.')

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 219-222.

² Of the twenty-two states mentioned, the Eretrians, Styrians, Paleans, and Plataeans alone were allies of Athens in the Peloponnesian War, and these four states furnished only 1,400 men at Plataea.

9. 58. *Taunt of Mardonius.*

Cf. above, 9. 46-48. It is generally admitted that the speeches of Herodotus are literary creations and reflect the standpoint of the author at the time of writing. Such an attitude toward Spartan bravery by an Athenian before 425 B.C. is hardly conceivable. (Cf. Thuc. 4. 34 'Cowed by fear of facing Lacedaemonians' for the actual attitude of the Athenians before the success at Pylos.)

9. 60. *Appeal of Pausanias to the Athenians.*

This episode is highly gratifying to Athenian pride, but is scarcely consistent with the lion's part Sparta takes in the actual fighting.

9. 69. *Zeal of the cowardly Greek allies after danger seems to be past.*

Cf. above, 9. 52. This is especially unfair to the Corinthians and Megarians. The Peloponnesian War broke out with the fierce Megarian quarrel (Thuc. 1. 42, 67).¹

9. 70. *Athenians make the breach in the wall.*

If the Tegeans entered first, the Athenians cannot have made the breach.² The Tegean tradition is more trustworthy, since it was supported by monumental evidence. The Athenian is very clearly for the glory of Athens.

9. 73-75. *Bravery of Sophanes.*

This episode is perfectly natural in itself; but the desire of the Periclean sympathizer to find some Athenian deeds of heroism to match the commonly accepted ones of Sparta is apparent. It is not enough to mention the individual name as in the case of the Spartans. Sophanes' right to a place of honor must be supported by a recital of his later achievements at the Strymon.

9. 78-79. *Cruelty of Lampon the Aeginetan.*

This reflects the old feud between Athens and Aegina which came to a climax in 431 B.C. when the Aeginetans

¹ Note also the Herodotean partisan thrust, *ἐν οὐδενὶ λόγῳ ἀπώλοντο*.

² Delbrück, *Per.*, p. 112.

were deported (Thuc. 2. 27), and was further intensified when in 424 B.C. the exiles were massacred at Thyrea (Thuc. 4. 57).

9. 80. *Questionable means by which the Aeginetans become rich.*

Cf. above, 9. 78-79.

9. 85. *Empty tombs of many states on the battlefield, especially of the Aeginetans.*

Cf. above, 9. 78-79.

9. 87. *Speech of Timagenides the Theban.*

Cf. above, 9. 1-3.

2. Pre-Periclean¹ Elements

Beyond the division of the account of Herodotus into its Periclean and pre-Periclean elements, except where the influence of monuments and relics is plainly apparent,² it does not seem profitable to go. The evidence is not at hand to say whether the pre-Periclean tradition of Herodotus was derived mainly from oral or written testimony. References to sources³ in the narrative are always and prob-

¹ Using pre-Periclean to mean all that cannot be shown to be Periclean.

² Cf. 8. 82; 9. 70, 81, 83, 85.

³ The direct source references in Herodotus' account of Plataea are as follows—those in brackets occur in Periclean material:

8. 128 οὐ γὰρ ὦν λέγεται

8. 129 λέγουσι Ποτειδαίηται . . . αἴτιον δὲ τοῦτο λέγοντες εὐ λέγειν ἔμοιγε δοκέουσι

8. 133 οὐκ ἔχω φράσαι· οὐ γὰρ ὦν λέγεται

8. 135 λέγεται ὑπὸ Θηβαίων

[9. 8 οὐδ' ἔχω εἰπεῖν τὸ αἴτιον]

[9. 16 τὰ ἐπίλοιπα ἤκουον Θερσάνδρου ἀνδρὸς μὲν Ὀρχομενίου . . . ἔφη δὲ ὁ Θέρσανδρος . . . ταῦτα μὲν τοῦ Ὀρχομενίου Θερσάνδρου ἤκουον, καὶ τὰδε πρὸς τοῦτοισι ὡς αὐτὸς αὐτίκα λέγοι ταῦτα πρὸς ἀνθρώπους πρότερον ἢ γενέσθαι ἐν Πλαταιῇσι τὴν μάχην]

[9. 18 οὐκ ἔχω δ' ἀτρεκέως εἰπεῖν]

ably purposely ambiguous, for there is throughout an evident striving to give the atmosphere of oral tradition which Macan has shown may often conceal a literary source.¹ It is very apparent that in the ninth book as in the fourth (4. 13, 16) Herodotus frequently employs devices to this end.

It is probable that the numbers and annalistic details, and the references to the legendary past are in the main from the logographers.² The indefiniteness of the numbers of the Persian army (Hdt. 9. 32) when contrasted with the minute details regarding the Greeks (9. 28) shows that Herodotus had access to no official Persian records. Indeed, Meyer asserts that he did not know a word of the Persian language.³ No one denies the influence of tombs and monuments.⁴ The oracle sanctuaries, especially that at Delphi, seem to have preserved in their records many

9. 20 Ἕλληνες . . . καλέουσι
 9. 32 οἷδε μὲν οὐδείς ἀριθμὸν· οὐ γάρ ὦν ἡριθμήθησαν· ὥς δὲ ἐπεικασαί
 9. 43 τοῦτον δ' ἔγωγε τὸν χρησμὸν . . . οἶδα πεποιημένον
 9. 65 δοκέω δέ, εἴ τι περὶ τῶν θείων πρηγμάτων δοκέειν δεῖ
 9. 68 δηλοῖ τέ μοι
 9. 71 ἀλλ' ὧ μὲν οὐδενὶ ἔχω ἀποσημήνασθαι . . . κατὰ γνώμας τὰς ἡμετέρας
 [9. 74 οὗτος μὲν οὕτω λέγεται, ὁ δ' ἕτερος τῶν λόγων τῷ πρότερον λεχθέντι
 ἀμφισβητέων λέγεται]

It is noteworthy that 9. 76, [9. 78], [9. 85], 9. 86 all have the unnecessary defining phrase ἐν Πλαταιῇσι in the opening sentence. This would seem to betray the presence of anecdotes from different literary sources.

9. 81 οὐ λέγεται πρὸς οὐδαμῶν, δοκέω δ' ἔγωγε
 9. 82 λέγεται δὲ καὶ τάδε γενέσθαι
 9. 84 ὑπὸ θεν . . . οὐκ ἔχω εἰπεῖν, πολλοὺς . . . ἤκουσα θάψαι . . . οὐ
 δύναμαι ἀτρεκέως πυνθέσθαι, ἔχει δέ τινα φάτιν καὶ Διονυσιοφάνης
 [9. 85 ὥς ἐγὼ πυνθάνομαι . . . τὸν ἐγὼ ἀκούω]

¹ Macan, *Herodotus Bks. IV-VI*, Vol. I, pp. lxxv ff.

² H. Panofsky, *Quaestionum de Historiae Herodoteae Fontibus Pars Prima*, suggests the following possibilities: Acusilaus, *Frag.* 19 = Hdt. 9. 34; Hecataeus, *Frag.* 353 = Hdt. 9. 27; Pherecydes, *Frag.* 24 = Hdt. 9. 34, *Frag.* 29 = Hdt. 9. 27; Hellanicus, *Frag.* 74 = Hdt. 9. 73, *Frag.* 84 = Hdt. 9. 27.

³ Forsch. I. 194.

⁴ Hdt. 8. 82, 121; 9. 70, 81, 85.

supernatural and portentous anecdotes which the Father of History, with his predilection for moralizing, noted down with reverent care.¹

There are some traces in the narrative of careful transcription of Spartan and Macedonian genealogies.² But to separate these elements—to say how much should be assigned to one and how much to another, how much is oral and how much is written source—is in general profitless, indeed impossible. Herodotus' account of Plataea, shorn of its evident ornamental digressions, its Periclean and possibly also Delphic elements, must represent fairly accurately the *vulgate tradition* of the battle as generally accepted by Greece in the age of Cimon.³

This term (vulgate) was suggested by Meyer's investigations in the sources of Plutarch's *Cimon*⁴ and was there applied by him exclusively to late literary biographical tradition. It is here expanded to include also oral, as well as literary sources in early tradition. By vulgate tradition I mean those general skeleton outlines of the battle, from which all eye-witnesses in the telling, though they might have been legion in number, and every scribe in the writing, would have been compelled, by the fact that a number of men survived who had taken part in the battle, to start in any discussion of Plataea, no matter how much they might have desired to warp the motives of the commanders or misinterpret their manœuvres. That this vulgate tradition was correct in the main as regards the facts of the manœuvres, the routes over which the troops marched, the list of states engaged, the names of the commanders, the number of days of the campaign—in short, the general out-

¹ Hdt. 8. 114, 129, 133-135, 141; 9. 33, 42-43, 64, 65, 81.

² Hdt. 8. 131 (Leotychides), Hdt. 8. 137 (Alexander), 9. 10 (Pausanias), 9. 33-35 (Tisamenus).

³ Cf. Holm, p. 59 n. 'I have followed Herodotus in many passages which are unauthenticated, and probably even untrue, because they reproduce the popular tradition of the Greeks.'

⁴ *Forsch.*, Vol. 2 (first essay).

lines of the battle—cannot be gainsaid.¹ There are certain factors of any battle in regard to which the vulgate tradition cannot be far wrong, and this is doubly true if it is crystalized within a generation. The controversies of the Civil War in the United States have arisen in the main, not over the facts of any given battle, but over the interpretation of these facts. As Meyer² implies, even the most devoted Spartan private at Plataea may have implicitly believed that the sacrifices were not favorable for fighting when the Persian attack began, and this view probably controlled Spartan as well as Athenian tradition. In short, it was the vulgate. The true reason for delay, known to Pausanias alone, was however undoubtedly tactical—a desire to draw in the Persians to a spot where they would fight under great disadvantage. The vulgate erred, it is true, but not in regard to the *fact* of the sacrifice—simply in regard to the interpretation of the fact. The question of the underlying historical residuum in each phase of the vulgate, and the correctness of the interpretation of the facts advanced in this vulgate, is reserved for the critical study of the tradition which is taken up in succeeding chapters, where considerations of general probability and comparative methods will play an important part. For present purposes it is sufficient to say with some confidence that the account of Herodotus, shorn of its Periclean elements, preserves in the main the details of the tradition of Plataea in the age of Cimon—the age of Aeschylus, of Pindar, of Timocreon and of Simonides.

(B) Pausanias and the Late Literary Allusions to Early Monuments

Pausanias describes some fifteen or twenty bits of monumental evidence relating to Plataea which, if really pre-

¹ No one expects the vulgate to be correct in regard to the numbers engaged. Two men estimating the numbers in a crowd of 5,000 to-day will often differ by as much as 2,000. To a Greek accustomed to a small army a body of 50,000 troops would seem many times larger than it actually was.

² *Forsch.* 2. 209-10.

Periclean, as it must be admitted he honestly believes them to be, are of value in determining the status of the tradition before it fell into the transforming hands of the Father of History. But the question may fairly be raised how far Pausanias has unconsciously read Herodotus into monuments existing in his day. A glance at the evidence chart in the appendix shows at once that the majority of Pausanias' literary allusions to Plataea are either direct reproductions of, or natural inferences from, the Herodotean version.

In this connection, however, Frazer's contention should not be overlooked.¹ He insists upon a distinction between the method employed in the historical, and that employed in the descriptive part of Pausanias' work. Granted that Pausanias employed Herodotus in part for his literary allusions—and the phrase 'in part' is used deliberately—he refers by name to other historians in the course of his history, notably Charon of Lampsacus, Hellanicus, Thucydides, Xenophon, Theopompus, Ctesias, and the Atthides²—there is no reason for believing that any one tradition completely controlled his descriptions. It must not be forgotten that he had inscriptions to aid him in his identifications—evidence which few investigators would reject if brought to light by excavations today. That he was critical in his examination of these inscriptions seems well established,³ and also that in so far as he was a specialist in any branch of archaeology it was in the monuments of the fifth century.⁴ My personal inclination is to accept the greater part of the monuments described by Pausanias which bear upon Plataea as correct descriptions of genuine pre-Periclean documents, and therefore to regard their testimony as pre-Periclean. Specific reasons for so doing are given under each in turn.

¹ Frazer, *Pausanias's Description of Greece*, Vol. I, p. lxxi.

² *Ibid.*, p. lxxiii.

³ *Ibid.*, p. lxxv.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. xxxiii.

Paus. I. I. 5. *Temple of Hera on the road from Phalerum to Athens burned by Mardonius.*

Herodotus (6. 96, 101; 8. 33; 9. 65) and Plutarch (*Pericles* 17) tell us that the Persians destroyed many Greek temples. The last clause of the oath which Diodorus (II. 29. 2f.) ascribes to the Greeks before Plataea, concerned the ruins of overthrown Greek temples which were to be left intact as memorials of the impiety of the barbarian. If this oath was a forgery (Theopompus, *Frag.* 167, Müller), it is reasonable to suppose that just such a ruin as the one under consideration was the genesis of the late story.

The temple is therefore accepted as *pre-Periclean*.

I. 27. I. *Corselet of Masistius. So-called sword of Mardonius.*

There is no doubt that spoils from the Persian War were preserved at Athens (Thuc. 2. 13. 4; Diod. 12. 40. 2).

It would be natural for the Athenians to secure the armor of Masistius whom they overthrew (Hdt. 9. 22). Pausanias' own criticism of the genuineness of the so-called sword of Mardonius is well founded (I. 27. I.). I therefore accept the corselet of Masistius as genuine and *pre-Periclean*, but regard the sword of Mardonius as a counterfeit set up in the Periclean age or later (Dem. 24. 129) to magnify the part which Athens played in the battle.

I. 40. 2-3. *Image of Artemis the Saviour at Megara.*

I. 44. 4. *Rock near Megara with which was associated the advance of the Persians. Replica at Pagae of the statue of Artemis at Megara.*

Theognis (775 ff.) and Herodotus (9. 14) attest the antiquity of a tradition regarding a Persian invasion of Megara. The image of the goddess in the temple, of which a replica existed at Pagae, was by Strongylion, who flourished in the last half of the fifth century.¹ On the whole it seems probable that all of these monuments were *pre-Periclean*.

¹ Frazer, *Pausanias's Description of Greece*, Vol. 2, pp. 523-4.

1. 43. 3. *Tombs of the Megarians who fell in the Persian Wars.*

The epitaph of Simonides (C.I.G. Vol. 1, No. 1051), the first part of which is undoubtedly genuine, establishes the fact that these monuments were *pre-Periclean*.

3. 11. 3. *Persian colonnade at Sparta with figure of Mardonius.*
 3. 14. 1. *Tomb of Pausanias at Sparta.*
 3. 17. 7. *Orations and games at the tomb. Two statues of Pausanias at Sparta.*

Pausanias (3. 11. 3) states that the original colonnade was built from the spoils of the Persian War, but that additions were made to it through a long period of time. The tomb of Pausanias and the commemorative rites at his tomb may not have been inaugurated until late (cf. Thuc. 1. 134. 4 f. *ῥοτερον*). It is possible that it was not until after the demands of the Athenians (Thuc. 1. 128) that the disgraced hero was restored to honor in his own country. On the other hand, the tribute of Herodotus to Pausanias (9. 64) which occurs in pre-Periclean material of the history, would seem to show that the Spartans made this restoration early.

I am inclined to accept all of these monuments and rites as *pre-Periclean*.

5. 23. 1-3. *Statue of Zeus at Olympia.*

Hdt. 9. 81 establishes this as *pre-Periclean*. Pausanias implies that he saw the artist's signature—Anaxagoras of Aegina.

9. 2. 2. *So-called tomb of Mardonius.*

Pausanias is doubtful regarding this monument. It is very probable that later ages assigned this name to some unknown tomb. It certainly did not exist before the Periclean revision of Herodotus (Hdt. 9. 84), for the latter is in doubt regarding the burial.

This monument is certainly not *pre-Periclean*.

9. 2. 5-6. *Tombs of the dead at Plataea, those of the Athenians and Lacedaemonians inscribed with elegies of Simonides.*

Thucydides (3. 58. 5) establishes beyond question that these tombs were erected before Herodotus wrote his history. (Cf. Hdt. 9. 85.) We probably have the elegy of Simonides which was on the Athenian tomb.¹ There is no doubt that the majority of the tombs, which cannot to-day be located, were *pre-Periclean*.

9. 2. 5. *Altar of Zeus the Deliverer at Plataea.*

We can safely infer that this altar was erected soon after the battle (Thuc. 3. 58). The Plataeans dated their public documents from its establishment (C.I.G.G.S., Vol. 1, No. 1667).

9. 2. 6. *Eleutherian games.*

Frazer² points out that the fact that the Thebans built the large inn at Plataea in 427 B.C. (Thuc. 3. 68. 3) proves indirectly that large crowds of visitors came to these games at that time. We have inscriptional evidence of the existence of the games in later years (C.I.G.G.S., Vol. 1, Nos. 49, 1856). There is little reason to doubt that these games were *pre-Periclean*.

9. 2. 6. *Trophy on the battlefield.*

This is referred to also in Plato (*Menex.* 245 A). On grounds of general probability we accept this as *pre-Periclean*.

9. 4. 2. *Statue of Arimnestus in the temple of Athena at Plataea.*

If the statue of the goddess in the temple was by Phidias, this would point toward *Periclean influence* in the erection of the statue of Arimnestus.

¹ Bergk, *P.L.G.*, Vol. 3 (third edition), p. 1151 (No. 100).

² *Pausanias's Description of Greece*, Vol. 5, p. 17.

10. 13. 9. *The Serpent-Column at Delphi. Inscription by Simonides (3. 8. 2).*

Both of these are preserved. (For inscription see Thuc. I. 132. 2).

10. 15. 1. *The Plataean Ox at Delphi.*

In the identification of this, Pausanias was undoubtedly aided by an inscription which established the date of the dedication. This he asserts to be *pre-Periclean*.

10. 19. 4. *Gold shields in the temple of Apollo at Delphi.*

(Cf. Aeschines, 3. 116.) I regard these as monumental frauds by the Athenians dating from the time of Pericles or later.

We are now in a position to reconstruct with some degree of confidence from the extant evidence,¹ from our general knowledge of the lost documents,² and from the results of the study of the sources of Herodotus and Pausanias, the successive stages in the course through which the tradition of the Plataea Campaign passed from 479 B.C. to the beginnings of the middle ages. It is true, as Grote (Preface, p. v) has said, that we possess to-day of Greek literature 'only what has drifted ashore from the wreck of a stranded vessel.' Nevertheless it is extremely improbable that any lost work not known by fragments or by name, exerted marked influence on the tradition. In the following reconstruction, where a number of writers or monuments which are practically contemporary confirm one another, they have been grouped together and the whole characterized by some appropriate designation. Where we have reasons to believe that marked variations in the tradition are due to the bias or tendencies of some particular writer, that writer has been isolated and given a distinct place in the steps of the development of the tradition. Writers not extant are in parentheses. From 479 B.C. to the tenth century A.D. the tradition of Plataea would seem to have passed through the following successive stages:

¹ See Appendix A.

² See p. 18 n. 2.

(I) THE PRE-PERICLEAN VULGATE (circa 479-449 B.C.).
with the following elements:

A. ORAL.—The testimony of eye-witnesses and contemporaries. See pp. 20-21.

B. LITERARY.

Official Records (Plut., *Arist.* 1. 5).

Simonides (p. 20).

(Charon of Lamprus.)

(Phrynicus.)

Aeschylus.

Pindar.

Timocreon of Rhodes (Plut., *Them.* 21. 2).

The pre-Periclean elements of Herodotus (pp. 27-30).

C. MONUMENTAL.

At Plataea—Tombs of the fallen Greeks (p. 34). Annual sacrifices (Thuc. 3. 58, Plut., *Arist.* 21. 2 ff.). Altar of Zeus the Deliverer (p. 34). Trophy on the battlefield (p. 34). Inscription for Eucidas in the sanctuary of Artemis Eucleia (Plut., *Arist.* 20. 5). Temple of Athena (Plut., *Arist.* 20. 3).

At Athens—Persian booty; arrows in the temple of Athena (*Anth. Pal.* 6. 3); corselet of Masistius in the Erechtheum (p. 32). Remains of ancient temples burnt by the Persians (p. 32).

At Delphi—The serpent-column (extant). Statue of Alexander (Hdt. 8. 121). Ox of the Plataeans (p. 35).

At Olympia—Dedicatory statue to Zeus (p. 33).

At Corinth—Dedicatory statue to Poseidon (Hdt. 9. 81).

At Megara—Tombs of Megarians who fell in battle (p. 33).

Image of Artemis the Saviour (p. 32). The arrow-pierced rock (p. 32). Replica of Artemis statue at Pagae (p. 32).

At Sparta—Persian colonnade (p. 33). Tomb of Pausanias (p. 33). Statues for Pausanias (p. 33).

At Tegea—Manger of Mardonius in the temple of Warlike Athena (Hdt. 9. 70).

At Potidaea—Temple and image of Poseidon desecrated by the Persians (Hdt. 8. 129).

D. RITUAL.

Sacrifice of a bull at Megara (*C.I.G.*, Vol. 1, No. 1051). Orations and games at the tomb of Pausanias at Sparta (p. 33). Eleutherian games at Plataea (p. 34). Rites at Athens for those who fell in the Persian Wars (Diod. 11. 33. 3).

(II) THE PERICLEAN REDACTION (circa 449-420 B.C.).

A. LITERARY.

(Stesimbrotus of Thasos.)

The Periclean elements of Herodotus (pp. 23-27).

(Hellanicus.)

(Choerilus of Samos.)

(Old Athenian comedy.)

(Ion of Chios.)

B. MONUMENTAL.

At Athens—Sculptures on the temple of Athena Nike (extant).

So-called sword of Mardonius (p. 32).

At Plataea—Athenian trophy (Plut., *Arist.* 20. 3). So-called tomb of Mardonius (p. 33). Statue of Arimnestus (p. 34).

(III) THUCYDIDES AND CTESIAS (circa 400 B.C.).

(IV) THE RENAISSANCE OF THE PRE-PERICLEAN VULGATE IN THE FOURTH CENTURY.

1. Plato.

2. The divergent Periclean tradition of the Orators (with monumental frauds, Aeschines 3. 116; Paus. 10. 19. 4).

3. Ephorus and the fourth century historians.

4. Clidemus and the *Atthis*-writers.

(V) THE PERIOD OF INDIVIDUALIZATION: DEMETRIUS; IDOMENEUS.

(VI) CORNELIUS NEPOS AND POMPEIUS TROGUS.

(VII) PLUTARCH, BIOGRAPHER OF ARISTIDES.

(VIII) THE FINAL PERIOD OF BELATED LITERARY ACCRETIONS.

In the discussion which follows, each of the above eight stages of the tradition is treated in a separate chapter and in each chapter I have aimed to give (1) a characterization in broad outlines of the main historical features of the period under review and of the tendencies of the writer or writers who handled the tradition in the period; (2) the details of the story of Plataea peculiar to that period; (3) a critical study of these details with an attempt in each case to establish the historical residuum.

CHAPTER II

(I) *The Pre-Periclean Vulgate*

(A) Historical Features of the Period

The Campaign of Plataea took place during the archonship at Athens of Xanthippus, which began on the 19th of July, 479 B.C. The traditional date of the decisive engagement is the 19th of September of the same year; but this, though probable, is not established. No new evidence is at hand beyond that given in Busolt's elaborate chronological note (p. 725 n. 4).

The thirty years which followed the expulsion of the Persians from Greece is known as the age of Cimon. Shortly before the Campaign of Plataea, Cimon, the son of Miltiades, had been sent from Athens to Sparta at the head of an embassy to effect active co-operation between the two leading states of Greece in the war against Persia. His success on this occasion seems to have influenced his future measures as a statesman, for during the years following the battle, when he was the leading spirit at Athens, the policy of the state was a definite one—alliance with Sparta and offensive warfare against Persia. The age of Cimon was one of harmony between states in Greece. It was not until nearly twenty years after Plataea that Sparta had her first open quarrel with Athens.¹ The friendly relations between the two states were then ruptured for a short time, but after the battle of Tanagra, in which the Athenians were defeated by the Lacedaemonians, Cimon's policy of a united front against the common enemy of Greece again prevailed. His death in 449 B.C., however, marked the ascendancy of views diametrically opposed to those which he had championed.

The writers who preserved the records of Plataea during the age of Cimon were men thoroughly imbued with the

¹ Thuc. i. 102. 3.

broad pan-Hellenic policy. Simonides executed commissions for states as hostile to one another afterwards as Athens, Corinth, and Sparta. Pindar has been well characterized as the most Hellenic of Hellenic poets.¹ And it was impossible that the nobility and moral greatness of Aeschylus should be blind to all but Athens. The very apparent effort of Herodotus in his history, when viewed as a whole, to be fair to all, side by side with his bitterly hostile characterizations, can be explained in no more satisfactory way than on the hypothesis that the pre-Periclean elements in his history are part and parcel of the same earlier pan-Hellenic tradition which characterized the three poets mentioned above.

The same may be said in general of the monuments and rituals of the period. After Plataea some states erected local memorials of their prowess; but by far the grandest were the common offerings at Delphi, Olympia, Corinth and Plataea. At Plataea, Sparta, Athens and Megara, local memorial days were probably observed. It is true that the evidence for a common meeting at Plataea of deputies from all Greece is not as good as one might wish.² That the different states magnified both in word and on stone the importance of their own services to the common cause is probable. But the belittling by one state of the parts played by the other states during these years is not attested by facts, and is wholly foreign to an age in which Athenian statesmen could send aid to Sparta in distress, on the plea that the Athenians 'ought not to suffer Greece to be lamed, nor their own city to be deprived of her yoke-fellow.'³

(B) Main Features of the Story in the Period

The following is a detailed analysis of the tradition of Plataea as current in Greece during the age of Cimon. The sources from which it is drawn are monuments and rituals

¹ Macan, *Herodotus Bks. IV-VI*, Vol. 2, p. 175.

² Holm, p. 76 n. 10.

³ Ion of Chios (Plut., *Cim.* 16).

accepted as pre-Periclean, official records accepted as genuine, Simonides, Aeschylus, Pindar, Timocreon and whatever of Herodotus does not reflect the Periclean age. In case of insufficient evidence, facts confirmed by Thucydides are accepted as pre-Periclean.

1. Council between Mardonius, Artemisia, and Xerxes after Salamis.
2. Orders to Mardonius. Disembarkment of marines at Phalerum. Retreat to Thessaly. Selection of troops.
3. The Spartans under Cleombrotus are unable to hinder the retreat.
4. Omen portending death to the Persians.
5. Winter campaign of Artabazus in Thrace.
6. Movements of the Greek and Persian fleets.
7. Visit of Mys to the oracles.
8. Embassy to Sparta to secure aid.
9. March of Mardonius on Athens. Retreat of Athenians to Salamis.
10. Destruction of Athens by Mardonius. 1,000 Lacedaemonians reach Megara. Advance of Mardonius to Megara. Retreat to Thebes. Encampment on the Asopus River.
11. Union of the Greek forces at Eleusis and march to Erythrae.
12. Cavalry charge and death of Masistius.
13. First shift of position by the Greeks.
14. Battle-order of the Greeks and Persians.
15. Instructions of the soothsayers to the two armies.
16. Ten days *in loco*. Seizure of the Dryoscephalae Pass by Mardonius.
17. Council of Mardonius and decision to fight.
18. Destruction of the spring Gargaphia by the Persian cavalry. A day's delay.
19. Decision of the Greeks to retire to the 'Island' and to relieve Cithaeron.
20. Charge of Mardonius during the movement.
21. Delay of Pausanias for favorable omens.
22. Details of the battle. The Spartans and Tegeans face the Persians. Overthrow of the shields. Fight near the temple of Demeter. Death of Mardonius at the hand of Acimnestus. Rout of the Persians.
23. Flight of Artabazus.
24. Contest on the left between the Athenians and medizing Greeks. Efficient service of the Persian cavalry.
25. Storming of the Persian camp.
26. Death-losses.
27. Roll of honor.

28. Episode of the Persian concubine.
29. The Mantinean and Elean contingents arrive too late.
30. Dedications from the spoil and division of the residue.
31. Episode of two meals in the tent of Mardonius.
32. Subsequent finds on the battlefield.
33. Disposal of the corpse of Mardonius.
34. Burial of the Greek dead.
35. Siege of Thebes.
36. Retreat of Artabazus to Asia.

(C) The Historical Residuum

1. *Council between Mardonius, Artemisia, and Xerxes after Salamis.*

The traditions of the effect of Salamis (Aesch., *Pers.* 728), of the dejection of Xerxes after the battle (*ibid.*, 913 ff.), and of the bitter feeling in Persia toward Mardonius (*ibid.*, 753) are as old as 472 B.C., but all are from the Greek standpoint. A formal council between Mardonius, Artemisia, and Xerxes, as related by Herodotus (8. 100-103), is improbable. The speeches at best can give only the Herodotean philosophy of the reasons which led Xerxes to retreat (Wecklein, p. 9). Since Mardonius was chosen to remain in Greece, later tradition may well have made him the originator of the plan (Busolt, p. 712 n. 1). Mitford (pp. 530 f.) regards the speeches as fictitious but thinks they may give in general the substance of what was felt, and suggests as the source the eunuch who attended the expedition, Hermotimus,¹ whose home was near Halicarnassus, the birth-place of Herodotus. Duncker (p. 294 n. 2) thinks that Artemisia herself in later years told of being trusted by Xerxes, and that the tradition is true. It is much more probable that the tradition regarding Artemisia grew up after the battle at Halicarnassus. Neither Ephorus nor Plutarch gives the story of the council, and Plutarch has much fun at Artemisia's expense.² Historians generally discredit a formal debate.

¹ Hdt. 8. 104.

² Plut., *Mor.* 870 A.

Several historians accept the explanation of Herodotus that the reason for Xerxes' return to Asia was cowardice in the face of his own personal danger, and his distrust of his forces (Thirlwall, pp. 311-12; Grote, p. 137; Curtius, pp. 327-8; Grundy, p. 408). These same critics also assume that Mardonius did not dare return to Persia in the face of defeat. Another writer suggests that Mardonius was desirous of obtaining a European satrapy and was prompted to assume responsibility through ambition rather than fear (Curtius, p. 328).

On the other side it is argued that, since Xerxes still had the greater part of his fleet after Salamis, a battle which was by no means decisive, he probably did not intend to retire at first, and did not actually do so until he became convinced that it was necessary to withdraw his fleet to protect the Hellespont (Duncker, pp. 291 ff.; Busolt, p. 708 n. 2; Meyer, p. 394). Delbrück (*Per.* p. 102), following Duncker (p. 298), holds that the real reason for the king's return was the desire to have an army in Ionia in case of threatened revolt. Xerxes' departure removed the temptation to hurry the campaign for spectacular results (Busolt, p. 713. n. 1). Grundy (p. 411) suggests that the king did not desire to take his whole force back to Asia lest the people should see the magnitude of his defeat.

The cowardice of Xerxes would seem to be a Greek exaggeration. That Mardonius was afraid to return to Asia is not as probable as that he remained in Greece under orders of Xerxes. It is reasonable to suppose that the presence of Xerxes was more needed in Asia than in Greece, and that political necessity rather than cowardice prompted his return.¹

¹ The words put into the mouth of the Athenian envoy in Thuc. I. 73. 5 are intended to reproduce what that envoy would feel about the retreat from an Athenian standpoint in 432 B.C. and not to give the historical residuum. Cf. Thuc. I. 22. 1.

2. *Orders to Mardonius. Disembarkment of marines at Phalerum. Retreat to Thessaly. Selection of troops.*

The disembarkment of the marines is mentioned incidentally in Hdt. 9. 32 as having already occurred. The earliest evidence (472 B.C.) makes no mention of the retreat to Thessaly as headquarters (Aesch., *Pers.* 796-807), although it suggests the motive that may have prompted it (*ibid.*, 792-4). The poet, however, does not pretend to narrate with exactness. The winter campaign of Artabazus in Thrace seems to be established by temple records at Potidaea (Hdt. 8. 129) which also certify to Persian occupation of northern Greece. On the whole there is no reason for doubting the Herodotean narrative (8. 107, 113), except in two points: (a) The reasons for the retirement of the land forces; (b) The number of troops taken by Xerxes to Asia.

- (a) The reasons for the retirement of the land forces.

Herodotus suggests three. First: 'Escort duty for the king.' This is superficial. The entire army was not needed for such a purpose; a small detachment like the troops under Artabazus would have been amply sufficient. Second: 'The season for active campaigning was at an end.' Duncker (p. 293), followed by Delbrück (p. 93), has shown that there was still time for an active campaign on land if it had been deemed advisable. Third: 'Thessaly offered better facilities for winter quarters.' This is tenable, but needs explanation.

Duncker (p. 301) suggests that further campaigning at the Isthmus would have been discourteous to the king immediately after his departure, discrediting him if Mardonius won, and compelling him to halt and come back for support if Mardonius lost. Delbrück (*Per.* p. 94) holds that the various detachments of the army, if in Attica, would constantly have become isolated. Abbott (p. 206) dwells on the fact that Thessaly was the home of the Aleuadae.

Busolt (p. 711) and Beloch (p. 376) have shown that a successful attack on the Isthmus was impossible without the co-operation of the fleet because of the natural advantages that would aid the defenders. Furthermore, Attica was not sufficient to support the army. Grundy (p. 417) demonstrates convincingly that Thessaly was not so decidedly superior in itself for winter quarters, but that, without a fleet, Mardonius needed a shorter line of communication with Asia, especially for commissary purposes.

(b) The number of troops taken by Xerxes to Asia.

The number of troops left with Mardonius is discussed in detail on page 58. The exaggeration of the size of the king's portion of the divided army (Hdt. 8. 100 end) is natural and apparent. Aesch., *Persians* 803 (which should be read in connection with vv. 798-799) may perhaps indicate that the number of troops which remained with Mardonius was of appreciable size, but Thuc. 1. 73. 5 cannot be accepted as proving that the king took most of his troops with him. If he did, the question at once arises why it was necessary for his safety to have an army of 60,000 men escort him (Hdt. 8. 126; Delbrück, *Per.* p. 139; Busolt, pp. 671 n. 1, 712 n. 4). Furthermore, when he reached the crossing, he had very few men with him (Hdt. 8. 115), and the fact that Artabazus brought back two-thirds of the army of escort safely to Mardonius, losing nearly all of the rest at Potidaea, would seem to indicate the mythical nature of the stories of the sufferings on the retreat.¹

Wecklein (pp. 43-45), following Niebuhr (p. 394), is disposed to regard the troops that were left with Mardonius as practically the whole Persian land force and to assume that the king had few men with him. This is the most reasonable solution, and is quite generally accepted. Hauvette's objection (pp. 436 f.), an appeal to Thuc. 1. 73. 5, is

¹ Cf. Welzhofer, 'Der Rückmarsch des Xerxes,' *Jahrbücher für Class. Phil.* 153. 678-9; Vogel, 'Zum Rückmarsch des Xerxes,' *ibid.*, 155. 118.

based on a failure to appreciate the worthlessness of this particular passage as historical testimony, which Thucydides himself would admit (Thuc. I. 22). Hauvette attempts to meet the objection noted above of the necessity of an army of escort, by arguing that the great mass, which as he assumes went back with the king, were inferior fighters. The argument is not convincing.

3. *The Spartans under Cleombrotus are unable to hinder the retreat.*

The fact is mentioned incidentally by Herodotus (9. 10), who is wholly indifferent to the time of the occurrence (Delbrück, *Per.* p. 94). The fact of the eclipse, which caused the suspension of operations, is established (Busolt, p. 715 n. 1). It took place on October 2, 480 B.C. Stein (p. 129) suggests that the sacrifice implies that Cleombrotus had planned offensive operations against the retreating Persians.

Herodotus claims that the army had been sent north to complete the walling of the Isthmus. It is uncertain, however, whether he means to assert that the walling was completed at this time or not. (Cf. 9. 8.) The failure of Cleombrotus to follow up the forces of the retreating king may have been due to the eclipse, but this was probably the excuse rather than the underlying reason. Duncker (pp. 304 f.) intimates that the Spartans were afraid and unwilling to advance. Delbrück (*Per.* pp. 94 f.) implies that the hesitation of Cleombrotus was a part of the Spartan military policy to insist on a naval engagement before the land-forces met. Meyer (p. 394) regards the delay as justified by the fact that an engagement at that time would have been premature, and that defeat of the Greek forces would have been irretrievable.

It seems probable that the eclipse exerted some influence on Cleombrotus (cf. Thuc. 7. 50. 4, Nicias at Syracuse), and that it confirmed him in his military instinct not to leave the Isthmus.

4. *Omen portending death to the Persians.*

The source from which this part of the tradition emanated is evidently the oracle at Delphi (Hdt. 8. 114 ἐκ Δελφῶν).¹ Wecklein (pp. 23-24) assumes rightly that it had its origin in the death of Mardonius at Plataea, so that it is therefore a *vaticinium post eventum* of no historical value.

5. *Winter campaign of Artabazus in Thrace.*

Herodotus indicates as his source for the story a local tradition in the temple records at Potidaea (Hdt. 8. 129; Wecklein, p. 9). The story of the attempted betrayal of the city by communication through messages attached to arrows may well have been a romantic commonplace in descriptions of ancient sieges, and probably has no historical foundation in the case of this one (Hauvette, p. 437). Busolt (p. 712 n. 4; p. 713 n. 1) and Stein (p. 99) think that Herodotus is indebted for all his facts regarding Artabazus to the latter's family records, since Artabazus afterwards held the satrapy at Dacylium, which Herodotus visited.² They therefore accept all the facts in Hdt. 8. 126-129 as historical, including the numbers of troops.

If the numbers of troops left with Mardonius are exaggerated,³ those of the force with Artabazus probably are also. It would be illogical to accept a reduction in the numbers for Mardonius, and to retain the numbers for Artabazus, on the ground that information was obtained from the latter. The second officer in command would know as much about the numbers of the other divisions of the army as about his own.

Modern historians in general accept the reason given by Herodotus for the march of Artabazus to the Hellespont—to escort the king safely to Asia. Rawlinson (p. 383 n. 1)

¹ A. W. Verrall, *Classical Review*, 17. 101-102, notes that the demands of the herald can be readily put into hexameters. He conjectures that verses which he reconstructs from Herodotus were an explanatory appendage to a work of art illustrating this scene.

² Cf. also E. Meyer, *Forsch.* 2. 231.

³ See p. 10.

thinks that Artabazus was permitted to winter near Potidaea and Olynthus for the purpose of foraging. Grundy (p. 429) discredits escort duty as the underlying motive, and urges that 'the main motive lay in the organization of the new main line of communications along the North Aegean, with reference especially to commissariat;' but this seems open to question, since Artabazus abandoned Potidaea, the one place where there was serious revolt, without having mastered it, and Mardonius manifested no uneasiness because of this abandonment.

6. *Movements of the Greek and Persian fleets.*

Herodotus again (8. 130-132) is the sole authority for these movements. The detailed genealogy of Leotychides in his account indicates a Spartan source. The rendezvous of the Persian fleet at Samos is probable, since a more offensive position was impossible for the Persians because of their losses at Salamis (Meyer, p. 401), and the station they took controlled both Ionia (Mitford, p. 540) and the waterway through the islands (Grundy, pp. 430-431). This fact renders improbable the statement of Herodotus that a Greek attack by sea was not expected. Herodotus offers no explanation for the sudden disappearance of Themistocles as commander of the fleet, but 8. 108 suggests that his policy of a campaign on sea which was pleasing to Sparta (Delbrück, *Per.* p. 103) had been voted down by the Athenians, and he himself deposed as leader. Hauvette (p. 443) thinks that it was not a change of policy which caused his overthrow, but that it was his overthrow that necessitated a change of policy. Accusations of dishonesty due to jealousy may have contributed to this overthrow (so Diod. 11. 27. 3; Duncker, pp. 315 f.). Grote (p. 147) and Wilamowitz¹ believe that his retirement came as a natural result of the elections. Beloch (p. 459 n. 2) argues that he was the leading man in the civil government of Athens at the time, and that it was impossible for him to conduct a

¹ *Philol. Untersuch.* 1. 58.

campaign in Asia or Thrace while he kept control of matters at home; he was unwilling to play a secondary rôle to Pausanias at Plataea, hence his name does not appear at all in connection with the campaign.

Nitzsch (pp. 258 ff.) first suggested that the Greek fleet acted in conjunction with the army in the Plataea-Mycalae Campaign in keeping the Persian land and sea forces separated. This is now quite universally accepted. The story of the fear of Samos by the Greek sailors is characterized by Rawlinson (p. 370 n. 7) as the grossest instance in Herodotus of rhetorical exaggeration. As Holm (p. 74 n. 3) remarks, the Greeks knew perfectly well that Samos was not far off. It may be regarded as established that the Greek fleet anchored at Delos for tactical, rather than romantic reasons.

7. *Visit of Mys to the oracles.*

The sources are the local oracle records (Hdt. 8. 133 οὐ γὰρ ὧν λέγεται, 135 λέγεται ὑπὸ Θηβαίων). Grote (p. 149) accepts the visit as authentic, and ascribes it to a show of ostentatious respect by Mardonius towards the feelings of the Greek allies who had medized, and on whom he was now dependent. Curtius (p. 332; cf. Mitford, p. 556) sees in it an attempt by Mardonius to secure from the oracle a legitimization of his plans. Munro (p. 145) thinks that Mys was sent to influence Greek public opinion. Recent historians quite generally reject the story, which has every mark of a temple legend.

8. *Embassy to Sparta to secure aid.*

The fact of the Athenian representation on the embassy is established by the ψήφισμα quoted in Plutarch (*Aristides* 10), which is undoubtedly taken from the generally trustworthy collection of Craterus. The names of the envoys were Cimon, Xanthippus and Myronides. Duncker (p. 326 n. 1) thinks that Xanthippus, the admiral, had been recalled with his ships to transport the Athenians to Salamis, and that he is the one referred to. Busolt (p. 721 n. 5) argues

that it was not the admiral but the archon of 479-8 who is mentioned. The fact that Cimon, who was notoriously pro-Spartan, was at the head of the embassy, would seem to prove that the details of distrust, ill feeling, and deception, as given by Herodotus, are entirely Periclean.¹ That the Spartans were dilatory at the opening of Xerxes' campaign is clear from Thuc. I. 69. 4, but this refers rather to the weeks before the arrival of the ambassadors than to the days while the latter were at Sparta.

The reasons for the delay of Sparta in sending troops are given by Herodotus (9. 6b-11) as the celebration of the Hyacinthia² and the desire to complete the walling of the Isthmus (cf. Thuc. I. 90). Nearly all modern historians have regarded them as inadequate. Duncker (p. 316) suggests that the Spartans distrusted the Athenians because of the deposition of Themistocles who was friendly to them, and also that they did not dare leave the Peloponnesus for fear of an attack at home by the Persian fleet. He implies that Sparta desired to have Athens captured in order to secure her own primacy in Greece, and that, when Pausanias finally crossed the Isthmus, it was simply for the purpose of doing just enough to satisfy Athens, and with no intention of fighting (p. 333). Meyer (pp. 404-405) urges that the crops may not have been harvested. Grundy (p. 440) thinks that the Spartans were incapable of forming a conception of a pan-Hellenic policy, and places the responsibility on an inner ring in Sparta, who may have planned to force the Athenians to help defend the Isthmus. Munro (p. 148) argues that Sparta was delayed by hostile neighbors in the Peloponnesus. Nitzsch's main contention (pp. 258 ff.), controverted by Duncker (p. 317 n. 1), but re-established by Delbrück (*Per.* pp. 105-107), that for obvious reasons of self-defense Sparta desired a campaign by sea and Athens, one by land, is accepted to a greater or less degree by most

¹ See pp. 24, 88 f.

² The influence of the Hyacinthia cannot be denied. Xen., *Hellen.* 4. 5. 11, Paus., 4. 19. 4.

recent historians except Munro (pp. 147 f.). Cimon's embassy seems to have effected a compromise on a simultaneous forward movement by both arms of the service (Delbrück, *Per.* p. 104). Meyer (pp. 403, 406) suggests that, when the Spartan troops marched out, the fleet also weighed anchor for Ionia.

9. *March of Mardonius on Athens. Retreat of Athenians to Salamis.*

There is no indication of the sources of Herodotus 9. 1-3 other than the fact that the tradition which makes Mardonius go directly from Thessaly to Athens is undoubtedly Athenian (Busolt, p. 721 n. 3). The truth is that he stopped some time in Boeotia (Hdt. 9. 17). Why he delayed in Thessaly after the opening of spring, is uncertain. Perhaps his provisions were not adequate; perhaps Artabazus had not returned; more probably he hoped to win the Greeks by bribes (Rudolph, pp. 11 f.; Munro, p. 144). Niebuhr (p. 395) doubts the second crossing over of the Athenians from Athens to Salamis, and thinks that they remained at Salamis after the retreat of Xerxes. He is practically alone, however, in this contention, which he has not proved. A return to Athens after Salamis is reasonable, and Herodotus asserts it. Furthermore, it is not at all certain that the Athenians expected Mardonius to come back in 479 B.C. (Thirlwall, p. 321; Grundy, p. 419), and under such circumstances they would have re-occupied Athens at once. It is not necessary to believe that the people rebuilt the city (Munro, p. 146).

The reasons which led Mardonius to occupy Athens are stated by Herodotus to have been presumption and the desire to gratify the king. The real reason is stated incidentally in Hdt. 9. 4 (cf. 9. 2)—to exert pressure on Athens to lead her to espouse the Persian side (Thirlwall, p. 326). Hauvette (pp. 447 ff.) argues that Mardonius could not have been influenced by the prospect of a campaign at the Isthmus or by the expectation of a battle in Athens where his cavalry could not operate. Grundy (p. 440),

after suggesting that Mardonius hoped that the recapture of Athens might induce Xerxes to attempt to regain control of the sea, assumes that he may also have intended an attack on the Isthmus, and occupied Athens in order to protect his left flank. Munro (p. 150) regards the Isthmus as his objective, and thinks that he failed because the Argives could not hold back the Spartans; but an offensive movement is improbable in view of the absence of the fleet, and the evident alacrity with which Mardonius left the country on the news of the advance of the Greeks (Hdt. 9. 15). It seems probable that only a small body of troops advanced with Mardonius to Athens, the main force remaining near Thebes (Delbrück, *Per.* p. 145; Hauvette, p. 455).

10. *Destruction of Athens by Mardonius. 1,000 Lacedaemonians reach Megara. Advance of Mardonius to Megara. Retreat to Thebes. Encampment on the Asopus River.*

There was monumental evidence (Paus. 1. 1. 5), as well as the testimony of Thucydides (1. 89. 3), to the destruction of Athens. The tradition of a Persian advance to Megara is very ancient (Theognis 773-782; Paus. 1. 40. 2; 1. 44. 4). The object as stated by Herodotus (9. 14) was to cut off the 1,000 Lacedaemonians. The Persian headquarters were at Thebes (Thuc. 1. 90. 2). Herodotus is our only witness to the size of the fortification on the Asopus River. He does not make it clear on which side of the river the Persian troops were. Hauvette (p. 456) successfully defends his testimony against the objections of Delbrück (*Per.* pp. 139-142), and shows that the size of the fort cannot be fairly used as evidence of the magnitude of the army.

The motives for the retreat of Mardonius given by Herodotus (9. 13)—better ground for cavalry operations and a secure avenue and base for retreat—are reasonable, especially in the light of Delbrück's suggestion (*Per.* p. 145) that Mardonius had only a part of his army with him. Bury (p. 288) thinks that the destruction of Plataea was

probably one of the objects in returning to Thebes, but that his main purpose was to fight, having Thebes secure behind him. Grundy (pp. 449 ff.) has an ingenious suggestion that Mardonius knew that he could not hope to take the Isthmus since he had not won over the Athenians, and that he aimed at a Persian ethnic-frontier at the Cithaeron-Parnes Range. The objection might be raised to this, however, that he did not occupy the passes at first.

The Megara advance, regarded either as a feint to cover the retreat (Holm, p. 68; Munro, p. 152), or as a cavalry reconnaissance to see what the Greeks were doing (Grundy, pp. 448-9), is reasonable, although it may not have occurred at the exact time Herodotus states.

The detour by Tanagra instead of the employment of the direct passes of Cithaeron, has caused some discussion. Thirlwall (p. 331) suggests that Tanagra offered better quarters for the night's stop. Grote (p. 158) holds that the mountain passes were inconvenient for cavalry. They were, however, suitable for beasts of burden (Hdt. 9. 39). Delbrück (*Per.* p. 144) conjectures that Mardonius employed all the passes, but that Herodotus knew of the march of but one column. Abbott (p. 215) suggests that Mardonius feared that the western passes might be seized. Grundy (pp. 447 ff.) thinks that Mardonius was influenced by the fear of having his retreat cut off. Mitford (p. 550) asserts that he left the Cithaeron passes unoccupied in order to draw the Greeks through them into the open country which he had chosen for a battle-ground, and this on the whole is the most probable. (So Duncker, pp. 301 .n. 1. 331; Meyer, p. 406.)

11. *Union of the Greek forces at Eleusis and march to Erythrae.*

The testimony of Herodotus (9. 19) is without difficulties, and may pass unchallenged. The double sacrifice at the Isthmus and Eleusis is indirect evidence, and therefore the best, that new troops joined at both places (Hau-

vette, p. 458). Munro (p. 157) thinks that Pausanias first attempted to turn the Persian left flank by a march through Panactum and that he later seized the road over Cithaeron.

The selection of the first position of the Greeks at the foot of Mount Cithaeron was an act of great strategical insight, and is the key to the tactics of Pausanias. Delbrück (*Per.* p. 96) regards it as a repetition of the tactics of Marathon. He continues (*Per.* p. 97): 'The decision of Pausanias to fight a defensive battle is so well attested and agrees so well with the circumstances, with the strategical conditions, with the tactics of the Greeks, with the experience of Marathon, that we may regard this point as the best attested in the history of the whole campaign. Every attempt at reconstruction as it goes backward or forward must keep this fact before it as the foundation and corner-stone.' Duncker (p. 336) admits the similarity to the position of Miltiades at Marathon, but will not allow that Pausanias took it for a like purpose of active campaigning. Munro (p. 151), on the contrary, thinks that Pausanias was eager to fight before Artabazus reached Mardonius. Grundy (pp. 441-442) argues that the Greeks were not aware of the effectiveness of Persian cavalry on open ground, and thinks (p. 451) that the fear of the establishment by Mardonius of an ethnic-frontier at Cithaeron led them to take the offensive and seize the range. It is true that the Greek cavalry did not take part at Marathon. But is it not much more probable that at both Marathon and Plataea the Greeks were well aware of the danger of a cavalry attack, and in both instances selected ground where the enemy's cavalry could not operate, thus enforcing its absence from the battle?

12. *Cavalry charge and death of Masistius.*

Monumental and inscriptional evidence at Athens attested this charge, with the death of the Persian leader (Paus. i. 27. 1), as well as the service rendered by Athenian bowmen against Persian cavalry. The inscription on the arrows was probably by Simonides, who also bears witness to the losses

sustained by the Megarians.¹ Both Ephorus (Diod. II. 30. 2-4) and Plutarch (*Arist.* 14) accept the incident with few changes from Herodotus. Historians generally since Busolt (p. 727 n. 2) have believed that Herodotus was indebted for the details of this skirmish to Lampon, founder of Thurii, who may have been the son of the Olympiodorus who led the Athenians to the rescue. Certain dramatic conventionalities may of course be rejected, viz.—the epic taunt of the Persians to the Greeks, many of the details of the armor of Masistius, the numbers in the rescuing party of 300 Athenians, and their heroic offer of service, which are a match for the 300 Spartans at Thermopylae,² the tragic lament of the Persians heard all over Boeotia which bears all the marks of a tragic chorus, and the ἐκκύκλημα episode in the Greek camp, which, if regarded as a real episode, is, as Abbott (p. 218) justly says, childish.³

Aside from these dramatic additions, however, which are exaggerations rather than perversions, the narrative inspires confidence. The praise of the Athenian warriors, although greatly overdone (Wecklein, p. 32 n. 9, p. 33), is not at the expense of Sparta, and hence is not Periclean. Periclean tradition would scarcely have admitted that the whole Greek army finally rescued the Athenians (Hauvette, p. 459).

The object of the charge has been well stated by Grundy (p. 461). It was an attempt to cut the Greek line in two and to seize the pass of Dryoscephalae.

That the Athenians alone responded to an appeal for volunteers by Pausanias is improbable. Even Hauvette doubts whether they were as spontaneously heroic (pp. 458-9). They alone had bowmen who could compete with cavalry (Wecklein, p. 33), and probably obeyed an order from Pausanias to support the Megarians.

¹ Bergk, *P.L.G.*, Vol. 3 (3d edit.), pp. 1154 (No. 107), 1172 (No. 143).

² Yet cf. Thuc. 6. 100. 1 for another Athenian division of 300.

³ Munro (p. 157) accepts the wagon incident because there was a road in front of the Greek position.

Herodotus states that the repulse of the cavalry encouraged the Greeks. Munro (p. 158) thinks that it cleared the Hysiae-gap of cavalry, and opened the way for the next move by the Greeks. To the ordinary soldier it would seem to be a victory. The experienced strategist, however, could not fail to see that the misfortune of the Persian commander rather than superior fighting had decided the day, and that even without a leader the valor of the Persian cavalry had made necessary a general engagement of the Greek forces. It is more probable that Pausanias felt it imperative, after having tested the mettle of the Persians, to secure a better defensive position.

13. *First shift of position by the Greeks.*

Herodotus (9. 25b) is the earliest writer to maintain the facts of this movement. His precise topographical details and their general correspondence with the present condition of the battlefield inspire confidence. Grundy's estimate of his worth (pp. 457-8), based on scientific investigations, is certainly reassuring. Grundy (p. 472) admits that although the facts of the movement are probably given correctly by Herodotus, his interpretation of the reasons which led to the movement is obviously deficient.

The motive given by Herodotus for the shift of position is lack of camp and water facilities at Erythrae, which implies that the second position was better than the first for a protracted campaign. Curtius (p. 338) adds the suggestion that the Greeks desired Plataea as a suitable base of operations. Busolt (p. 728) urges that the new location furnished protection from cavalry attacks. Hauvette (p. 459) regards the move as an advance due to confidence inspired by the repulse of the Persian cavalry. Grundy (pp. 473 f.), Woodhouse (pp. 41, 45 f.), and Bury (pp. 290 f.) explain it as an attempt of the Greeks to turn the right wing of the Persian army by a sudden march to the western Asopus. They think that the Greeks planned to cross and take the offensive by advancing to Thebes and

cutting the Persian line of communication. To do this it is necessary to assume that the Greeks were ignorant of the effectiveness of cavalry on level ground. They conclude that the plan miscarried because either the Athenians were dilatory, or the whole Greek line moved incoherently, or the Persians detected the move and took a new position where they could not be outflanked.

Their hypothesis is ingenious. The three phases of the movement as given by Grundy are reasonable; but, even if we accept them, there is nothing in Herodotus to prove them part of an *offensive* movement, nor is there the slightest suggestion that the Greeks intended to cross the Asopus. It is incredible that Pausanias should have attempted to cross a river and turn the enemy's flank with heavy armed hoplites. To reach Thebes, advance must be made over eight miles of excellent cavalry ground (Awdry, p. 97); Pausanias had no cavalry. The Spartans were not accustomed to siege-warfare even if they should reach Thebes (Awdry, p. 97). If, as Grundy suggests (p. 473), the Greeks were confident of their ability to meet any force that could be opposed to them, why did they desist from their undertaking without an engagement simply because the Persian troops shifted?

Duncker (pp. 340-341) regards the abandonment of the Dryoscephalae Pass as a grave tactical error. If so, why did Mardonius not discover it for eight days? Duncker is certainly wrong in asserting that the communications of Pausanias were cut. By abandoning the pass and taking his new position, Pausanias recovered possession of the Plataea-Athens Pass, the Plataea-Megara Pass, and the Plataea-Thebes Road. The two passes were the most direct ways to the Peloponnesus. The Plataea-Thebes Road secured the town of Plataea. In the first position taken by the Greeks, the cavalry of the Persians could have occupied unchallenged both of these direct passes, as well as the town of Plataea on the left of the Greek position; they already controlled the pass at Panactum on the Greek right.

From these positions they could have cut the Greek line of communication, and completely surrounded the Greeks. The second position relinquished Dryoscephalae, the pass farthest removed from the Peloponnesus; but it secured the two shortest routes, one of which Grundy admits is still largely used (p. 446, n), it protected the town of Plataea, and it commanded a depression in which the two combats which ultimately decided the battle were fought, peculiarly adapted to the Greek method of fighting (Grundy, p. 454). It will thus be seen that the second position of the Greeks as well as the first proves the strategical insight of Pausanias, and is thoroughly consistent with the method so successful at Marathon and Salamis of compelling the enemy to fight on a spot of the Greeks' own choosing. Is it not possible that the second movement behind the hills through the depression where the battle was finally fought, was made in the hope of drawing the enemy into the spot at this early stage of the campaign, and that only after it proved ineffective did the Greek army mount the Asopus Ridge?

14. *Battle-order of the Greeks and Persians.*

That the assignment of the Greek and Persian troops to their positions in the battle-line did not take place until this stage of the campaign is, according to Woodhouse (p. 43), improbable. Herodotus (9. 28, 32) here followed the epic conventionality. Munro (p. 157) thinks that the battle-order was taken earlier at the charge of Masistius. Hauvette (p. 460), however, argues that it was not until this time that the Greek troops were sufficiently concentrated to admit of a battle-line being formed, and Grundy (p. 468) shows that the second phase of this second position behind the Asopus Ridge, out of sight of the enemy, was strategically the best place to form the line. The statements of Herodotus would seem to imply indirectly that the battle-lines of the two armies were of about the same size, since the troops on the extreme right of the Greeks faced those on the extreme left of the Persians, and vice versa. Unless it

be argued that the Greek line was less deep, this would support Delbrück's contention that the army of Mardonius was not numerically much superior to that of the Greeks.

The battle-order of the Persians as given by Herodotus is probably correct. They were in full view of the Greek army for many days. Nitzsch (p. 234), controverting Niebuhr (p. 372), who regards Choerilus of Samos as the source, argues that Herodotus' sources of information respecting the numbers were original official Persian documents. Hauvette (p. 464) thinks that the good faith of Herodotus in refusing to quote exact figures of some of the Persian detachments argues for the accuracy of the figures which he does give. Rudolph (p. 14), on the contrary, regards the exactness with suspicion.

There is no conclusive evidence that Herodotus employed official Persian records. The early Greek tradition regarding the numbers of the Persians (Aesch., *Pers.* 803, 981) is indefinite, although implying a large number. But exaggeration is natural in the attempt of the Greeks to make the victory appear as great as possible (Delbrück, *Per.* p. 160). On grounds of general probability it is certain that the Herodotean estimate of 350,000 must be an exaggeration; for it seems improbable that the Greek army contained over 30,000 hoplites, with perhaps an equal number of light-armed troops, and if the Persian army was five times as great, it would certainly have been more aggressive in the rear of Cithaeron, even if inferior in quality. Munro (pp. 144 f.) works out the size on the basis of army-corps numerically equal to that of Artabazus. He thinks Mardonius had 80,000 troops (p. 152). Olsen (p. 3) admits that Herodotus has exaggerated the numbers, but contends that the army must still have been vast enough to appear to the Greeks fabulously large. All that can be ventured regarding its size is that it was probably not very much larger than the Greek force.

There are two early documents which bear on the battle-order of the Greeks: the names on the serpent-column at

Delphi still extant, and those on the Zeus statue at Olympia as reported by Pausanias (5. 23. 1-3). Frazer¹ compares these with the battle-order of Herodotus, and satisfactorily reconciles the three. The Herodotean battle-order is in the main correct.

Niebuhr (p. 396) was the first to throw doubt on the numbers of the Greek army as given by Herodotus. Curtius (p. 336) noted that the figures of Herodotus made an army such as Hellas assembled on no subsequent occasion. Delbrück (*Per.* p. 163-4) held the numbers tactically impossible; he also noted that the large number of helots said to have accompanied each Spartan is without parallel, and that Herodotus has neglected to mention the Athenian bowmen (9. 22, 60) in his summary. Beloch (*Jahrbücher für Class. Phil.* 137. 324 f.) has attempted to show that the numbers are impossible from the standpoint of the population of Greece in 479 B.C. Munro (p. 152) regards them as an estimate of the full fighting strength of Greece outside of the Spartan and Athenian contingents. All conjectures are of course arbitrary. The following are those of recent historians: Delbrück (*Per.* pp. 163-4), 35,000-40,000 hoplites; (K. p. 82) 20,000 hoplites, 40,000 in all; Beloch (p. 378), 20,000-25,000 hoplites, with as many attendants; Rudolph (p. 12), 78,000 in all; Bury (p. 288), 70,000 in all; Meyer (p. 407), 30,000 hoplites. Busolt (p. 728), Holm (p. 69), and Grundy (p. 469), accept the Herodotean estimate.

15. *Instructions of the soothsayers to the two armies.*

The traditions of the two soothsayers (Hdt. 9. 33-37) were evidently current in Spartan historical records which extended as far down as the battle of Tanagra (457 B.C.). The question of the later careers of the two rivals does not concern us. That the Greeks employed a soothsayer is certain. Probably Mardonius also followed the Greek custom, because of the medizing Greeks in his army. Abbott (p.

¹ *Pausanias's Description of Greece*, Vol. 5, pp. 299 ff.

220) argues that, because he was on Greek soil, he felt that he must rely on Grecian deities for support. Whether Hegesistratus and Hippomachus (Hdt. 9. 38) both officiated is, however, more doubtful.

The fundamental question at issue is whether the soothsayers controlled the generals, or the generals controlled the soothsayers and employed them to carry out a settled defensive policy. Thirlwall (p. 340) notes that the warnings of the Persian soothsayers exactly coincided with the advice of the Thebans (Hdt. 9. 2, 41). Grote (p. 167) thinks that defensive tactics were the safest answers for the soothsayers to give, and the most satisfactory for the soldiers on both sides to hear. Delbrück (*Per.* pp. 96-97) establishes the fact that both generals had practically impregnable defensive positions, and had everything to gain if the other party attacked first. Since the army of Pausanias was composed of twenty detachments it was not easy to hold it together if inactive. Superstition could, however, be effectively employed to quiet restlessness. Delbrück (*K.* p. 86 n. 2) further suggests that the same prophet Tisamenus was in the hands of the Spartan general Archidamus at the battle of Dipaea in 467 B.C. (cf. Hdt. 9. 35 with Polyænus 1. 41), and may also have been employed by him there to justify his policy of attack.

16. *Ten days in loco. Seizure of the Dryoscephalæ Pass by Mardonius.*

Herodotus 9. 38-40 is the earliest testimony. That the armies faced each other exactly ten days and then decided to fight is improbable. Neither Ephorus nor Plutarch accepts the number. Busolt (p. 725 n. 4 end) and Meyer (p. 413 n.) show the large number of events which happen after ten days or multiples of ten days in this campaign (Hdt. 9. 8, 41, 86, 87) and conclude that ten days is the Greek week and is therefore a general term. Meyer (p. 410) thinks the actual delay was much longer than that stated by Herodotus. Woodhouse (57. n. B) and Munro (p. 160) confine it to three days.

The bitterness shown toward the Thebans as betrayers of the pass and as inciters of the Persians, is recognized quite generally by the historians, and indicates that the emphasis on the *importance* of the seizure of Dryoscephalae is Periclean. There is, however, no reason to doubt the fact of the seizure. Grundy (p. 456) thinks that the Persians seized both the Dryoscephalae and Plataea-Athens Passes.

The reasons for the delay on either side as stated by Herodotus are inadequate. His sole explanation concerns the soothsayers. Regarding the delay on the Persian side, Curtius (p. 338), following Plutarch, holds that Mardonius was trying to win over separate detachments of the Greeks by inducements; Delbrück (*Pers.* p. 97), that Mardonius remembered Marathon; Hauvette (p. 465), that he had not forgotten the cost of the Masistius-charge; Rudolph (p. 15), that Mardonius and Artabazus could not come to an agreement as to the course to pursue; Munro (p. 153), that Mardonius was waiting for Artabazus. The two feints reported by Herodotus, however, (the demonstration at Dryoscephalae, 9. 39, and the advance to the river bank, 9. 40), both indicate a desire to draw the Greeks from their position, rather than indecision.

The reason for the Greek delay is best summed up by Meyer (p. 409). The Spartan defensive position was unsailable. For an offensive movement they had no cavalry (Beloch, p. 378), and were slightly, perhaps much, inferior (Rudolph, p. 15; Olsen, p. 5) in actual numbers.

17. *Council of Mardonius and decision to fight.*

Several historians have regarded the account of this council (Hdt. 9. 41-43) as authentic in its details and have accepted Thersander of Orchomenus, with whom Herodotus claims to have conversed (Hdt. 9. 16), as the source. The story of the feast at Thebes can be shown, however, to be scarcely credible.¹ The details of the deliberation may be referable to the records of the house of Artabazus at

¹ See pp. 85-86.

Dascylium.¹ They are more likely from oracle-records (Hdt. 9. 42; Wecklein, pp. 27 f., 31). The arguments advanced cannot represent the real reasons which led Mardonius to fight. The fear of Artabazus and the vexation of Mardonius are more dramatic than real. That the Persians lacked food-supplies is improbable. Herodotus contradicts himself on this point (cf. 9. 41 'plenty of supplies in Thebes,' with 9. 45 'provisions will fail him'; Busolt, 729 n. 4). Grundy (pp. 476 f.), however, thinks that the Phocian refugees were threatening Mardonius' line of communication, and accepts the latter statement.

Busolt (p. 730 n. 5) has pointed out that it is not at all certain that Mardonius came to a decision to fight. This would account for the day's delay that followed. Alexander is made to say by Herodotus (9. 45) that the engagement may be deferred. Delbrück (*Per.* pp. 98, 118 ff.), followed by Meyer (p. 410), notes that Mardonius was better able to remain on the defensive than Pausanias because he had stores in Thebes, and thinks that the former had learned that the Greek fleet had reached Ionia, a diversion planned by the Greeks to relieve the land forces and force Mardonius to give up his Fabian strategy and either retreat or fight; and that hence he did not dare to defer battle longer for fear that the Persian fleet might be defeated and his own line of communication be exposed. But Xerxes had probably gone to Asia with the sole purpose of taking care of this end of the campaign, and as the Greek fleet consisted of only 110 ships (Hdt. 8. 131), scarcely one-third of the Persian squadron, it is doubtful whether Ionian affairs caused Mardonius undue anxiety. Hauvette (p. 468) seems to be right in his contention that Mardonius was satisfied to wait for the right moment for attack to surprise the Greeks; and that when he did fight, he thought that this moment had come. (So Meyer, p. 411.)

¹ See p. 46.

18. *Destruction of the spring Gargaphia by the Persian cavalry. A day's delay.*

That the destruction of Gargaphia (Hdt. 9. 49) was 'an irreparable loss to the Greeks,' and that because of it they could not remain a day longer in their position (Thirlwall, p. 343), cannot be maintained by the facts established by the most recent topographical investigation. There were streams and springs directly behind the Greek position (Delbrück, *Per.* p. 111; Woodhouse, p. 49).¹ Furthermore, the Persian cavalry withdrew from Gargaphia at night (Hdt. 9. 52). Busolt (p. 730 n. 5) regards the attack as an unpremeditated skirmish; Hauvette (p. 468), as merely an episode. Rudolph (p. 15) emphasizes the complete lack of evidence that the Lacedaemonians, although well able to do so, contested the seizure desperately. They would have shown more resistance if Gargaphia had been the sole water-supply.

The emphasis on the importance of this incident is Periclean. It is placed in Herodotus directly after the epic taunt of Mardonius on the cowardice of the Spartans. Herodotus is anxious to establish the fact that the Spartans could not hold the water-supply at their end of the line. He incidentally speaks in very vague terms about some 'Greeks' (9. 49) who had already been forced to relinquish the water-supply on the left wing. They were the Athenians.

It was a part of the strategy of Pausanias to make Mardonius think that he was utterly unable to hold his two wings. This would tempt Mardonius to divide his force and attack at these two points simultaneously—the movement which actually took place in the battle. If the Persian cavalry were encouraged to believe that they had gained a footing at Gargaphia, it would be natural for the Persian infantry to follow. The falling back of the Greek right and left wings would entice the Persian forces into the depression in which the battle actually took place, which was as much of a death-trap for the Persians as Thermopylae,—

¹ Streams O₁ O₂ O₃ O₄ and the spring of Apotripi.

but with no chance this time for a betrayal of the rear, since the Athenians protected it behind the Asopus Ridge.

19. *Decision of the Greeks to retire to the 'Island' and to relieve Cithaeron.*

Herodotus (9. 50, 51) gives three reasons for the decision of the Greeks to retire to the third position, the location of which has been satisfactorily established (Grundy, pp. 480-87): (1) lack of water; (2) the continued cavalry attacks; (3) the relief of the provision train in the Cithaeron Pass. Of modern historians of the battle, Mitford (pp. 559-560), Thirlwall (p. 343), Grote (pp. 172-3), Duncker (p. 344), Curtius (p. 339), Abbott (p. 223), and Hauvette (pp. 471-2) are disposed to accept these reasons as adequate. Munro (p. 161), however, supposes that only the Athenians were ordered to go to the 'Island,' not the entire army. Busolt (p. 732) thinks that there were better water-supplies in the new position, but that the main reason for the move was defense from the cavalry. Beloch (p. 378), followed by Bury (p. 292), does not consider that the question of water was imperative, but thinks that the second Greek position was too exposed. Delbrück (*Per.* p. 113) asks what troops were sent to open up the Dryoscephalae Pass. He (p. 117) rejects the explanations of Herodotus, and supposes that Mardonius made a diversion in the direction of Phyle—perhaps under Artabazus and his troops (which would explain their absence from the battle), in order to threaten the line of communication with the Peloponnesus. To meet this, the Greek center, half of the army, was sent back; while the line was being reformed, Mardonius unexpectedly attacked; his plan succeeded in one place, with the Megarians and Phliasians. Woodhouse (p. 48) thinks that the whole movement was to recover the line of communication. Duncker (p. 344) suggests that the Greeks were trying to get communication by sea with the Isthmus. Grundy (pp. 479, 487 f.) regards the Greeks at the moment of the council as a beaten army. He assumes that the Athenians on the left wing had been forced to retire from the Asopus River and had taken refuge on the Asopus Ridge; that the Per-

sian cavalry had got round the right wing and occupied the plain in the Greek rear (Awdry, p. 92); that the Greeks were without water and remained so for forty hours, and that they were cut off from all the passes. In short, all the historians except Delbrück regard the Greeks as forced to the third position by the Persian attack.

It has been shown that the first position taken by the Greeks was one of temporary strategical value, but not impregnable for a defensive campaign. It has also been shown that the second position, far from being an over-reaching offensive movement due to over-confidence, made the Greek position impregnable. The two direct passes to the Peloponnesus and the town of Plataea were thus secured as well as a depression exactly suited to the Greek defensive method of warfare, a plan of campaign made necessary by the fact that Pausanias had no cavalry. It has been shown that Mardonius, because he also had an excellent defensive position, refused to be drawn across the river. Evidently the general who succeeded in enticing the other army upon his chosen ground would be practically sure of the victory. Mardonius made at least two feints to entice the Greeks upon his ground, the movement to Cithaeron (Hdt. 9. 39) and the pretense of crossing the river (Hdt. 9. 40), but neither succeeded. Can one who believes in the generalship of Pausanias consistently deny to him the credit of strategy, when the results show that the enemy was enticed across the river and the battle was finally fought in the spot above all others best adapted to the Greek method of fighting? Such a tribute is too much to ask of the tradition which Herodotus reports for very obvious reasons; but it is not too much to ask of a Thucydides (I. 130. 1).

But let us first examine the generally accepted view, which is Herodotean pure and simple, that the Greeks were a beaten army. It is remarkable that no students of the battle except Delbrück and Macan¹ should have challenged what

¹ Cf. *Herodotus Bks IV-VI*, Vol. 2, p. 247 n. 2, where he argues that the retreat of the center at Marathon was a preconcerted arrangement. 'At Plataia, on a vastly larger scale something like the evolution was perhaps repeated.'

after all is the one feature of the Herodotean narrative which would lend itself most easily to perversion. No tactical move can be more easily misinterpreted than a feigned retreat. Whether it fails or succeeds it can always be given a false coloring. Woodhouse (p. 49) has especially emphasized the fact that the Greeks were not cut off from water. Grundy's own map proves that they still had uninterrupted communication with the Peloponnesus by two passes, and Herodotus himself admits that this was the case even after the seizure of Cithaeron (9. 41, 'The Greeks had become more numerous'). Although the cavalry disturbed Gargaphia and blocked the passes by day they were withdrawn at night (Hdt. 9. 52). Grundy admits this (p. 489, 'It is evident indeed that the Persian cavalry withdrew during the night'). This of course makes the fact that they had got around the right wing of little weight, since they did not remain there. There is no evidence that the Persian cavalry were riding at will close along the whole rear of the Greek line from left to right (Awdry, p. 92). That the Athenians had been *forced* from their position at the Asopus River to one upon the Asopus Ridge is simply a hypothesis.

Pausanias had waited more than a week in order to entice the Persians across the river. He knew that Mardonius was eager to attack but would not do so unless he was led to think that the odds were in his favor. The feigned retreat is the one form of Spartan strategy which we know was employed in the Persian Wars by Sparta (Hdt. 7. 211). It was used with deadly effect at Thermopylae by Leonidas, uncle of Pausanias. But Mardonius, knowing the strength of the Greek position, could not be drawn on by an ordinary feigned retreat. It would be as ineffective as the Persian feint of crossing the river (Hdt. 9. 40). If, however, the Persians could be made to think that they had gained an advantage on the two Greek wings, by driving the left wing from the river, and by keeping the right from the spring of Gargaphia, they would be led to regard a falling back

of the Greek army as forced, and hence as giving an opportunity of attacking with the advantages in their favor. Pausanias' plan of battle was then as follows: The Persians were to be allowed to secure footings at the extremes of the Greek line and to hold these positions during the day. By night the Greek center was to be sent back to Plataea, which Grundy (p. 446) characterizes as one of the most important strategic positions in Greece since it commanded the northern end of the Plataea-Megara Pass. From there they could act as reserves for either the Athenians or the Spartans. The Athenians would be halted out of sight of the Persians behind the Asopus Ridge, and all that Mardonius would see of the Spartans when the day dawned would be the rear-guard under Amompharetus just disappearing in the depression between the Asopus Ridge and the Long Ridge. Mardonius would infer at once that the right moment had come. His troops would follow the retreating enemy, not by charging uphill over the Asopus Ridge, which is 360 feet high,¹ but by dividing forces and going around in two directions; a part, with Mardonius at its head, through the depression between the Asopus and Long Ridges; the others, the medizing Greeks, on a flank movement by the Thebes-Plataea Road. Both divisions would be unconsciously led into a trap where cavalry could not successfully operate, as the result proved, except in one point—a trap which was carefully manned by the Greeks.² In case the Greeks were defeated they could fall back and still hold the Cithaeron Range from Plataea to the Plataea-Athens Pass.

¹ That the Persians did not charge over the hill is apparent from Hdt. 9. 65, where it is stated that not a Persian entered the sacred precinct of Demeter, nor was a dead body found there. This precinct is on the top of the Long Ridge, which is 300 feet high. The Asopus Ridge is 60 feet higher. (Cf. Grundy, p. 503.)

² If the Persians occupied the Plataea-Athens Pass at this time, why did they not fall upon the Spartan rear during the battle? Munro (pp. 164 f.) observes that the isolation of the three divisions of the enemy which had lost all touch with one another was an opportunity such as no general could have neglected. Why deny to Pausanias the credit for effecting this isolation by strategy?

20. *Charge of Mardonius during the movement.*

Herodotus (9. 59) gives correctly the reason which led Mardonius to order a general charge. He supposed that the Greeks were in flight. The height of the Asopus Ridge confirms the statement that he could not see the Athenians. Duncker (p. 348) argues that Mardonius supposed that the Greeks were in battle with the Persian troops in the Dryoscephalae Pass and hastened to aid his own men. Nothing in the sources suggests this.

21. *Delay of Pausanias for favorable omens.*

The prayer of Pausanias (Hdt. 9. 61, 62) is established by Thuc. 2. 74. The reasons for the delay are variously given. Duncker (p. 349) thinks that Pausanias was waiting for the coming of the Athenians; Holm (p. 70) implies the same; but nearly all the other historians regard the delay as a calm and deliberate holding back of his troops by Pausanias until the Persians should come to close quarters, when they would be no match for the hoplites (Delbrück, *Pers.* pp. 118 f., *K.* p. 84; Busolt, p. 735; Meyer, p. 411).¹

22. *Details of the battle. The Spartans and Tegeans face the Persians. Overthrow of the shields. Fight near the temple of Demeter. Death of Mardonius at the hands of Aeimnestus. Rout of the Persians.*

The early testimony (Aesch., *Pers.* 817) confirms the impression made by the Herodotean narrative (9. 62-65). The meagreness of details regarding the actual battle would indicate that there was no Spartan account of it in literature. There is no mention of the part played by the helots in the battle, unless the raising of the fence of shields by the Persians indicates that missiles were being shot from the Spartan side. It is clear (Aesch., *Pers.* 85, 147-149) that the Persians relied mainly on the bow and the Greeks on the spear. Duncker (p. 349) supposes that the helots were

¹ Cf. Xen., *Anab.* 1. 8. 14-15.

in the trees and shot with their slings from there. Olsen (p. 11) thinks that the Tegeans advanced to the attack before the order was given, because their religious scruples were not so great as those of the Spartans. Hauvette (p. 477), following Rawlinson (p. 435 n. 4), suggests that the statements in Herodotus that the Persians came on in disorder, that they lacked military discipline and skill, and that they were poorly armed (cf. 8. 113; Stein, p. 175) are Athenian inventions to detract from the greatness of the Spartan victory. The reference to the Delphic oracle regarding Leonidas betrays its source. In general, outside of these points which are open to criticism, the account appears to be accurate.

23. *Flight of Artabazus.*

For a possible source for this incident see p. 46. Herodotus (9. 66) asserts that Artabazus foresaw the issue of the battle and did not wish to expose his troops. Delbrück (K. pp. 83 f.) suggests that Artabazus had been sent away by Mardonius to make a diversion toward Phyle and did not return in time for the battle. Munro (p. 165) supposes that Artabazus never effected a junction with Mardonius after the siege of Potidaea. It is more probable that he was in command of a reserve force or else that he gathered up some of the fleeing after the rout began, and escaped with them.

24. *Contest on the left between the Athenians and medizing Greeks. Efficient service of the Persian cavalry.*

Herodotus (9. 67, 68) is the earliest testimony. The question may be raised as to whether the achievements of the Athenians have been exaggerated in the Periclean redaction of the account of this part of the battle. It is true that the Boeotian cavalry are not badly cut to pieces. They are able to inflict serious damage on the Megarians and Phliasians later (9. 69). The tribute to the courage of the Boeotians is, however, undoubtedly pre-Periclean, and

the narrative as a whole is probably authentic. Munro (p. 164) thinks it likely that the Athenians did not dare to cross the open plain to take up their position at the 'Island,' or that they resented being ordered out of the left wing, which was a coveted post. It is reassuring to find the Persian cavalry in the Herodotean account operating in the one place on the battlefield where such an operation is topographically possible.

25. *Storming of the Persian camp.*

That the Athenians assisted the Spartans in the storming of the Persian camp seems probable. They were summoned by the Spartans for similar work at the siege of Ithome (Thuc. I. 102. 1). That the Athenians made the breach and the Tegeans entered it is improbable (Delbrück, *Pers.* p. 112). Busolt (p. 737 n. 4) holds that we have here two contradictory traditions, Athenian and Tegean. The Tegean tradition was supported by monumental evidence (Hdt. 9. 70). Hauvette (p. 481) thinks that the Athenians were content to be simply engineers or sappers. On the whole it does not seem safe to lay undue emphasis on the part played by the Athenians.

26. *Death-losses.*

The early tradition (Aesch., *Pers.* 816-20) testifies to heavy losses on the Persian side (*νεκρῶν θίves*). The Herodotean estimate must be, however, greatly exaggerated. Grote's conjecture (p. 182) that large numbers of captives were sold into slavery is not probable, since we do not hear of such slaves afterwards in Greece. Meyer (p. 413 n.) thinks that Artabazus probably saved the greater part of the army.

Neither Aeschylus, Simonides, nor Herodotus indicates that the Greek losses were excessively heavy. Busolt (p. 740 n. 2) notes that Herodotus states that many Lacedaemonians fell at the beginning of the battle (Hdt. 9. 61) and in the skirmish with Mardonius (Hdt. 9. 63), yet gives the total of dead Spartans as ninety-one. The figures of Herod-

otus are possibly from isolated grave-stones, those for the Athenians including only warriors who fell from a single tribe.

27. *Roll of honor.*

Herodotus evidently secured the names of Posidonius, Philocyon, Amompharetus, and Callicrates from the inscriptions over the burial mounds (cf. 9. 71, 72 with 9. 85). It is probable that the poetical and patriotic sentiment which is ascribed to Callicrates (9. 72 end) is a paraphrase of the epitaph on his grave-stone. The traditions regarding Aristodemus and Sophanes are both open to suspicion. It is clear that the second λόγος regarding Sophanes is the more reasonable and that the anchor-myth developed from it (Wecklein, p. 47). The traditions regarding the parts played by the nations correspond to the facts of the battle and inspire confidence.

28. *Episode of the Persian concubine.*

This story (Hdt. 9. 76, 77) is not an Athenian invention of the Periclean age, since the woman is made to seek out a Spartan for protection. It is an anecdote with a possible basis of fact, from a Spartan source, the main purpose of which is to exalt the character of Pausanias (Hauvette, p. 482). Verrall¹ notes that the words of the woman fall readily into hexameters, and sees in these verses a dedicatory inscription on a work of art which represented the deliverance, and which was put up as a votive offering at Aegina by the Coan woman in gratitude for her escape.

29. *The Mantinean and Elean contingents arrive too late.*

The inscriptions on the serpent-column at Delphi and the dedication at Olympia contain the name of the Eleans, but not that of the Mantineans. This was probably due to the close friendship which existed between Sparta and Elis. That the Greek army was constantly receiving additions before the battle is apparent (Hdt. 9. 41). It is reasonable to suppose that the process continued during and after the

¹ *Classical Review*, 17. 99-101.

battle. Munro (p. 148), however, argues that these two states were affected with medism and delayed purposely. The new-comers were not allowed to pursue the retreating forces according to the Lacedaemonian custom (Busolt, p. 738 n. 2).

30. *Dedications from the spoil and division of the residue.*

The richness of the booty is proved by the costly dedicatory offerings. Of the three mentioned by Herodotus (9. 81), one is extant in a fragment. The latter corresponds so exactly to the Herodotean description as to inspire confidence in the Herodotean descriptions of the other two. The erection of an altar to Zeus the Deliverer is established by Simonides.¹

31. *Episode of two meals in the tent of Mardonius.*

The same apparent purpose may be detected in this episode as in § 28. Wecklein (pp. 46-47) contends that Xerxes would never have left his tent in Greece and holds that this inconsistency in the statement of Herodotus betrays the anecdotal character of the whole. A tradition regarding the tent of Xerxes was, however, current at Athens (Paus. 1. 20. 4; Plut., *Pericles* 13).

32. *Subsequent finds on the battlefield.*

The earliest evidence (Aesch., *Pers.* 818-19) indicates that numbers of human bones were scattered over the battlefield. The discoveries of physical monstrosities and of chests of precious metals (Hdt. 9. 83) smack of romance, and although possible, are not demonstrated. Busolt (p. 740 n. 3) accepts as a historical fact the inference from Herodotus that the Plataeans buried the Persian dead.

33. *Disposal of the corpse of Mardonius.*

No historical residuum can be established. The question of the disposal of the body of Mardonius was evidently a much-discussed one in popular tradition.

¹ Bergk, *P.L.G.*, Vol. 3 (3d edit.), p. 1166 (No. 140).

34. *Burial of the Greek dead.*

The vulgate tradition must have emanated from the funeral-mounds with inscriptions near Plataea, which were decorated annually (Thuc. 3. 58. 4). The inscription of Simonides on the Athenian mound is possibly still extant.¹ The poet indicates that there was also a tomb of the Megarians at Megara.² The statement of Herodotus (9. 85) that all the nations had tombs, is consistent with the vulgate tradition. His interpretation of this fact, which will be discussed later,³ belongs to the Periclean redaction of the history.

35. *Siege of Thebes.*

All the details of this incident, except the number of days (Busolt, p. 725 n. 4 end), the speech of Timagenides, and the kindness of Pausanias toward the children of Attaginus, may pass unchallenged. The speech of Timagenides is probably correct in its *Tendenz*. The kindly attitude of Pausanias toward the children of Attaginus is recorded by Herodotus for the same reason as the episodes in §§ 28 and 31.

36. *Retreat of Artabazus to Asia.*

Meyer (*Forsch.* 2. 231) compares the lack of definiteness in the details of this retreat with the fullness of record of the march of Xerxes over the same territory (Hdt. 7. 26-131) and concludes that Herodotus can have had no official or documentary source for the march of Artabazus. It is possible, however, that the very fact of the completeness of the previous itinerary caused the more summary treatment of the later one. The story of the stratagem by which the Thessalians were deceived regarding the outcome of Plataea, betrays the creative touch of Herodotus. The historical residuum seems to be that the cleverness of Artabazus saved the greater part of the remnant of the Persian army. He is said to have later gained high repute because of his actions at Plataea (Hdt. 8. 126).

¹ Bergk, *P.L.G.*, Vol. 3 (3d edit.), p. 1151 (No. 100).

² *Ibid.*, p. 1154 (No. 107).

³ See p. 85.

CHAPTER III

(II) *The Periclean Redaction*

(A) Historical Features of the Period

With the death of Cimon in 449 B.C., the Athenian foreign policy, which had persisted for a generation after Plataea, was completely reversed. In place of the broad, Cimonian, national ideal of united Greece against Persia, Pericles substituted the narrower policy of compromise with the common enemy and internal rivalry between Athens and Sparta for the leadership of Greece. The inevitable result was civil war, carried on with a vindictive bitterness on both sides which has seldom been equalled.

The policy of Pericles divided into two hostile camps not only Greece, but also Athens herself. Among Pericles' fellow citizens were many malevolent opponents. The internal discord as well as the national feuds are constantly appearing in the literature of the day.

The extant literature of the Periclean age relating to the Campaign of Plataea reflects these prejudices throughout. Herodotus was a devoted admirer of Pericles and a firm believer in his political ideas. There can be little doubt that the final revision of Books 7-9 of the history, which dates from the opening years of the Peloponnesian war, was intended to include a justification of the Periclean policy by a somewhat arbitrary treatment of the past history of Greece. It is possible that the purpose of Herodotus was strengthened, and his partiality intensified, by the slanderous attack on Pericles, which was included in a political pamphlet brought out at Athens by Stesimbrotus of Thasos about the year 430 B.C. Aside from the little we know of the epic poem of Choerilus of Samos, which probably dealt with the Campaign of Plataea in a manner satisfactory to the Athenians, we have no definite knowledge regarding the other writers who dealt with Plataea during these years.

The entire absence of allusion to Plataea, however, in one body of literature of the Periclean age requires at least a word of comment. In contrast to the frequent allusions to Marathon and Salamis in extant works and fragments of the comic poets of the latter half of the fifth century B.C., there is not a single reference to Plataea. The omission is apparently deliberate. In the *parabasis* of the *Wasps* of Aristophanes (1070-1100) there is a rapid review of the Persian wars. There are references to Marathon (1081-2; cf. Hdt. 6. 112), Thermopylae (1084; cf. Hdt. 7. 226), Salamis (1086-7; cf. Plut., *Them.* 12; Aesch., *Pers.* 427), and Mycale (1092-3; cf. Hdt. 9. 98). We should be glad to regard the *καὶ κατεστρέψαμην τοὺς ἐναντίους* of lines 1092-3 as a characterization of Plataea, but it plainly cannot be separated in thought from the *ἐκέισε* which refers to Mycale. Furthermore, since the comedians strove to exalt the hoplites at the expense of the marines,¹ we should expect to find the land fight of Plataea enthroned along with Marathon in opposition to the naval conflict of Salamis, if Athens had played any prominent part in it. The silence of the comedians whose works are extant or preserved in fragments goes far to confirm the deductions already drawn from the pre-Periclean documents, that Plataea was so dignified and honorable a Spartan victory that it afforded the comedians occasion neither for the belittling of Sparta nor the glorification of Athens.

(B) Main Features of the Story in the Period

The early and comparatively trustworthy tradition of Plataea of Cimon's day underwent a marked transformation in the Periclean age. The basal facts were of course not neglected, since men were still living who had taken part in the battle, and much had been crystallized in records. But in the interpretation of the motives which underlay the various manœuvres, and in undue emphasis on comparatively unimportant details, as well as in suppression of

¹ Macan, *Herodotus Bks IV-VI*, Vol. 2, p. 182.

important ones, there was still large opportunity for reconstruction of the tradition to suit partisan ideas. With the passing away of the writers of broad pan-Hellenic sympathies like Aeschylus, Pindar, and Simonides, Sparta's claims were no longer heard. She was a nation without a literature. Athenian writers and sculptors, inspired by the bitterness of the civil struggle against Sparta, began to depreciate the part played by the latter and her allies, and to lay greater emphasis on the share of Athens in the battle. Around the stratagem of Pausanias which, as has been demonstrated, lent itself easily to misrepresentation, a mass of Periclean misinterpretations was gathered. For example, the transfer of the small body of Athenian bowmen from the left wing to the right, in order to support the Spartans at the attack of the Persian cavalry on Gargaphia, came to be regarded in Athenian tradition as a surrender of the right wing to the Athenians by the Spartans from fear. A little sermon on Spartan cowardice was inserted into the account of the battle in the shape of an epic taunt by Mardonius. The falling back of the Greek center to cover the town of Plataea in the final engagement was branded as a retreat. The fact that Amompharetus was the last to leave the second position was interpreted to mean that he alone of the Spartans had the courage to stay. In countless other ways the tradition was transformed to satisfy the personal prejudices of the transformers.

The undue emphasis on the part played by Athens, the flattery of Macedon, the apologetic treatment of Argos and Phocis, and the bitter attitude toward the Thebans, Aeginetans, and Megarians as indicated elsewhere,¹ all find a ready explanation in events which took place in the opening years of the Peloponnesian war. There is one feature of the Periclean redaction, however, which is difficult to understand on the theory that the work of Herodotus received its final revision before the year 428 B.C. This is the unveiled and contemptuous attack on Spartan courage which is constantly

¹ For the complete list of Periclean elements and the reasons for regarding them as such, see pp. 23-27.

recurring in the ninth book of Herodotus.¹ There is first of all the cowardly shift of wings by the Spartans (9. 46-47); then the scornful taunt of Mardonius (9. 48); next the disgraceful and disorganized retreat (9. 52); then the readiness to flee of all the Spartans, save brave Amompharetus and his company, sole representatives of the former Spartan valor (9. 53-57); finally the comment of Mardonius that the Lacedaemonians are themselves good for nothing, having gained distinction among worthless Greeks (9. 58).

If now it be granted that the speeches in Herodotus represent the Greek point of view at the time when the writer composed them, it is difficult to see what sincere Greek in the year 428 B.C.—and Herodotus is surely honest—would have ventured such an estimate of Spartan courage. There was certainly nothing in the relations of Sparta and Athens to justify it. For two decades after Plataea the rival states were at peace. At the battle of Tanagra in 457 B.C. Athens went down before Spartan courage. Later came the peace. In the speech of Pericles, made at the opening of the Peloponnesian War in 432 B.C., Pericles admitted that 'in a single pitched battle the Peloponnesians and their allies were a match for all Hellas' (Thuc. I. 141. 6). The speech of Pericles delivered in 430 B.C. (Thuc. 2. 60 ff.) does not contain the slightest reflection on the valor of Sparta. Pericles admits that the enemy are superior on land (c. 62); hence he advocated battle on sea (c. 65). In 428 B.C., the accepted date of the redaction, the Athenians were cooped up in the city, 'still suffering seriously from the plague and the war' (Thuc. 3. 3). From within, in desperation, they watched King Archidamus with his Spartan soldiers destroy their harvest. It would be cold comfort, indeed, under these circumstances, to be assured that the men who held them at bay were quaking cowards and good for nothing. Such an attitude toward Sparta is not natural in 425 B.C. In the *Acharnians* of Aristophanes, produced in that year, the courage of the Lacedaemonians is treated with great respect. In one passage (541 ff.) the

¹ Rawlinson, p. 427 n. 3.

Athenians are pictured as ready to man 300 ships to fight with a single Lacedaemonian vessel, and throughout the play the Athenians claim only the supremacy of the sea. In Thuc. 4. 34 we have another more definite indication of the attitude of Athens toward Spartan courage in 425 B.C. When the Athenian hoplites land at Sphacteria, fresh from Athens, they do not dare attack at first, being 'cowed by the fear of facing Lacedaemonians'. And yet these must have been the very men who, if the 428 B.C. theory holds, confirmed Herodotus in his estimate of Spartan cowardice when he wrote the account of Plataea. But the statement of Thucydides (4. 40) regarding the state of mind at Athens on the news of the unexpected outcome of the battle at Pylos proves conclusively the true attitude:—'Nothing which happened during the war caused greater amazement in Hellas; for it was universally imagined that the Lacedaemonians would never give up their arms, either under the pressure of famine or in any other extremity, but would fight to the last and die sword in hand. No one would believe that those who surrendered were men of the same quality with those who perished' (trans. Jowett). Cleon found it wise to bring back with him the barley which was captured with the Spartans when they surrendered in order to prove that he had actually beaten them in battle and not starved them out (cf. Thuc. 4. 39. 2 with Arist., *Knights* 1166 ff.).

No writers who have hitherto discussed the date of the final revision of the last three books have considered the bearing on the question of the Athenian attitude toward Spartan courage in Book 9. The most satisfactory explanation is that these books received their final revision after the capture of Pylos by the Athenians in 425 B.C., when, for the first time in the history of the nation, Spartan soldiers gave up their arms and Spartan courage was at a discount.

Kirchhoff,¹ followed by Bauer,² admits the possibility of

¹ *Über die Entstehungszeit des Herodotischen Geschichtswerkes* (second edition 1878), pp. 24 f.

² *Die Entstehung des Herodotischen Geschichtswerkes* (1878), p. 146 n. 3.

a date as late as 424 B.C. for this final revision, inasmuch as Hdt. 7. 235 apparently reflects the campaign of Nicias at Cythera in that year. (Cf. Thuc. 4. 53 f.; Wecklein, p. 10.) But he rejects this date in favor of the earlier one of 428 B.C. for two reasons: (1) because the reference can be explained naturally as a strategical plan of Demaratus without the supposition of the influence of a contemporary event, (2) because it is the custom of Herodotus to refer directly to an event which is recent or contemporary, whereas this reference is indirect. There still remains in favor of 424 B.C. the statement in Hdt. 6. 98 regarding the reigns of the kings of Persia, which Kirchhoff holds does not refer to the close of the reign of Artaxerxes; but his argument is by no means convincing, as Bauer in the note referred to above has pointed out.

Kirchhoff's first reason is largely a subjective one, and is by no means as cogent as when it was written, because of the modern view, developed during the quarter-century since he wrote, of the non-historical character of the speeches of Herodotus. And, in regard to the second, does not Kirchhoff himself¹ quote an incident in which Herodotus refers to a recent event indirectly? Recently Knapp² has called attention to the reflection in Hdt. 7. 101-104 of an event which must have taken place after 425 B.C. (cf. Paus. 6. 5. 4-7). The attack on the Aeginetans in Hdt. 9. 78-79 where Lampon is represented as so inhuman is more easily explained as written to justify the massacre of 424 B.C. than the deportation of 431. The courteous treatment of Alexander by Herodotus, if it reflects patronizing contemporary politics, is most fittingly referred to the year 424-3 after the rejection of Sparta by Perdiccas, as related in Thuc. 4. 128. 5: 'From that time forward Perdiccas regarded Brasidas in the light of a foe, and conceived a new hatred of the Pelopon-

¹ P. 19, the indirect allusion to the speech of Pericles delivered in 440 or 431 B.C.

² *Bursian*, Vol. 100-101, p. 25; *Wochenschrift für Klass. Phil.*, 13 Oct. '97, p. 1156.

nesians, which was not a natural feeling in an enemy of the Athenians. Nevertheless, disregarding his own nearest interests, he took steps to make terms with the one [the Athenians] and get rid of the other' (trans. Jowett).

There is further evidence to show that Books 7-9 of Herodotus were not finally revised till after 425 B.C. which although not conclusive is striking. We possess four plays of Aristophanes produced in four successive years, 425-422 B.C. Books 1-3 are apparently referred to and parodied in the *Acharnians* produced in 425 B.C.¹ There is little doubt regarding the parody of Books 4-6 in the *Knights* produced in 424 B.C.² The review of the Persian wars in the *parabasis* of the *Wasps*, produced in 422 B.C., must have been inspired by Books 7-9.³ If these three triplets of books in their final revised form were given to the public, one each year, so as to be reflected in Aristophanes in the year following, we may assume that Books 1-3 appeared in 426 B.C., Books 4-6 in 425 B.C. and Books 7-9 in either 424 or 423 B.C.

But even if these contentions be not granted and it seems best to hold to the date of 428 B.C., one thing can be affirmed. If the surrender of the Spartans at Pylos did not inspire the Herodotean estimate of Spartan courage, it at least established that hitherto unjustified estimate so firmly in the literary tradition that the bias was never thereafter wholly eradicated.

The Periclean redaction is concerned with five main lines of reconstruction of the tradition of Plataea:

(1) *Exaltation and Exaggeration of the part played by Athens.*

(a) First attempt of Mardonius to win Athens over (Hdt. 8. 136-144).

(b) Second attempt (9. 4-5).

(c) Dispute between Athenians and Tegeans for left wing (9. 26-28).

(d) Appeal of Pausanias to Athenians for aid (9. 60).

¹ Stein, *Herodotus* I. 4. 14 n.

² Stein, *Herodotus* VI. 131. 10 n.

³ Rogers, *Aristophanes' Wasps*, 1071 n.

- (e) Athenians make the breach in the wall (9. 70).
- (f) Bravery of Sophanes (9. 73-75).
- (2) *Exaltation of Alexander of Macedon.*
 - (a) His embassy to the Athenians (8. 136-144).
 - (b) His betrayal of the Persian attack (9. 44-45).
- (3) *Exaltation of the Phocians (9. 17-18) and lenient treatment of the Argives (9. 12).*
- (4) *Reflections on the parts played by the Thessalians, Thebans, and Aeginetans.*
 - (a) Thessalians and Thebans aid Mardonius (9. 1-3).
 - (b) Attaginus the Theban entertains Persians (9. 15b, 16).
 - (c) Timagenides the Theban betrays the pass (9. 38).
 - (d) The Thebans incite the Persians to attack (9. 40).
 - (e) Lampon the Aeginetan makes an inhuman proposal (9. 78-9).
 - (f) The Aeginetans become rich by dishonesty (9. 80).
 - (g) Empty tomb of the Aeginetans (9. 85).
- (5) *Reflections on the courage of the Spartans and their allies.*
 - (a) Delay of the Spartans in sending aid after the embassy arrived (9. 6-11).
 - (b) Spartans desire to shift wings (9. 46-47).
 - (c) Taunt of Mardonius (9. 48).
 - (d) Retreat of the Greek center (9. 52).
 - (e) Delay of Amompharetus (9. 53-57).
 - (f) Taunt of Mardonius (9. 58).
 - (g) Zeal of the Greek center after danger appears to be past (9. 69).

(C) The Historical Residuum

- (1) *Exaltation and Exaggeration of the part played by Athens.*
 - (a) and (b) First and second attempts of Mardonius to win Athens over (Hdt. 8. 136-144) (Hdt. 9. 4-5).

Ephorus admits the first attempt into his story of the battle, but rejects the second. If a choice must be made between the two,¹ the second is the more reasonable, since, at the time of the second, Mardonius was in possession of Athens, and his proposals would therefore have had greater weight (Duncker, p. 329). Possibly Athens waited before giving a final reply, until the news arrived that Sparta's

¹ This may be an instance in which tradition supplied Herodotus with a doublet.

troops were on the march (Hauvette, pp. 448-449). It is remarkable that Thucydides, in relating the speeches of Athenian envoys in praise of Athenian services in the Persian wars, refers to neither of these events. His only allusion to Persian proposals is to those made before the embarkment, previous to the battle of Salamis (Thuc. I. 74. 4).

That Mardonius attempted to win over the Athenians before his advance to Athens is, however, credible. He needed naval coöperation (Mitford, p. 541; Grundy, p. 437) and knew that Athens and Sparta had different policies for the war (Nitzsch, p. 260). The deposition of Themistocles indicated the ascendancy at Athens of the anti-Spartan party (Munro, p. 145). The offer would be especially tempting to Athens in her desperate condition (Grote, p. 151). He may have intended to found a federation of Greek states under the protectorate of Persia (Curtius, p. 333). On the whole it does not seem safe to go beyond the conclusions of Beloch (p. 377)—that Mardonius made proposals to Athens, but the latter was clever enough not to bite at the bait; and Delbrück (*Per.* p. 103)—that Athens probably used these proposals as a lever to force Sparta to her plan of campaign.

Duncker (p. 321) was the first to intimate that the reply of Athens may have been less emphatic than Herodotus gives it. He regarded it as accurate in the main, however, and suggested as its source (p. 338 n. 1) the circle of Alexander. Wecklein (p. 32 n. 9) showed its distinctly Athenian coloring. Both Hauvette (pp. 445, 447) and Grundy (pp. 436-7) admit that much of it emanated from the Athenian side. On logical grounds, Busolt (p. 721 n. 1) and Delbrück (*Per.* p. 92) reject the Herodotean version. Athens would simply have tied her own hands by making such a reply to Persia without having exacted some formal pledge of support from Sparta. Busolt tries to find this in the *συνθέμενοι* of Hdt. 9. 7, but is successfully controverted by Hauvette (p. 466). Delbrück holds that the Herodotean version

carries with it a great inconsistency. The Athenians apparently reject the Spartan offer of help as too much to accept from their friends, but at the same time make excessive demands.

The speeches are magnificent bits of oratory, and may well have been suggested by commemorative orations over the dead delivered at Athens in the age of Pericles.

Grote (p. 155 n. 1) was the first to discredit the Lycidas-incident on the ground that it exhibits the patriotism of Athens in too brilliant a light. That a councillor was stoned at some time for favoring Persian proposals is, however, probable (Dem. 18. 204). Meyer (p. 405) accepts the incident but not the name of the councillor.

(c) Dispute between the Athenians and the Tegeans for the left wing (Hdt. 9. 26-28).

Woodhouse (pp. 41-43) has given six conclusive reasons why this dispute cannot be regarded as authentic. His sixth and final point is: After the battle the Lacedaemonians were given the prize of valor (Hdt. 9. 71); for second place the Athenians and Tegeans contested; by the subtle device of this debate the Spartans, admittedly the best troops, are made by Herodotus to decide that the Athenians are superior to the Tegeans. Herodotus employs a similarly method in 9. 9, where a Tegean is made to pay a tribute to the military importance of Athens.

The reasons for discrediting (d) the appeal of Pausanias to the Athenians for aid (9. 60) and (f) the bravery of Sophanes (9. 73-75) have been given previously.¹ The historical residuum in (e) has already been stated.²

(2) *Exaltation of Alexander of Macedon.*

That Alexander of Macedon played a rôle in the Persian Wars which was acceptable to Greece is probable from the fact that he is mentioned with honor in the fragments of

¹ See p. 26.

² See p. 70.

Pindar (120, 121. *Bergk*, 4th ed.). There is evidence of a golden statute of him at Delphi (Hdt. 8. 121). This testimony is of great value because indirect. Tradition also ascribed to him services to Greece earlier in the campaign (Hdt. 7. 173).

That he was at the head of the first embassy to the Athenians (Hdt. 8. 136-144) is very probable because of his friendly relations to Athens in general (Duncker p. 318).

That he personally visited the Greek camp and made the dramatic speech ascribed to him by Herodotus (9. 44, 45) is highly improbable. Woodhouse (pp. 43-44) has shown the reasons for rejecting this phase of the story. Holm's theory (p. 69) that Alexander played a part on the Persian side similar to that of Themistocles on the Greek side, and that he gave the information under the pretense of a betrayal in order to entice the Greeks to attack, is improbable from the standpoint of strategy. If the Greeks had learned that the Persians were to attack, they would not have been enticed thereby across the river, but rather would have remained secure in their impregnable defensive position. Curtius (p. 338) first suggested that Alexander sent the information to the Greeks by a messenger instead of giving it in person, which best satisfies the conditions.

(3) *Exaltation of the Phocians (Hdt. 9. 17, 18), and lenient treatment of the Argives (Hdt. 9. 12).*

The influences which determined the Periclean attitude toward this part of the tradition are stated elsewhere.¹ The only safe historical residuum is that the Phocians medized unwillingly, as probably many other Greek states did, and that the Argives remained neutral (Grote, p. 157; Grundy, p. 444). That the Spartans took the longer route through Arcadia when marching to the Isthmus is probably due to the fact of their long-existing enmity toward Argos rather than to any recent hostility inspired by Mardonius.

Grote (p. 161 n. 1) compares the incident of the Phocians with Thuc. 8. 108.

¹ See p. 24.

(4) *Reflections on the parts played by the Thessalians, Thebans, and Aeginetans.*¹

The perversion here shows itself in undue emphasis rather than in entire fabrication. Spartans themselves may have suggested to Pausanias the impaling of the head of Mardonius (Hdt. 9. 78-79).² Pausanias may have refused to entertain the suggestion, in which case the story may have sprung from a Spartan source which desired to glorify his character (Grote, p. 184 n. 2). When the proposal was rejected, however, no one would remember who made it. To ascribe it to one individual Aeginetan, therefore, is the perversion of undue emphasis. It is undoubtedly true that Thessalians and Thebans aided Mardonius (Hdt. 9. 1-3, 40), but Phocians and Macedonians probably did also. Phocians and Macedonians, as well as Timagenides the Theban (Hdt. 9. 38), no doubt discussed the Dryoscephalæ raid. Some one no doubt told Mardonius; but to ascribe this to a Theban rather than to a Macedonian is again the perversion of undue emphasis.

One has no hesitation in accepting the fact that all Greece was enriched by the booty of Plataea, and that in an army of 40,000 men some got more than they deserved by dishonest means. But that this was confined entirely to the Aeginetans (Hdt. 9. 80), is an undue emphasis which finds no support in the general principles of human nature.

In his discussion of the erection of the cenotaphs Herodotus betrays the intense hatred of the time in which he writes. There are many states which are guilty but he picks out one on which he puts undue emphasis. (9. 85 ἐπὶ καὶ Αἰγινητέων—'For example the Aeginetans.')

Meyer (p. 413 n), although he does not introduce the episode into the text of his history, regards the story of the entertainment of Mardonius and fifty Persians and fifty Greeks by Attaginus the Theban (Hdt. 9. 15b-16) as authentic historical information; since Herodotus states as

¹ For the reasons for the Periclean attitude see pp. 23-27.

² Yet the whole story may be a fabrication to match Hdt. 7. 238.

his source Thersander of Orchomenus, who was present on the occasion, and with whom Herodotus afterwards conversed. But this assignment of a definite individual source is probably a literary mannerism to enhance verisimilitude, and finds ready imitation in subsequent historical writers (e. g. Pausanias). Grote (p. 159 n. 4) notes the difficulty raised by the fact that Thebes and Orchomenus were ancient enemies, and dodges his own difficulty by implying that the ancient feud was dormant long enough to allow Thersander to attend the banquet, but that a deadly hatred grew up again afterwards. Wecklein (p. 60) has shown that there are inherent improbabilities in the story itself. Persians are made to speak Greek and to express Greek sentiments. The last part of the Persian's speech readily falls into hexameters.¹ Grote (p. 160 n. 1) noticed its philosophical character. Rather than a portrayal of the actual state of the Persian army, the anecdote would seem to be an artistic prophetic prelude, a *vaticinium post eventum*, which is a Herodotean conventionality.

(5) *Reflections on the courage of the Spartans and their allies.*

The hypothesis that the final revision of Books 7-9 of Herodotus was completed after the campaign at Pylos explains satisfactorily all reflections on the courage of Sparta and her allies. Thucydides (4. 40. 1) bears witness to the fact that nothing which happened during the war caused greater amazement in Hellas than the surrender of the Spartans. But when the fact was once established, even the Athenian allies constantly ridiculed Spartan courage (Thuc. 4. 40. 2). The captives were probably on public exhibition (Arist., *Clouds* 180-187). Athens argued as follows: The old theory of Spartan courage had been clearly exposed as a myth; and now that the myth was exploded, the sooner the apocryphal was eliminated from the history of the past the better; did not the Pylos-episode prove that Sparta's successes in the past had been due to

¹ Verrall, *Classical Review*, 17. 99.

reputation and luck? How clear it now was that the so-called feigned retreat at Plataea was in reality a disorganized retreat which luck at the last moment transformed into a victory! Thermopylae should stand unchallenged, since it was impossible to deny that the Spartans had lived up to their ideals there; but the story of Plataea must receive a thorough recasting.

We may reasonably suppose that Herodotus was perfectly honest in this conviction. He was a mere echo of the public sentiment, a mirror of the age in which he lived. He probably did not live long enough after the Pylos-episode to see matters in their true perspective and to realize that although the bravery of 292 Lacedaemonians was at a discount, the national ideal was still preserved. It was not until the failure of the Sicilian expedition in 413-412 B.C. that Athens again completely regained her respect for Spartan courage. The present estimate one holds of a nation cannot fail to effect to a greater or less degree, proportionate to the narrowness of his mind, his estimate of its past history, and Herodotus did not write from the standpoint of the impartial historian, but as an ardent Periclean and anti-Spartan.

To establish his point Herodotus was compelled to start from the assumption that it was the custom of the Spartans never to retire from a battle position which had once been taken (9. 53). This was inconsistent with his account of the tactics employed at Thermopylae: 'The Lacedaemonians fought memorably both in other respects, showing that they knew how to fight with men who knew not, and whenever they [the Lacedaemonians] *turned their backs, they retreated in close order*; but the barbarians seeing them retreat followed with a shout and clamor; then they, being overtaken, wheeled round so as to front the barbarians, and having faced about, overthrew an inconceivable number of the Persians' (Hdt. 7. 211, trans. Cary).

It is remarkable that Ephorus, with his unquestioned partiality for Athens, makes no reference to any of these seven Herodotean reconstructions which reflect on Sparta and the

allies, while Plutarch, as if to shift and fix the responsibility, prefaces his redaction of this material with the phrase 'As Herodotus relates' (*Aristides* 16).

Besides the general underlying inconsistency, no parts of the entire Herodotean narrative contain more special discrepancies than these seven reflections on Spartan courage. To arrive at the historical residuum they must each be examined in turn.

- (a) The delay of the Spartans in sending aid after the embassy arrived (Hdt. 9. 6-11).

Thirlwall (p. 329) was the first to reject much of the story as fictitious on the ground that the action of the ephors was capricious and childish. He advanced as the real cause of the delay the transfer of leadership due to the death of Cleombrotus. Duncker (pp. 328, 328 n. 1, 330) suggested that the Spartans deliberately waited until they knew that Mardonius had reached Athens so that they would not need to fight to save the city. Stein (p. 128) thinks that the secrecy of the Spartans was due to their unwillingness to reveal to the Athenians their military methods and resources (cf. Thuc. 5. 68). Grote (p. 156 n. 1), although vigorously championing the story against Thirlwall, struck at the real difficulty—the impossibility of sending out 40,000 troops without the knowledge of the Athenian envoys. The numbers are of course open to suspicion, especially of the helots (Delbrück, *Per.* p. 93), although Hauvette (p. 452) and Grundy (p. 443) would justify them on the ground that light-armed troops were necessary to meet the Persian mode of attack.

The historical residuum is probably as follows: the embassy with Cimon, who was notoriously pro-Spartan, at its head, was received with courtesy at Sparta, and after deliberations a compromise between the two states was effected. Several days, perhaps weeks, were consumed in getting the troops ready,¹ and the army with the Athenian

¹ Meyer (*Forsch.* 2. 205 n. 1) thinks that the troops were already under arms.

embassy finally marched out quietly, by way of Arcadia, because of the ancient feud with Argos (Holm. p. 68).

(b) Spartans desire to shift wings (Hdt. 9. 46-47).

Grote (p. 171) is correct in his assertion that 'no incident similar to this will be found throughout the whole course of Lacedaemonian history.' Duncker (pp. 317 n. end, 338, 342-3) accepts it literally and brands the Spartans as cowards, claiming that Pausanias took the right wing in the first place so as to impose the brunt of the battle on the Athenians and to be near the pass through which to escape to the Peloponnesus in case of a defeat; the attacks of the cavalry made the Spartans afraid, they dared not attempt to clear the pass, hence they moved over to the left wing only to return because they were in more danger of attack there. Wecklein (p. 33) and Delbrück (*Per.* p. 117) regard the move as tactical. Delbrück suggests that it was to give the impression that disorder reigned in the Greek camp and thus to entice Mardonius to attack. To this Hauvette (p. 470) objects that a retreat alone and not a regular evolution would give such an impression. Busolt (p. 731 n. 2) thinks that the Spartan heavy-infantry would actually have made better headway against the medizing Greeks.

There are however many cogent reasons for not taking the story at its face value. Pausanias is made to admit the superiority of the Athenians as fighters to the Spartans; which is plainly Periclean glorification. His argument that the Athenians had had more experience in fighting Persians is false. Marathon was ten years previous, and the Spartans had recently fought with the Persians at Thermopylae (Nitzsch, p. 245). Awdry (p. 95) suggests that Amompharetus would never have consented to such a shift; Woodhouse (pp. 44-45) gives other objections; but Hauvette's word (p. 469) is final. It would be absolutely impossible from a military standpoint to shift the 50,000 men said to have composed the right wing twice in one afternoon, while the left wing executed a like inverse movement

at a distance so near that the enemy saw and imitated it. Meyer (p. 410) accepts the change of position, but (p. 410 n. 1) does not believe it took place on the last day before the decisive battle. Grundy (p. 477) concludes that the movement was some evolution which Herodotus did not understand. He, as well as Hauvette (pp. 470-471), admits that the Athenian element in the story is evident. Woodhouse's theory (pp. 46-47) that the shift of wings would have been carried out by mere marching if the army had crossed the river in Grundy's conjectured left-flank movement (Grundy, pp. 460 ff.), and that this proposal, which was never carried out, came afterward to be regarded as actual history, cannot be seriously considered, as there is not sufficient evidence in Herodotus that it was even intended. Munro's (pp. 159 f.) theory, that the troops marched to the second position by brigades and that the Spartans, moving first, marched by the Athenians, is ingenious but not wholly satisfactory. It is possible that the Athenian bowmen, the only Greek troops which could cope successfully with cavalry, were shifted from the left wing to assist the Spartans against the Persian cavalry in its numerous attacks near the spring of Gargaphia (Wecklein, p. 33). Such a movement could easily be misinterpreted as showing that the Spartans yielded to the Athenians in the face of the enemy. Olsen (p. 7), a conservative critic, notes that when the battle actually began Pausanias was on the right wing where he was originally stationed, and rejects the story entirely.

(c) Taunt of Mardonius (Hdt. 9. 48).

This has been universally regarded since Grote (p. 172) as an epic embellishment.¹ It has no basis of fact.

(d) Retreat of the Greek center (Hdt. 9. 52).

The treatment of the Greek center by Herodotus was not accepted by Ephorus, and was vigorously controverted by Plutarch (*Mor.* 872 C). The movement was early ascribed by modern historians to a desire for protection rather than

¹ Cf. *Iliad* 8. 161.

fear (Thirlwall, p. 344). The center cannot have been composed of cowards. The Megarians had proved their fighting qualities in the charge of Masistius. Holm (p. 70) suggests that what was at first orderly finally became disorderly because it was difficult for so many small contingents to keep together; Bury (p. 292), that the troops mistook orders or were deceived by the darkness; Grundy (pp. 490 f.), that there was general nervousness and that the troops were without guides.

Grundy (p. 490) asks why, if the allies really intended to flee, they did not make directly for the Plataea-Megara Pass. On the whole Woodhouse's suggestion (pp. 50, 51) applies as well to the hypothesis of this monograph as to that of his own. 'In order to carry out the project of Pausanias it was essential to dispose the various brigades in such a way that they might support one another. The new post of the quondam centre, near the Heraion under the walls of Plataiai, was well chosen in this respect, to check any attempt on the part of the Persian cavalry to creep along the side of the mountain and endanger the operation in which the Spartans were about to engage.' It is certain that in this case Periclean antagonism has misinterpreted a military manœuvre as a retreat.

(e) Delay of Amompharetus (Hdt. 9. 53-57).

Duncker (p. 338 n. 1) suggested as the source of this episode Archias of Pitane (Hdt. 3. 55). Rudolph (p. 9) thinks that the scene as a whole bears the stamp of genuineness. In support of the acceptance of the story at its face value the case of Aristocles and Hipponoedas has been quoted, two Spartan subordinate officers who refused to make a movement at the orders of the general Agis (Thuc. 5. 71, 72). The cases are not, however, parallel. In the case related by Thucydides the generals refused to march forward to face an enemy, not backward as here. Furthermore they were in disgrace because of their disobedience, while Amompharetus received high funeral honors (Hdt. 9. 85).

Thucydides (1. 20) latently controverts the account of Herodotus. The story has inherent difficulties. Amompharetus is said to be willing to die rather than retreat, but he finally does retreat like the rest. This is either consummate sarcasm to show that there is not a living Spartan who will not retreat, no matter how profuse his protestations of bravery may be, or else it is an inconsistency. Duncker (p. 346) asserts that Amompharetus was trying to force Pausanias to take the offensive; Hauvette (p. 474), that the obstinate captain held out to keep the whole army on the ridge, and that when he found out that he could not prevail, there was no longer reason for his staying. Meyer (p. 411) holds that perhaps a part of the Spartans to whom the movement appeared cowardice, objected vigorously and at last obeyed only with the greatest reluctance. But in the next few lines he asserts that when the attack finally came the superiority of firm military discipline showed itself in all its grandeur and that Pausanias had absolute control of the Spartans. Now unhesitating obedience is the one thing essential for all discipline. If Pausanias allowed his commands to be questioned before the battle, it is doubtful whether he could have enforced them during the battle. Munro (p. 164) thinks that Amompharetus was forced to remain in position to protect the Greek line because of the delay of the Athenians in marching to the 'Island.'

Woodhouse's explanation (p. 54) seems the most probable. 'The Spartans did not evacuate their position without taking the precautions demanded by their situation. Amompharetos and his Lochos were detached to occupy the crest of the ridge which concealed the Spartan lines; on the ridge stood the monument of Androkrates. The object of this was two-fold,—to observe the Persian cavalry, which would soon resume its daily task of keeping in touch with the Greeks, and to retain as long as possible the semblance of the Greeks being in position.' In other words, Amompharetus was 'one whose tried valour gained for him the perilous but honorable task of screening the retirement of the

main body.' If Mardonius was to be led into the trap, some one must draw him to the selected spot by appearing to contest the ground up to that place. It is quite possible that three of the young men who were buried together, Posidonius, Amompharetus, and Philocyon (Hdt. 9. 85), were all officers in this rear guard, and hence received special honors.

It may be asked how we shall account for the form in which this story is presented in Herodotus. The fact that Amompharetus was the last man to leave the Asopus Ridge would easily enough be construed by malevolent interpreters of Spartan tactics to show that he alone had the courage to stay. Such a tradition would very readily associate itself with that name of the four seen on the honor grave-stones at Plataea, which when analyzed means, 'The one whose courage cannot be called in question' (*α-μομφ-αρητ-ος*) (Hauvette, p. 475). Stein (p. 167) regards the name as merely an honorary title, given afterwards to some Spartan captain because of his bravery in the battle.

(f) Taunt of Mardonius (Hdt. 9. 58).

Both Diodorus and Plutarch reject this speech. Thirlwall (p. 345), Grote (p. 176), Duncker (p. 348), and Abbott (p. 225) are the only historians who admit it. Grundy (p. 500 n.) characterizes it as a tale. It undoubtedly represents the feeling of Athens toward Sparta when Herodotus wrote. It is permeated throughout with the contempt for Spartan courage which sprang up in Athens after the capture of Pylos. (Cf. 'you said that the Lacedaemonians never fled from battle' with Thuc. 4. 40 'it was imagined that the Lacedaemonians would never give up their arms.')

(g) Zeal of the center after danger appears to be past (Hdt. 9. 69).

Herodotus expressly states that the allies did not move forward from Plataea until they received a message. Yet they were only a little over a mile away from the actual

scene of the battle; and the temple of Hera, where they were stationed, could be seen by Pausanias (Hdt. 9. 61). Holm (p. 71) thinks that they not only did not contribute toward the victory, but were even forced further back. Delbrück (*Per.* p. 113), followed by Busolt (p. 736 n. 3), conjectures that they took part in the battle proper. Wecklein (p. 66) notes that Herodotus utterly ignores the part of the Corinthians in the engagement and that he implies that their tomb on the field was empty, although some must have fallen. Olsen (p. 13) suggests that the eagerness of the Megarians and Phliasians not to be late led to their taking no precautions and hence to the disaster.

The honorable part played by the center in this phase of the campaign is at least attested by the epigrams of Simonides.¹ It is probable that the center took its position according to orders, and that the message of Pausanias conveyed the information that the ruse had worked successfully and that it was no longer necessary to hold the town of Plataea. In response to orders the center split into two sections, one going to the support of each wing.

Delbrück (*Per.* p. 112) asks how the enemy's cavalry could have attacked the Megarians and Phliasians if the Athenians were in the position assigned them by Herodotus. If it be granted that the medizing Greeks came around the Asopus Ridge instead of charging over it—the latter evolution being a practical impossibility because of the height—the Athenians would then be stationed behind stream A1 with their rear protected by the Asopus Ridge. The Megarians would be on Ridges 3, 4 and 5 with their rear protected by Plataea. The medizing Greeks would dash in between the two and be assailed on both sides. In this engagement, a fratricidal struggle, it is very probable that the Megarians, without bowmen, would suffer very heavily, although the medizing Greeks were finally defeated.

¹ Bergk, *P.L.G.*, Vol. 3 (3d edit.), pp. 1146 (No. 84), 1154 (No. 107).

CHAPTER IV

(III) *Thucydides and Ctesias*

(A) *Thucydides (circa 420-400 B.C.).*

The history of Thucydides assumed definite shape during the years which comprise the buoyant expectations and the dashed hopes of the great Sicilian expedition. When Thucydides revised his work, Spartan courage had again gained its prestige, and men were in a position to look with truer perspective at the history of the past. It is unfortunate that Thucydides did not include in his introductory book a review of the Persian wars as concise and convincing as his review of the Pentakontaëtia; but he chose to apply his genius to contemporary history and to minimize the importance of the great struggle with Persia.

Possibly he felt that the field of the Persian Wars had already been exhaustively treated by Herodotus, and that his scientific spirit could never hope to produce a rival work that would compete with the latter in popular interest. Certain it is that he was impatient at the ready hearing which the false as well as the true in Herodotus received (Thuc. I. 20, 21), and that he was himself the first scientific critic of the Herodotean narrative. The fact that his references to Plataea are for the most part indirect and in reported speeches of envoys, makes them doubly valuable, since Thucydides admits that his speeches are not verbatim reports, but represent what he personally thinks the speakers would have said under the circumstances (Thuc. I. 22).

His statements have already been employed extensively in the preceding discussion to support or overthrow phases of the pre-Periclean tradition. It remains to summarize his additions to the current tradition. All of these may unhesitatingly be accepted as facts of history.

1. In I. 73. 4 he calls attention to the fact that the Athenian land force was relatively weak in comparison

with the naval force. This is another reason for concluding that the Athenians can not have played a leading part at Plataea, inasmuch as their troops were mostly soldiers disembarked from the fleet and more accustomed to methods of naval warfare than to land campaigns.

2. In 1. 132 he gives a full account of the serpent-column, including the words of the elegiac couplet of dedication, and the story of the effacing of the inscription and the inscribing of the names of the confederate states.

3. In 2. 71. 2 and 3. 58. 4 he first calls attention to the sacrifice of Pausanias in the *agora* of Plataea after the battle to Zeus the Deliverer. He notes the declaration of the sanctity and independence of Plataea, as well as the institution of a yearly dedicatory sacrifice to the fallen heroes, to be perpetuated by the Plataeans.

4. In the face of a thorough investigation and condemnation of the treachery of Pausanias (1. 128-134), he refuses to let this prejudice his estimate of him as a great general at Plataea (1. 130. 1).

(B) *Ctesias (circa 400 B.C.).*

Ctesias lived at the court of Persia, and tells us that he had access to Persian official records and that he conversed with many Persian eye-witnesses of the events he relates. He also wrote with the deliberate purpose of controverting Herodotus, and is the first declared literary champion of Sparta after the age of Cimon.

The attempt to glorify the Spartans is apparent in his treatment of Plataea; but the perversion is not subtle, as is the case with the Periclean exploiting of Athens. There is hardly a fact which is not, on the face of it, impossible. According to his version the battle takes place after Thermopylae and before Salamis. Xerxes is still in Greece. The Persian army, incited by the Thebans, is sent against the Plataeans. The Persians number 120,000. Pausanias meets them with the same-sized body of Spartans that Leonidas had at Thermopylae. The Persians are routed;

but Mardonius escapes alive, although wounded. He dies afterwards in an attack on Delphi, where a heavy hail-storm lays him low.

It is impossible to regard seriously any of the story of Ctesias, and it is hard to reconcile these glaring perversions with his generally reliable testimony for the history of Greece during the Spartan supremacy of 400-370 B.C.

CHAPTER V

(IV) *The Renaissance of the Pre-Periclean Vulgate in the Fourth Century*

(A) Historical Features of the Period

No better summary of the historical and literary features of the fourth century need be sought than the brief survey of Macan.¹ He characterizes the century as an age of reflection and afterthought in states whose liberty was secured by mutual exhaustion. It was the day of the critical rather than the creative spirit. Philosophers and historians were no longer content with the mere tradition of the past, but sought to get at the historic facts. Ancient decrees were collected and published. Rival historians vigorously controverted one another. But what concerns us most in the discussion of Plataea is the fact that 'the better philosophy turned away from the latter-day democracy, if not to Sparta, at least to old Athens before the antithesis to Sparta had been accentuated by Pericles and his influence.' It is in this century, therefore, which of all others concerned itself with the renaissance of the tradition of the Persian wars in its pre-Periclean aspect, that we shall expect to find the confirmation of our hypothesis regarding the actual facts of the battle of Plataea.

(B) Main Features of the Story in the Period

The result of such an investigation is gratifying beyond all expectation. If we except the orators, whose tradition can be shown to be little more than a careless working-over of Herodotus to glorify Athens, the testimony of the others who can be said to have examined the subject in a critical spirit, without a single exception, philosophers, historians, and antiquarians included, supports the hypothesis previously advanced. Plato insists that the battle of Plataea was won by a feigned retreat (*Laches* 191 C), and that Plataea, and not Salamis, was the completion of the deliverance of

¹ *Herodotus Bks IV-VI*, Vol. 2, pp. 187-188.

Greece (*Menex.* 245 A). Ephorus, in spite of his pronounced partiality for Athens, discourses at length on the consummate skill with which the Greeks chose the second position, and asserts that Mardonius was trapped into engaging in a place where he could not use all his powers (*Diod.* II. 30. 5, 6). There is not the slightest suggestion of cowardice on the part of the Greek center. The fragments of Theopompus and Timaeus (*Ath.* 573 C) restore the Corinthians to honor; that of Nymphis (*Ath.* 536 A) makes Pausanias, not Aristides, the victor at Plataea. Only one *Atthis*-writer, Clidemus, is known to have made reference to the battle; and he simply affirms that the fifty-two Athenian dead were all of one tribe (*Plut., Arist.* 19). This absence of reference in the *Atthis*-writers would seem to show that Athens did not play a prominent part in the battle. Finally, if it be admitted that the $\psi\eta\phi\iota\sigma\mu\alpha$ mentioned by Plutarch (*Aristides* 10) is from the collection of Craterus, this would establish the friendly relations between Athens and Sparta at the time of the battle, since, according to the decree, Cimon, notoriously pro-Spartan, led the embassy.

(C) The Historical Residuum

1. Plato (*Laches* 191 C).

Meyer (p. 411 n. 1; *Forsch.* 2. 207 n. 2; so Olsen, p. 12) is the first historian to accept this feigned retreat. He confines it to that part of the battle which ensued after the Persians had formed the fence of bucklers, and this is possible. But in any case, it is typical of the Spartan method of fighting, and with *Hdt.* 7. 211 greatly reinforces our contention that the retreat at Plataea was premeditated.

2. The Divergent Periclean Tradition of the Orators: *Lysias, Demosthenes, Aeschines, Hyperides, Lycurgus, the Parian Marble.*

As has been stated above, the tradition of the orators is little more than a working-over and amplification of

Herodotus so as to glorify Athens. Thus the reference in Lysias (2. 44-47) contains two additions which are simply rhetorical—the angry retort of the Athenians to the Peloponnesians to build a wall around the entire Isthmus, and the new emphasis on the part played by the Plataeans at the rout of the medizing Greeks. Isocrates (12. 92-93) intensifies this emphasis. The two variants in Demosthenes—that Perdiccas destroyed the king's army (23. 200), and that a fine of 1,000 talents was imposed upon the Lacedaemonians because of the arrogance of Pausanias with the Delphic tripod (59. 96-98), can have no basis of fact. With Aeschines (3. 259), Plataea has grown to be as much of an Athenian victory as Marathon. With Hyperides, Aristides is deemed worthy of a special oration for his generalship at Plataea (Plut., *Mor.* 350 B). By the time of Lycurgus (c. 71) the Athenians have become so patriotic that they are ready to stone even Alexander, when he is sent with the proposals of the king. The culmination comes on the Parian Marble, where the Athenians are regarded as the sole victors at Plataea.

It is clear that the orators add no new historical facts, since they used history only incidentally, and for rhetorical purposes.

3. *Ephorus and the Fourth Century Historians.*

The sole surviving historical work relating to Plataea in that part of the fourth century which may be characterized as the age of the renaissance of pre-Periclean Greece, is Ephorus, whose account of Plataea is reproduced in Diodorus. There are several tendencies of Ephorus which must be reckoned with in an estimate of his writings. He was above all a theorist and rhetorician rather than a statesman. He had little knowledge of correct military tactics (Polybius 12. 25 F). He was pronouncedly pro-Athenian, in opposition to Theopompus with his Spartan tendencies.

That the account of Plataea in Ephorus is taken primarily from Herodotus, with Ephorean amplification, is established satisfactorily by Bauer (pp. 319-325) and Rudolph (pp.

24-25). That the account of Herodotus was the only one which Ephorus had read is, however, untenable. Ephorus was a voluminous reader (Busolt, Vol. I, p. 158), and was a critic of Hellanicus. Furthermore, he alone reproduces the second inscription placed on the tripod at Delphi (II. 33. 2), which attests the fact that he had consulted documents of pre-Periclean origin. When, accordingly, he criticised the work of Herodotus which lay before him, he did it with the mental residuum of his past reading, to aid and in large measure to control his views. It is therefore manifestly incorrect to assert that all the variants from the story of Herodotus in his history are simply arbitrary inventions of his own, with no *raison d'être*. In each case there will be found some rational explanation for his results. Munro (*Journal of Hellenic Studies*, 22. 329) characterizes him as follows: 'Ephorus had a keen sense of the intelligible, which, in spite of its occasionable temptations, is a valuable faculty. . . . It [his history] has been built up by reflections, inference, rationalism and conjecture. It is in some respects an admirable piece of work, but it is exactly on a level with the work of a modern historian of the campaign—it is reasoned history, not independent historical evidence.'

Many of his variations need only be set in the light of his own tendencies and of the exact wording of the Herodotean narrative, to explain themselves satisfactorily at first sight.¹

(1) Regarding the numbers engaged (19. 6, 28. 4, 30. 1), Ephorus is speaking in even hundred-thousands, 400,000, 400,000 + 200,000, 100,000, 500,000. His estimate of 100,000 Greeks is the nearest round number to the Herodotean 110,000. Herodotus has himself admitted that he did not know the numbers of the medizing Greeks on the Persian side (9. 32). Hence Ephorus makes two conjectures (Busolt, p. 712 n. 4; Bauer, p. 319).

(2) The attempt to bribe Peloponnesian cities (28. 3; cf. Hdt. 7. 133), the time of sending the Athenian embassy

¹ All references by chapters and sections are to Diodorus, Bk. II.

to Sparta (28. 5; cf. Hdt. 9. 6-11), the oath at the Isthmus (29. 2-3; cf. Hdt. 7. 132, 145),¹ the fact that the Athenians had been forewarned of the cavalry charge of Masistius (30. 2; cf. Hdt. 9. 44) are simply the introduction of Herodotean material in the wrong place (Wecklein, p. 67; Busolt, p. 721 n. 2; Meyer, p. 372 n., p. 414 n; Rudolph, p. 25).

(3) The cavalry battle at night² (30. 2; Busolt, p. 623 n. 3) and the second fight before Thebes (32. 2; Bauer, p. 323) are ever-present schematic features in the military descriptions of Ephorus.

(4) Because the Greeks *did* fight at Plataea, and because they *did* institute the Eleutherian games after the battle, Ephorus thinks that they had decided on both these things beforehand (29. 1; Bauer, p. 320). Because the Greeks finally won, he infers that they were sure of victory (30. 4). Because very few Persian captives were taken, he infers that no quarter was given (32. 5; Busolt, p. 738 n. 1).

(5) Pausanias is spoken of as the bravest (33. 1) because of the tribute of Herodotus (9. 64).

(6) The death-losses, more than 10,000 Greeks (33. 1) and more than 100,000 Persians (32. 5), are here again round numbers justified by the indefiniteness of Herodotus (Grote, p. 182 n. 3; Busolt, *Rhein. Mus.* 38. 629-630).

(7) The fact that Aristides is given equal prominence with Pausanias in planning the strategy of the battle (30. 6) and the statement that the Athenians vied with the Lacedaemonians for the leadership of Greece (32. 4) are clearly the result of fondness for Athens. For the same reason, the cavalry engagement is made general at first, instead of against the Megarians alone, in order to show the superior foresight and fighting qualities of the Athenians (30. 2).

No one of the variants included under the above seven heads can be accepted as the true historical residuum. In

¹ So Wecklein (p. 67). Bauer contends for its genuineness.

² A night attack of cavalry is tactically improbable.

every case the explanation is sufficient to prevent further consideration. There are, however, two other main points constituting the framework of the campaign, in which the account of Ephorus appears to be at variance with that of Herodotus. But on second examination, it becomes clear that they are at variance with the Periclean redaction of Herodotus alone. In short, in spite of the fact that Ephorus had the Periclean account of Herodotus before him when he wrote, and in spite of the fact that he copied it in many instances verbatim (Bauer, pp. 319-327), he deliberately rejected the Periclean tradition on two crucial points in favor of that of the pre-Periclean vulgate. These two main points are as follows:

(1) He asserts that the Greeks took but two positions (the one at Erythrae and the other on the Asopus Ridge); that in the second position the Greek troops were disposed so skilfully by their commanders that Mardonius was compelled to fight where he could not employ his troops to their full power. There is not the slightest intimation of distress or necessity for retreat on the Greek side. The whole movement is characterized as a brilliant stratagem.

(2) The entire Greek center is given a share in the battle, and plays its full part. There is no mention of a retreat by this body.

Rudolph (p. 26) is disposed to question the truth of the first of these two variants on the ground that Ephorus regularly fights his battles in a narrow place (cf. Thermopylae, 6. 4, Artemisium, 13. 2, Salamis, 18. 4).¹ There can, however, be no doubt that Ephorus is really right, in spite of the schematic likeness regarding Thermopylae and Salamis, and we are now sure from Grundy's careful survey that the battle of Plataea was finally fought in a spot where the Persians were compelled to enter the field with narrow front, as they came between the Asopus and Long Ridges. Del-

¹ So Grote, p. 168 n. 3; Bauer, p. 321; Busolt, p. 728 n. 1; Woodhouse, p. 40 n. 7.

brück (*Per.* p. 116 n. 1) accepts this variant unreservedly, although it is the only case in which he has dared to follow the late tradition.

Rudolph also rejects the second variant on the indefinite ground that the story of the disintegration of the Greek army, including the cowardly flight of the center and its zeal after danger is over, as told by Herodotus, is more unique. Bauer (p. 323) would be glad to regard this variant as of historic value, if it were not for the fact that 'Herodotus is everywhere else apparently the source of Ephorus.' Hence, he concludes, Ephorus cannot here be drawing from another source. But Ephorus himself proves his ability to go to another source a few sections later, where he quotes the otherwise unknown epigram of Simonides, extolling all the Greeks with no Herodotean discrimination against the center.

It is perfectly possible that in the details of these two variants, Ephorus' military sense is deficient, and that in general he is too schematic; but in regard to their general *Tendenz* he has taken a decided position: (1) that Plataea was won by a brilliant stratagem, and (2) that the Greek center played a perfectly brave and honorable part in the battle. He accepted this view, which restores Sparta and the Spartan allies to glory, in spite of the fact that he had the Periclean revision of Herodotus before him, and in the face of his great love for Athens. Such an inconsistency can be explained on the assumption that the renaissance of pre-Periclean history and documents characteristic of his century and in which he had a part, restored quite conclusively to him those features of the battle which on other grounds, as we have already conjectured,¹ constituted the pre-Periclean vulgate of Plataea.

The inscription (33. 2) has been universally accepted as genuine. It was probably inserted in the place of the one which was effaced, mentioned in Thuc. I. 132. 2.

¹ See Chapter 2.

Bauer (pp. 324-5) thinks that the references to the adorning of the graves, and to the public orations at Athens (33. 3), are a reminiscence of the stay of Ephorus in that city.

Aside from Ephorus, no one of the other four historians of the fourth century whose fragments refer to events connected with the campaign gives further light on the status of the tradition beyond that noted above.¹ Theopompus (*Frag.* 167) attacks the story of the oath at the Isthmus as narrated by Ephorus. This has already been rejected on other grounds.

4. *Clidemus and the Atthis-writers.*

There is no reason for doubting the truth of the statement of Clidemus (*Plut.*, *Arist.* 19. 3) that the fifty-two Athenians who fell were all of the Aeantid tribe. It is probable that Plutarch's sum total is also from the same writer. It is a very reasonable estimate (*Perrin*, p. 310).

The decree of Plutarch (*Aristides* 10) is probably from the collection of Craterus; and if so, the names of the envoys are certainly correct.

¹ See p. 99.

CHAPTER VI

(V) *The Period of Individualization: Demetrius; Idomeneus*

From the renaissance of pre-Periclean elements under Plato, Ephorus and the Antiquarians, the Plataea tradition passed in the third century B.C. into what may be termed the period of individualization. The third century was an age of incipient biography, which was not yet entirely freed from the enveloping forms of history, rhetoric, and philosophy. The germs of this new trend may be detected as early as the fourth century in Ephorus, in the growing emphasis on the part played by Aristides in the battle. Above all, it appears in such personal encomium as the lost *Plataicus* of Hyperides, written to exalt the part played by Aristides at Plataea. In the literature of the third century, personality reigned supreme. The two representatives of this period who are known to have dealt with Plataea are Demetrius and Idomeneus.

A single fragment of Demetrius (Plut., *Arist.* 1. 5) states that Aristides was made archon after Plataea, and either Demetrius or Plutarch affirms that it was because of the reputation and successes which he won there that he received political preferment. That Aristides played a prominent part in the battle is improbable, since his name is mentioned only once by Herodotus, who would naturally be partial to him.

One section of Plutarch's *Aristides* is taken directly from Idomeneus (10. 5), and three others (11. 3; 13; 20) have every appearance of coming from the same author. In each instance Aristides is glorified, and three of the instances are entirely new phases of the tradition. The historical residuum must be weighed for each separately.

1. *The Mission of Aristides to Sparta and his solemn reproof of the Ephors* (Plut., *Arist.* 10. 5).

Plutarch shows this to be false by quoting the original decree of the embassy with the names of the envoys (10. 6). Idomeneus has individualized the general embassy of Herodotus (9. 6) where no names are given, in favor of Aristides, or has confused it with Thuc. 1. 91. 3, and has manufactured a *bon môt* for the occasion.

2. *The Perplexing Oracle from Delphi and its solution* (Plut., *Arist.* 11).

The legendary nature of this story is shown at once by the dream of Arimnestus (Duncker, p. 340 n. 3). Meyer (p. 413) regards the oracle regarding Athens as possibly authentic. Duncker (p. 340 n. 3) calls attention to the fact that the decisive battle took place near the temple mentioned here, and suggests temple influence. It is quite probable that the tradition regarding the boundaries of Plataea arose from a misunderstanding of the actions of Alexander the Great (Arrian, *Anab.* 1. 9. 10). It may, however, have its source in Hdt. 6. 108.

3. *The Conspiracy in the Athenian Camp* (Plut., *Arist.* 13).

Thirlwall (p. 340), Grote (p. 168), and Woodhouse (p. 36 n. 4) accept this. Busolt (p. 729 n. 4) and Meyer (pp. 403, 413-14) admit the possibility of it. It is apparent that the event would not be mentioned in Herodotus even if true, since it reflects on the reputation of Athens (Wecklein, p. 33; Munro, p. 149). But the fact that it gives such an admirable chance to display the ability and kindliness of Aristides, renders at least his participation open to suspicion.

4. *Contest over the battle-honors* (Plut., *Arist.* 20).

Rawlinson (p. 444 n. 6) shows that this story is improbable, since if there had been any such strife between Athens and Sparta it would not have escaped Herodotus. He

characterizes it as a late invention to glorify Aristides. Rudolph (p. 30) thinks that the gift of eighty talents to the Plataeans for the rebuilding of the temple betrays its origin—the Plataean temple-records. Perrin (p. 314) notes that Thucydides makes no mention of the contest and suggests a similar story regarding Marathon (Paus. 9. 4. 1-2) as a possible origin.

CHAPTER VII

(VI) *Cornelius Nepos and Pompeius Trogus*

(A) *Cornelius Nepos.*

In contrast to the detailed account of Marathon in his life of Miltiades, Cornelius Nepos scarcely more than mentions the Campaign of Plataea in either the life of Pausanias or that of Aristides. Macan's estimate of his sources,¹ that he used Ephorus certainly, and that he either used Herodotus also, or else that he coincides with Herodotus through Ephorus, applies perfectly to his story of Plataea. It is the Ephorean, fourth century, pre-Periclean renaissance view of the battle which Nepos holds. Through the generalship of Pausanias, Mardonius was put to flight at Plataea. His was the credit for this grandest (*illustrissimum*) of battles.

There is no intimation in Nepos of a disorganized Greek retreat or a cowardly center.

The only variant in Nepos from the earliest tradition is in the numbers of the Persians, 200,000 infantry, 20,000 cavalry. They are round numbers which inspire no confidence.

(B) *Pompeius Trogus.*

The version of Pompeius Trogus is plainly a rationalized summary of earlier tradition, through Herodotus, or possibly an epitome of Herodotus. His historical philosophy of the battle is extremely interesting. He suggests that the reason which led Xerxes to retire after Salamis was not personal cowardice, but fear of an uprising in Asia. This, as we have seen, is the present consensus of most historians.² Trogus implies only one attempt to win over Athens. There are no details of the battle in his account, except that Mardonius is defeated. Instead of the Aegine-

¹ *Herodotus Bks. IV-VI*, Vol. 2, p. 206.

² See p. 42.

tans alone, all Greece is said to have entered upon a life of extravagance as a result of the distribution of the spoils of the battle.

In one point Trogus is in direct contradiction to the Herodotean version. As in Ctesias (*Pers.* 29), Mardonius escapes alive from the battle with a few, 'as if from a shipwreck.' This same peculiar metaphor occurs again in Aelius Aristides (Vol. 1, p. 237, *Dind.*). Since both Trogus and Aristides, on other grounds, seem to have used Theopompus, it is possible that we have here a rhetorical simile from the latter's reference to the battle. It is, however, more probable that Mardonius is confused with Artabazus, as is clearly the case in 2. 14. 1 (Mardonius, not Artabazus, is made to reduce Olynthus). However it is explained, the variant can have no historical value.

CHAPTER VIII

(VII) *Plutarch, Biographer of Aristides*

There is little that can be added to the two detailed studies of the Plutarchean accounts of Plataea, by Rudolph (pp. 27-31) and Perrin (pp. 59, 60, 62-63, 282-317).

Plutarch's account is 'practically the story of Plataea by Herodotus, freely adapted and supplemented by material from Ephorus and later writers . . . and above all individualized, so far as Athenian participation allowed at all, in favor of Aristides' (Perrin, p. 62). In spite of the numerous variants from, and accretions to, the Herodotean narrative, there are very few which cannot be readily explained as due to the individuality of the writer, and it is doubtful whether Plutarch makes more than a single addition of historical value to the tradition of the battle.

It is evident at the start that Plutarch, or his immediate source, assigns to Aristides what Herodotus assigns to the Athenians in general.¹

He also frequently distorts the story to the advantage of the Athenians. Thus in Chapter 10 the Athenians show righteous anger at the proposal of the Spartans to aid them and a curse is added for those who medize. In Chapter 15 Mardonius plans to attack the Athenians rather than the Spartans.

¹ Cf. Rudolph, p. 28. He gives the following list of cases: Aristides gives the final word to the Spartan ambassadors and enacts the decree anathematizing all medizers (c. 10); is sent to Sparta (c. 10); sends aid to the Megarians (c. 14); adjures the medizing Greeks not to fight (c. 18); reconciles the Athenians (c. 12); shows the Athenians the honor of their position (c. 16). It should also be noted that Alexander of Macedon is made by Plutarch to seek out Aristides, and not Pausanias, when he betrays the Persian attack (c. 15).

Much material betrays Boeotian and temple-legend origin.¹ The attack of the Lydians is from a writer on Spartan antiquities (Perrin, p. 301), and was incorporated into the story to explain a Spartan custom of the cult of Artemis (Duncker, p. 350 n. 1).

The statement that Pausanias forgot to give the signal for battle to the allies (c. 17) is plainly a Plutarchean inference to contradict the statement of Herodotus, which is so vigorously controverted in the *De Malignitate Herodoti*.

Busolt (p. 720 n. 4; p. 735 n. 6) would assign the absence of all extended reference to Alexander (c. 10. 'Letters instead of ambassadors are sent to the Greeks') and the mention of the beast-like appearance of the Greek line (c. 18) to writers of the Macedonian age. The statement that Greek contingents kept joining the army' is an inference from Hdt. 9. 77. The neglect to mention the first shift of position, the leaving of the Amompharetus episode in the air, the tears of Pausanias, the mistake in spelling Aeimnestus, are all self-explanatory. They are the inevitable lapses of the genial biographer.

One incident which is mentioned by Plutarch alone may possibly be true. The story of Euchidas and the sacred fire was evidently confused with a somewhat similar story dealing with the receipt at Athens of the news of the victory at Marathon. This latter story was current as early as 350 B.C. in the writings of Heraclides of Ponticus (Plut., *Mor.* 347 C). The accepted name of this runner was Eucles. Tradition was more apt to project events of the second Persian war into the story of the first than vice versa, hence the Plataean story is more likely to be true, and was probably the source of the Marathonian. At the altar of Zeus the Deliverer at Plataea some one regularly held the position

¹ Cf. Rudolph, pp. 30-31. The instances quoted are: reply of oracle (c. 11); dream of the Lydian (c. 19); glorification of Plataea (c. 20); story of Euchidas (c. 20); the commemorative festival (c. 21).

of 'Fire-bringer' (*C.I.G.G.S.*, Vol. 1, No. 1667). Late tradition had a confused idea that a runner fought at Plataea (Paus. 6. 3. 8). It is also very probable that the incident was commemorated in the *Prometheus Pyrcaeus*, the satyr play of the Aeschylean Persian War-tetralogy.¹ The story is not intrinsically improbable. The distance by road was a little more than 110 miles.²

¹ Teuffel-Wecklein, *Aesch. Pers.*, p. 40.

² The American professional record for 120 miles is 16 hours, 48 minutes and 10 seconds,—and the American survived.

CHAPTER IX

(VIII) *The Final Period of Belated Literary Accretions*

Although Plutarch was the last of the classical writers to whom may be assigned a definite place in the moulding of the tradition of Plataea, it would not be right to close this review of the genesis and growth of the story without mention of its fate in the last years of the old world. The spirit of the age seems to have spent its time and energies in 'nothing else, but either to tell, or to hear some new thing.' Rhetoricians and editors of school text-books were not content to reproduce the facts of past history, and to let their imagination play with the interpretation of motives. They must have new facts as well. The vagaries thus originated need no discussion. They are self-refuting. But a review of the most marked may not be amiss.

The cause of the failure of Xerxes at Salamis was too many soldiers; hence he withdrew to Asia and left Marodonius with a few to subjugate Greece (Aristodemus 2. 1). The oracle at Delphi led the king to make proposals to the Athenians (Aelius Arist. Vol. 1, p. 233 *Dind.*). He promised them 10,000 talents if they would desert Greece (Aristodemus 2. 2). Themistocles made the patriotic reply that Athens could not be bought (Schol. Ael. Aris. Vol. 3, p. 191 *Dind.*). Alexander was ordered to get out of the country before sunset, and guides were sent with him to prevent violence on him, or intercourse with him (Ael. Arist., Vol. 1, pp. 232-4 *Dind.*).

The date of the battle was the 6th of Thargelion (Aelian, *V.H.* 2. 25). The Greeks camped at Plataea (Aristodemus 2. 3). Spartans and Athenians changed places, but did not return to their original positions (*ibid.* 2. 4). Marodonius fought the battle bare-headed, which made it possible for Aeimnestus to kill him (*ibid.* 2. 5). The sword

taken from him by the Athenians and dedicated at Athens was a far nobler offering than the Propylaea and Olympeum (Dio. Chrs. Or. 2, p. 85 *Reiske*). The Persians fled to Thebes; 120,000 were killed and the survivors, 60,000 in number, on their return home were killed by Alexander; this act restored him to favor with the Greeks (Aristodemus 3. 1). The Achaeans seem to have had no part in the battle (Paus. 7. 6. 4). The question of the relative bravery of the Greek states which took part in the battle was never settled; the names of all the states were inscribed on a discus after the manner of a round-robin (Aristodemus 9). Artontes paid several Ionians for burying the body of Mardonius (Paus. 9. 2. 2).

CONCLUSION

A brief summary of the results of this discussion follows :

(1) The deciding engagement at Plataea is now generally admitted to have been fought and won in a depression through which the Greek forces were retiring. This depression was between high hills, and was exactly suited to the Spartan method of warfare. Mardonius was led to attack where his troops were at a great disadvantage, because he supposed that the Greek troops were in retreat.

(2) The fundamental question in the interpretation of the battle involving to a greater or less degree the courage of the Spartan troops, and in any case the generalship of Pausanias, is the nature of this Greek retrogressive movement. Most writers believe that it was an actual abandonment of the Asopus Ridge, due to the logical consequences of an underestimate of the strength of the enemy at the time when the previous position was taken, and necessitated by the inability of the Greek troops to hold their own against Persian offensive tactics.

(3) It will be found upon examination that a feigned retreat with the deliberate purpose of drawing the Persians into the depression, satisfies all the demands of the narrative. We know that the Spartans used similar tactics at Thermopylae, and Plato asserts that this stratagem was employed at Plataea also.

(4) The primary evidence, Aeschylus, Pindar, Simonides, Timocreon and the monuments, supported by Thucydides, Plato, Ephorus, Nepos, and Trogus, has not the slightest suggestion of forced abandonment of the Asopus Ridge by the Greek troops and is outspoken in its praise of the generalship of Pausanias.

(5) The account of Herodotus, commonly accepted because detailed, but often inconsistent with itself, interprets the victory as the chance outcome of a disorganized Greek

retreat, and openly discredits the courage of the Spartans. At the same time it contains a wholly unexpected and hitherto inexplicable tribute to Pausanias.

(6) It can be shown from direct references to events of the opening years of the Peloponnesian War in the text that the history of Herodotus was written as late as 428 B.C. in the midst of the bitter civil war between Sparta and Athens. It is therefore certain that many misinterpretations, and especially the treatment of Pausanias, are due to a desire on the part of Herodotus, who belonged to the Periclean anti-Spartan circle, to exalt Athens and to discredit Sparta.

(7) If all elements of the Herodotean story which plainly reflect events and prejudices of the Peloponnesian War be eliminated, the residuum will be found to agree perfectly with the primary evidence.

(8) Although the most detailed accounts of the battle, and the ones which have practically controlled the tradition in ancient and modern history, the revised Herodotus and Plutarch, both accept the cowardice of the Spartans, and discredit the generalship of Pausanias, sufficient reasons can be given for the writer's attitude in each case.

(a) The Athenian attitude toward Spartan courage in the revised Herodotus can be satisfactorily explained on the hypothesis that the revision of Herodotus was not completed until after the capture of Pylos in 425 B.C., when for the first time in the history of Sparta, some of the Spartan soldiers surrendered. This surrender, which discounted Spartan courage throughout all Greece, would lead almost anyone to question whether, after all, the feigned retreat at Plataea had not been in reality a retreat due to cowardice, which fortune had turned to the advantage of the Spartans.

(b) Plutarch would have been unable to write a life of Aristides so far as his participation at Plataea was concerned, if he had not accepted the Periclean revision of Herodotus. As it was, he was compelled to assign arbitrarily to Aristides what Herodotus assigned, after much

amplification, to the Athenians. He protests vigorously against a Herodotean inaccuracy in his account of Plataea, gives the events which concern the actual battle and discredit the Spartans, on the authority of Herodotus, and if the tract on the *Malignity of Herodotus* be admitted to be his, controverts openly the Herodotean attack on the courage of the Spartans and their allies.

On the basis of these contentions, it seems reasonable to regard the final engagement at Plataea as a brilliant Spartan victory, made possible by the consummate strategy of Pausanias, and effected by the successful evolution of a feigned retreat, in which the Spartans bore the brunt of the Persian attack, with excellent support from the Athenians and the Greek center.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

THE ANCIENT DOCUMENTS AS THEY HAVE BEEN PRESERVED; THEIR AUTHENTICITY, SETTING AND CONTENTS

- (1) THE SERPENT-COLUMN. (Frazer, *Pausanias's Description of Greece*, Vol. 5, pp. 299-307) 479-474 B.C.

First in time and importance of the existing documents relating to Plataea, is a part of the original serpent-column which supported the golden tripod dedicated from the spoils to Apollo at Delphi. The fragment, 5.34 meters high, of bronze, inscribed in Dorian letters of the first half of the fifth century (Frazer, p. 302), with the names of thirty-one states who 'fought the war,' is at present in the Hippodrome at Constantinople. Herodotus (9. 81) and Thucydides (1. 132. 3) agree that the tripod was completed soon after the close of the war. Thucydides (ἐθὺς, 1. 132. 3) is witness that the list of states was inscribed upon it certainly before the downfall of Pausanias. It probably received its present inscription prior to the presentation of Aeschylus' *Persians*. There is general agreement among the ancient authorities (Hdt. 8. 82; Thuc. 1. 132. 3, ἐνγκαθελούσαι; Dem. 59. 97) with the fact which Fabricius' restoration of lines 1-3 of the inscription (τοῖδε τὸν πόλεμον ἐπολέμεον) establishes, that the column ultimately commemorated the whole war rather than the Campaign of Plataea alone.

Of the states whose names are inscribed, the Lacedaemonians stand first, the Athenians second, and the Corinthians third. The names of two states, the Tenians and Siphnians, are plainly later additions.

- (2) AESCHYLUS, *Persians* 803-822. (Text, Weil) 472 B.C.

The *Persians* of Aeschylus, produced at the festival of the Greater Dionysia at Athens in 472 B.C., contains the earliest extant literary allusion to Plataea. After a vivid description of the battle of Salamis (vv. 353-471) and the retreat of the king's forces (vv. 482-514), the poet summons the ghost of Darius from the lower world. Upon learning of the great calamity which has befallen his people, the old king reviews the past history of the nation (vv. 759-786), and prophesies the doom of the army remaining in Greece; picked troops of the Persian army are still delaying near the Asopus River in Boeotia, but their fate is sealed; they cannot escape the wrath of the Gods in retribution for temple desecration and other acts of

impiety; nothing can now save them from terrible slaughter 'in the land of Plataea beneath the Dorian spear' (vv. 802-822).

Aeschylus clearly intends to convey four impressions: (1) that the battle was fought near the Asopus River in Boeotia; (2) that the Persians had a picked body of troops; (3) that the jealousy and anger of the Gods caused their overthrow; (4) that the victory was due preëminently to the Spartans and not to the Athenians.

(3) PINDAR, *Pythian* I. 75-81. (Text, Christ) 470 B.C.

The second reference to the Campaign of Plataea in Greek literature occurs in the first Pythian ode of Pindar, which was written, within nine years after the battle. This ode commemorates the victory of Hiero of Syracuse in a chariot-race at the Pythian games. It summarizes the achievements of the king both as warrior and statesman. In lines 75-81 the poet desires to exalt the victory of Hiero and his brothers over the Carthaginians at Himera in 480 B.C. He does this by means of comparison and contrast: 'What Salamis to Athens, what Plataia to Sparta, that to the sons of Deinomenes is the day of Himera' (Gildersleeve, *Pindar, The Olympian and Pythian Odes*, p. 242).

The implication of this indirect testimony is clear. Plataea was a distinctively Spartan victory, as Salamis was distinctively Athenian.

(4) SCULPTURES ON THE TEMPLE OF ATHENA NIKE AT ATHENS. (Le Bas, *Voyage Archéologique en Grèce et en Asie Mineure*, p. 127) 440-430 B.C.

There is no inscriptional evidence to prove that the frieze on the west side of the temple of Athena Nike on the Acropolis represents the battle of Plataea, but some archaeologists hold this view. The temple fronts the east, and its south, west, and north sides face respectively the battlefields of Salamis, Plataea, and Marathon (Gardner, *Ancient Athens*, pp. 375 f.). The friezes on the north and south sides picture conflicts of Greeks with Persians. That on the west is supposed, from the helmets of the warriors, to depict a contest between Athenians and Boeotians. The Athenians according to Herodotus (9. 31) faced the Boeotians and other medizing Greeks at Plataea.

Callicrates, one of the architects of the Parthenon, designed this temple. It was ordered to be built about the year 450 B.C., but there seems to have been delay in its construction. The structure itself may antedate the Parthenon, but the sculptures on it are generally referred to the early years of the Peloponnesian war. As a document, if genuine evidence, the only value of the frieze would consist in its indirect testimony to the prevalent idea in the Periclean age of Athens' part in the Campaign of Plataea.

- (5) HERODOTUS, 8. 100-103, 107, 113-114, 121, 126-144. 9. 1-89. (Text, Stein) *Circa 430 B.C.*

The most detailed account of the Campaign of Plataea in classical literature occurs in that part of the history of Herodotus which deals with the expedition of Xerxes against Greece. No exact date can be set for the completion of this section of the history. It cannot have been published in revised form before 430 B.C. (cf. Hdt. 7. 137 with Thuc. 2. 67), and indirect references point to a later date. The details of the Campaign of Plataea as given by Herodotus have already been enumerated in Chapters 2 and 3. For a brief but complete analysis see Hunt (pp. 271-273).

- (6) THUCYDIDES, 1. 18, 20, 23, 69, 73, 77, 89, 90, 130, 132.

2. 71, 74.

3. 54, 57, 58, 62, 68. (Text, Hude) *420-400 B.C.*

Thucydides gives no connected account of the Campaign of Plataea. Some fifteen or twenty references, more or less direct, occur in the first three books of the history in connection with (1) the rapid review of preceding Greek history; (2) the discussion of the career of Pausanias; (3) the speeches of Plataean, Theban, Athenian, and Corinthian envoys in the early years of the Peloponnesian war. The allusions are found in both early and late material in these three books, and therefore cannot be dated with more exactness than the limits of the decades 420-400 B.C. They state the following facts regarding the Campaign of Plataea:—

- (a) The Persian armament was vast 1. 18 (*μεγάλῳ στόλῳ*), but only a small part was left in Greece with Mardonius 1. 73.
- (b) The Lacedaemonians led the Greeks 1. 18, 77.
- (c) Pausanias was commander-in-chief 1. 130, 2. 71, 3. 54.
- (d) The Athenian land-force was relatively weak 1. 73 (*οὐκ ἱκανοὶ ὄντες κατὰ γῆν ἀμύνεσθαι*).
- (e) The Spartans delayed sending troops 1. 69.
- (f) All the Boeotians except the Plataeans medized. The latter fought by the side of the Athenians 3. 54, 58, 62.
- (g) Athens was destroyed by the Persians 1. 89.
- (h) The base of the Persians was Thebes 1. 90.
- (i) There was no such company as the Pitane in the Spartan army (cf. Hdt. 9. 53) 1. 20.
- (j) Pausanias acquired a great reputation for his generalship at the time of the battle 1. 130.
- (k) Prayers were offered at the battle by the Spartans 2. 74.
- (l) After the battle Pausanias, on his own authority, inscribed on the tripod dedicated at Delphi the following epigram:

Ἑλλήνων ἀρχηγὸς ἐπεὶ στρατὸν ὤλεσε Μῆδων
Παυσανίας Φοῖβῳ μνήμ' ἀνέθηκε τόδε.

The Lacedaemonians effaced it at once and put on in its place the names of the states which assisted in overthrowing the barbarian and in dedicating the offering. But the act of Pausanias gave great offense 1. 132. On the tripod was the name of Plataea 3. 57.

(m) Sepulchres of the slain were erected on the battlefield and a yearly sacrifice instituted, with offerings of garments 3. 58.

(n) After the battle Pausanias, in the presence of the confederate troops, sacrificed in the agora of Plataea to Zeus, and declared the city and country of the Plataeans independent 2. 71, 3. 68.

(o) Plataea was the liberation of Hellas, and Pausanias was the liberator 2. 71.

(7) PLATO, *Laches* 191 C

[*Menexenus* 241 C, 245 A]

Laws 707 C. (Text, Stallbaum)

400-350 B.C.

There are four references in the dialogues of Plato to Plataea:

(a) *The tactics of the Spartans in the battle Laches 191 C.* That the *Laches* is one of the earlier dialogues of Plato seems reasonably established. Stallbaum's conjecture (*Platonis Opera Omnia* [2d edit.], Vol. 5, 1. p. 31) that it was written before the accusation of Socrates is not accepted by Grote (*Plato*, Vol. 1, p. 481) and it is impossible to date it exactly by internal or external evidence. The theme of the dialogue is 'Courage, its Nature and Attainment'. Laches insists that courage consists in remaining in the line and not fleeing at the approach of an enemy. Socrates objects that pretended flight may be a part of legitimate tactics and cites the Scythian cavalry, the horses of Aeneas in Homer, and Aeneas himself 'counsellor of flight.' Laches admits that flight is permissible for chariots or cavalry, but contends that the discussion is about the Greek infantry. Socrates replies: 'And yet, Laches, you must except the Lacedaemonians at Plataea, who, when they came upon the light shields (τοῖς γερρόφοροις) of the Persians, are said not to have been willing to stand and fight, and to have fled; but when the ranks of the Persians were broken, they turned upon them like cavalry, and won the battle of Plataea' (trans. Jowett). All commentators agree that the reference is unquestionably to Plataea.

(b) *Greatness of the battle. Forces engaged in it* [*Menexenus* 241 C]. The *Menexenus*, regarding the authenticity of which there is doubt, is dated by Jebb (*Attic Orators*, Vol. 1, p. 210) 386 B.C. (?) It contains allusions to the Corinthian war, and, whether by Plato or not, preserves much of the Platonic spirit, and can be assigned with some degree of confidence to the period between the *Laches* and the *Laws*. In the dialogue Socrates rehearses to his friend a funeral oration over fallen warriors which Aspasia, the consort of Pericles, is supposed to have been preparing to deliver to the

Athenians (Macan, Vol. 2, pp. 188-189). Plataea is characterized as 'third in order and third in the work of the salvation of Hellas' and 'the greatest and most memorable of all'. Athenians and Lacedaemonians shared in the conflict, and will receive lasting honor from future ages.

(c) *Trophy on the battlefield [Menexenus 245 A]*. An incidental allusion is made to the trophies of Marathon, Salamis, and Plataea.

(d) *Plataea rather than Salamis the salvation of Greece Laws 707 C*. The *Laws* were composed after the *Republic*, and belong to the later years of Plato's life. They continue the discussion of the state begun in the *Republic*. Megillus a Lacedaemonian, Clinias a Cretan, and an Athenian are the disputants. At the beginning of the fourth book the question of the proper location of a colonial city is raised. The Athenian urges that it be at a distance from the sea, and cites the evil effects of the navy on Athenian national life. Clinias expresses surprise, stating that he has always regarded the naval battle of Salamis as the salvation of Hellas. The Athenian replies that such is the common opinion, but that he and Megillus are agreed that Marathon was the beginning, and Plataea, not Salamis, the completion of the deliverance of Greece.

(8) ARISTOTLE, *Politics* 1307 A. (Text, Susemihl) 4th century.

In a single passage in the *Politics* Aristotle makes a general reference to Pausanias and the latter's connection with the Persian War. He is speaking of the causes which lead to revolutions. Such are liable to occur when those who are already great and might be still greater desire to rule, as for example, at Lacedaemon in the subsequent career of Pausanias who was general in the Persian war.

(9) [LYSIAS], 2 (*Epitaphius*). 44-47. (Text, Thalheim)

400-350 B.C.

The sole reference to events connected with the Campaign of Plataea in Lysias occurs in the *Epitaphius*, an oration included in the manuscripts of that author, but generally regarded as spurious. The *Epitaphius* is a funeral eulogy for the Athenians who died in defense of their country in the Corinthian war fighting against Sparta, and is therefore to be studied in connection with the *Menexenus* of Plato. Macan (Vol. 2, pp. 195-196), after a careful review of the evidence, refers it to the half-century before 350 B.C. with the weight of testimony favoring the earlier years. In that part of the oration where the reference to Plataea occurs the author is reviewing the greatness of Athens in the past with special reference to Marathon and Salamis. The orator continues: after Salamis (*ὅσπερ δὲ*) the Peloponnesians completed the wall across the Isthmus and planned to settle down in security, confident that they could repel invasion, and willing to let the other Greeks shift for

themselves; the Athenians, in anger, advised them to build a wall around the entire Peloponnesus, intimating that they would go over to the Persians and make the king's rule on sea supreme; the Lacedaemonians accepted the reproof and bore aid to Plataea; most of the allied troops on the Greek side deserted from the battle-line because of the numbers of the enemy; but the Lacedaemonians and Tegeans put to flight the barbarians, and the Athenians and Plataeans routed the medizing Greeks; that day put a most glorious end to former perils.

- (10) XENOPHON, *Anabasis* 3. 2. 13, *Hellenica* 7. 1. 34. (Texts, Gemoll and Keller) 394-354 B.C.

A direct reference in Xenophon to the Plataea Campaign occurs in the *Hellenica* in the speech of Pelopidas at the Persian court on the occasion of the visit of the Theban envoys in 367 B.C. He urged 'that the Thebans alone among all the Hellenes had fought on the king's side at Plataea.' The reference in the *Anabasis* is in the speech of Xenophon on assuming the leadership of the Ten Thousand. He alludes to the countless host of Xerxes and the victory of 'our ancestors' over them by *land* and sea.

- (11) AENEAS TACTICUS, 31. 26. (Text, Hercher) Circa 350 B.C.

The extant work by this author, a treatise on the defense of walled towns, contains an account of the ruse employed by Timoxenus at the siege of Potidaea.

- (12) ISOCRATES, 12 (*Panathenaicus*). 92-93. (Text, Benseler-Blass) 342-339 B.C.

Isocrates in the *Panathenaicus*, which can be referred with certainty to the years 342-339 B.C., makes no direct allusion to Plataea, but in an extended eulogy of Athens asserts that she has sinned less than Sparta; an instance of Sparta's crimes is her action toward Plataea. Then follows a eulogy of the Plataeans 'who campaigned with the Athenians and the other allies, who sacrificed to the divinities of the place, who helped to free both the non-medizing Greeks and those who medized under compulsion, and who alone of the Boeotians played the honorable part'.

- (13) DEMOSTHENES 6 (*Against Philip*). 11
 12 (*Letter of Philip*). 21
 [13 (*On the Dues*). 24]
 18 (*On the Crown*). 208
 23 (*Against Aristocrates*). 200
 24 (*Against Timocrates*). 129
 [59 (*Against Neaera*). 96-98]. Text, Dindorf-Blass) 353-330 B.C.

There are seven references to Plataea in Demosthenes occurring in both public and private orations and extending over a period of twenty years in that orator's career. They are as follows:

(a) *Booby of Plataea on the Athenian Acropolis* 24. 129. The twenty-fourth oration, *Against Timocrates*, was delivered in 353-2 B.C. to prevent the passage of a statute proposed by Timocrates to help three of his friends who, when state officials, had embezzled money. Demosthenes argues that all of the three, since he has been treasurer of the Acropolis, have stolen monuments of victory set up there, notably the silver-footed throne [of Xerxes] and the short-sword (*ἀκινάκη*) of Mardonius, the latter weighing three-hundred darics.

(b) *Fate of the remnant of the king's army at the hands of Perdiccas of Macedon* 23. 200 = [13. 24]. The twenty-third oration, *Against Aristocrates*, was delivered in 352 B.C. An attempt had been made to secure unusual civil rights at Athens for Charidemus of Oreus. His services to the state were loudly exploited by Aristocrates his advocate. Demosthenes argues that, in the old days, citizenship was the highest gift of the state. He cites the case of Perdiccas, king of Macedon, who destroyed the remnant of the king's army fleeing from Plataea and thus made the Persian catastrophe complete, but received no other reward than citizenship.

(c) *Embassy of Alexander to win over the Athenians* 6. 11. The reference occurs in the reply to the envoys. The oration is dated 344-3 B.C. The question under discussion is the incorruptibility of the Athenians. Demosthenes refers to the attempt of Alexander to bribe the Greeks; the king promised to Athens sovereignty over the rest of Greece, but the Athenians preferred to give up their homes and fight on ship-board for the common cause.

(d) *Golden statue of Alexander of Macedon at Delphi* 12. 21. A letter purporting to be a statement of the grievances of Philip of Macedon against the Athenians is numbered 12 in the collection of orations of Demosthenes. It breathes the atmosphere of the *Philippics*, and can be roughly assigned to the year 340 B.C. (Blass *Att. Bered.*, Vol. 3, i. p. 394). An incidental reference is made in the closing chapters to a golden statue set up by Alexander at Delphi from the spoils of the Persian war amassed at Amphipolis.

(e) *The Plataeans and the tripod at Delphi* [59. 96-98]. The fifty-ninth oration, *Against Neaera*, is generally regarded as spurious. It was delivered between the years 343 and 340 B.C. The question at issue is the civil rights of a certain Stephanus who is living with a hetaera. Reference is made incidentally to the Plataeans and their relation to Athenian citizenship. The orator recounts their

services to the state: at the battle at Plataea against Mardonius, the Plataeans fought by the side of the Athenians; after the battle Pausanias inscribed on the tripod dedicated to Apollo at Delphi, which the Greeks had erected as a common memorial for both Salamis and Plataea, a couplet [quoted in full here; see Thuc 1. 132], assuming that the work and dedication were his own and not that of the allies; the Plataeans obtained redress from the Lacedaemonians for the allies to the extent of 1,000 talents, the Amphictyonic council so decreeing, and compelled the Lacedaemonians to erase the lines and inscribe the names of the states which had a common share in the work.

(f) *Plataea classed with Marathon, Salamis, and Artemisium* 18. 208. In the *Oration on the Crown*, delivered in 330 B.C., in a strong adjuration Plataea is placed second in the list, after the reference to Marathon, but before the references to Salamis and Artemisium.

(14) AESCHINES, 2 (*On the Embassy*). 75

3 (*Against Ctesiphon*). 116, 259. (Text, Blass)
343-330 B.C.

Two of the references in Aeschines to Plataea are of a general nature. In the first (2. 75), which is dated 343 B.C., Plataea is mentioned first in a list of the glorious deeds of the Athenians, followed by Salamis, Marathon, and Artemisium in order. In the second (3. 259), referable to the year 330 B.C., the dead at Plataea are classed with those of Marathon. The third reference (3. 116) exposes a monumental fraud by the Athenians at Delphi. The Athenians were accused of having recently dedicated some gold shields with the inscription that they had been taken from the Medes and Thebans when the latter fought with the Athenians.

(15) LYCURGUS, *Against Leocrates* cc. 71, 80. (Text, Blass)

331 B.C.

There are two references to the Campaign of Plataea in the sole extant oration of Lycurgus, which was delivered in 331 B.C.

(a) *Reception of Alexander by the Athenians* c. 71. So devoted were the Athenians of yore to their country that when Alexander, the ambassador of Xerxes, came to demand earth and water, though he had formerly been a friend, he was nearly stoned to death.

(b) *Pledges of the Greeks before the battle* c. 80. All the Greeks gave pledges to one another before the battle of Plataea when drawn up in battle array against the hosts of Xerxes.

(16) PARIAN MARBLE, 67-69. (Text, *C.I.G.*, Vol. 2, No. 2374)

264-263 B.C.

The Parian Marble, a chronological inscription from the island of Paros, now at Oxford, contains an interesting reference to Plataea. Under the head of the year 216 of the marble, which embraces the archonship of Xanthippus at Athens, there is the following notice:—"Then took place the battle of Plataea between the Athenians and Mardonius the general of Xerxes, in which the Athenians were victorious and Mardonius died in the battle'.

- (17) PSEUDO-DICAEARCHUS, *Life of Greece*. (Text, Müller, *F. H. G.*, Vol. 2, pp. 257-8) 164-86 B.C.

In a fragment describing Greek cities ascribed to Dicaearchus the geographer but probably by a later writer (Frazer, *Pausanias's Description of Greece*, Vol. 1, pp. xlii f.) and dating back to the second or perhaps the first century B.C., there is a reference to the battle of Plataea. The writer is describing the approach to the town as follows:—"From Tanagra to Plataea is two hundred stades. The road is deserted and rocky, rising to Cithaeron, but not however dangerous. The city according to the comic poet Posidippus "has two temples, a stoa, a name, a bath and mine host Sarabus. For most of the year the place is as lonely as the sea-shore, but at the time of the Eleutheria it is a city." The citizens have nothing else to say of themselves than that they are colonists of Athens, and that the battle between the Greeks and Persians took place there'.

- (18) CICERO, *De Officiis*, I. 18. 61. (Text, Müller) 45-44 B.C.

In a reference in the *De Officiis* Cicero speaks of the heights of eloquence to which men will rise when commemorating military exploits; their theme made eloquent the orators on Marathon, Salamis, Plataea, Thermopylae, and Leuctra.

- (19) NEPOS, 3 (*Aristides*). 2; 4 (*Pausanias*). I (Text, Halm-Fleckeisen) Circa 99-24 B.C.

From the two lives of Aristides and Pausanias by Cornelius Nepos a very meagre account of the Campaign of Plataea can be gleaned:

(a) Pausanias was leader of the Greek forces (*illo duce*) *Paus.* I.

(b) Aristides commanded the Athenian contingent (*praetor*) *Arist.* 2.

(c) Mardonius, satrap of the king, a Mede, of royal extraction, the bravest and most resourceful of the Persians, led the king's forces *Paus.* I.

(d) The troops of Mardonius numbered 200,000 infantry chosen man by man (*viritim*) and 20,000 cavalry *Paus.* I.

(e) The Grecian force was by no means as large *Paus.* I.

(f) The Persian troops were put to flight and Mardonius was killed *Arist.* 2; *Paus.* I.

(g) The battle was the greatest achievement of Pausanias *Paus.* 1.

(h) After the battle Pausanias became vain and fell under censure because he dedicated at Delphi from the spoils a golden tripod, with an inscription that it was by his leadership that the Persians had been annihilated, and hence he had given a memorial of this victory to Apollo. The Lacedaemonians effaced the verses, and put nothing else in their place aside from the names of those states by whose aid the Persians had been vanquished *Paus.* 1.

(20) DIODORUS, II. 19, 23, 27-33, 44, 46, 82. (Text, Vogel)

Circa 30 B.C.

In the eleventh book of the world-history of Diodorus, which was published in 30 B.C., is preserved an extended account of the Campaign of Plataea. A detailed analysis of this, which is not readily accessible in English, follows:

19. 6 *Retreat of Xerxes. Mardonius left in Greece.*

After Salamis, Xerxes, fearing lest he be cut off from Asia, decides to make the quickest possible retreat from Europe to Asia. He leaves Mardonius in Greece with the best cavalry and infantry, in numbers not less than 400,000.

23 *Comparison of Himera with Plataea.*

Many writers compare Himera with Plataea, and the strategy of Gelon with that of Themistocles. The battle at Himera took place first and gave the Greeks courage.

27. 1 *Date of the battle.*

The battle took place in the archonship at Athens of Xanthippus and the consulship at Rome of Quintus Fabius Silvanus and Servius Cornelius Tricostus.

27. 1 *Movements of the Persian fleet.*

The Persian fleet winters at Cyme, and takes its position at Samos in the spring to guard Ionia. It numbers more than 400 ships.

27. 3 *Deposition of Themistocles.*

Themistocles is deposed by the Athenians from his command because he received gifts from Sparta. Xanthippus is made commander in his stead.

28. 1 *Relation of Athens to Greece.*

The estrangement of Athens from the Greeks is common talk.

28. 1, 2 *The embassies from Persians and Greeks.*

Ambassadors come to the Athenians from the Persians and the Greeks. The former bring the offer of Mardonius to give them

their choice of any land in Greece, to rebuild their walls and temples, and to make their city autonomous, if they will espouse the Persian cause. The latter, sent to the Lacedaemonians, implore Athens to have regard for relationship of kin and tongue.

The Athenians reply to the Persians that no offer of land or money will tempt them to betray Greece. They assure the Spartans of their constant devotion to Greece, and urge them to send aid to Athens at once since an invasion is imminent.

28.3 Attempt to bribe Peloponnesian cities.

While in Boeotia Mardonius attempts to win over some of the Peloponnesian cities by bribes to the leading men.

28.3, 4 Invasion of Attica begun. Size of Persian army.

After the failure of the embassy to Athens Mardonius leads his force toward Attica. Aside from the troops left by Xerxes he has amassed 200,000 troops from Thrace, Macedonia, and cities in other regions.

28.5 The Athenians, failing to get aid from Sparta, cross to Salamis.

On the approach of Mardonius the Athenians despatch letter-carriers to the Lacedaemonians requesting aid; but the latter are slow, and when the Persian troops are near, the Athenians transport their households to Salamis.

28.6 Ravaging of Attica.

Mardonius in anger wastes the country, razes the city, and dishonors the shrines.

29.1 Decision of the Greeks to fight at Plataea and to institute the Eleutheria.

When Mardonius has returned to Thebes, the council of the Greeks decides to associate itself with the Athenians, and to fight at Plataea. They pledge themselves in case of victory to celebrate an annual Eleutherian festival at Plataea.

29.2, 3 The oath at the Isthmus.

In council at the Isthmus they swear a common oath of unity and loyalty as follows: (a) to regard liberty as more than life, (b) not to desert leaders or the fallen, and to bury the dead, (c) in case of victory not to waste the cities of any of the allies which took part in the Persian war, (d) not to rebuild the temples, but to leave them as memorials of the impiety of the barbarians.

29, 4 (44. 1) *The march to Erythrae. Greek commanders.*

They then proceed through Cithaeron to the foothills near Erythrae in Boeotia, where they encamp. Aristides commands the Athenians; Pausanias, the entire army.

30. 1. *Mardonius advances and fortifies. Numbers on both sides.*

On learning of the advance of the Greeks, Mardonius leads his force from Thebes and fortifies a camp surrounded by a wooden wall and a deep ditch, at the Asopus River. The Greeks number 100,000, the Persians 500,000.

30. 2, 3, 4 *The Persian cavalry attack at night.*

At night the Persians begin a general attack on the Greek camp with all their cavalry. The Athenians are prepared, and fight bravely. All the Greeks repulse the detachments which face them except the Megarians, who are opposed by the Persian commander and the bravest of the horse. The Megarians hold their ground with difficulty, and send to the Athenians and Lacedaemonians for help. Aristides despatches his own picked troops, who charge, rescuing the Megarians and overthrowing the commander of the Persians and many of his followers. The rest flee.

30. 4 *Growing confidence of the Greeks.*

The Greeks, victorious as it were in a trial heat, are confident of ultimate victory.

30. 4-6 *Strategical change of position by the Greeks.*

After this the Greeks change their camp to a place better adapted for a complete victory. The new situation has a high hill on the right and the Asopus on the left, with the camp in the middle. It was selected with consummate skill by the Greeks because of its narrowness. Hence the entire force of barbarians could not engage at once; and their countless numbers were no advantage. Pausanias and Aristides, with great confidence, arrange their troops as circumstances admit, and advance.

31. 1 *Mardonius hampered in the attack.*

Mardonius, compelled to draw up his troops with a narrow battle line, attacks the Greeks.

31. 1, 2 *The battle and death of Mardonius.*

Mardonius at the head of the bravest Persians attacks the Lacedaemonians. Many fall on both sides. While he and his body guard fight bravely, the rest of the Persians withstand the attack. When he falls and his troops are badly cut up, they flee.

31.3; 32.1 *The opposing armies are both divided.*

The Persians retreat to the wooden wall pursued by the Lacedaemonians. The medizing Greeks flee towards Thebes followed by the Athenians, Plataeans, and Thespians. Artabazus, with more than 40,000 troops, makes for Phocis with the Corinthians, Sicyonians, Phliasians, and others at his heels.

32.2 *The engagement before Thebes.*

The Thebans come to the aid of the medizing Greeks who are being pursued by the Athenians. Many fall on both sides. The Thebans finally retreat within the city walls.

32.3, 4 *Overthrow of the fortifications and final rout.*

The Athenians then go to the aid of the Lacedaemonians at the Persian fortification. The contest is bitter; but neither intrenchments nor numbers can withstand the Athenians and Lacedaemonians, who, inspired by former victories, strive to outdo each other for the leadership of Greece.

32.5 *Slaughter of the Persians.*

No quarter is given to the Persians, because Pausanias is afraid of their vast numbers if taken alive. Over 100,000 Persians are slain.

33.1 *Death-losses and burial of the Greeks.*

The Greeks bury their dead, 10,000 in number.

33.1 *Division of booty. The roll of honor.*

The booty is divided equally among all the soldiers. The awards for valor go to Sparta among cities, and to Pausanias among individuals.

33.1 *Retreat of Artabazus to Asia.*

Artabazus, with his 40,000 Persians, flees through Phocis and Macedonia and reaches Asia safely.

33.2 *Dedication of the golden tripod at Delphi.*

The Greeks dedicate a golden tripod to the God at Delphi as a thank offering with this inscription:

Ἑλλάδος εὐρυχόρου σωτήρης τόνδ' ἀνέθηκαν,
δουλοσύνης στυγερᾶς ῥυσάμενοι πόλιας.

33.3 *Institution of funeral orations at Athens.*

The Athenian people adorn the graves of those who fell in the Persian war, and institute a contest of public orations over the dead.

33.4 *Punishment of the medizing Thebans.*

Pausanias then marches against Thebes and demands the surrender of those who were responsible for the Persian alliance. Terrified by the numbers and valor of the Greeks, the guilty parties surrender and all are put to death.

44; 46.2 *Pausanias, victor at Plataea.*82.1 *Plataea compared with Tanagra.*

The victory at Tanagra is rated with those of Marathon and Plataea; and all three are spoken of as Athenian victories.

(21) STRABO, 402, 411, 412. (Text, Meineke) Circa 20 A.D.

That part of the *Geography* of Strabo which treats of Europe contains three allusions to Plataea. The first reference (402) states that in the Persian war which took place about Plataea the country was badly devastated. In the second (411) it is asserted that the town of Haliartus no longer exists, having been razed to the ground in the Persian war. The third reference (412) is more explicit. The writer is speaking of the situation of the town: 'There the forces of the Greeks completely annihilated Mardonius and his 300,000 Persians. They built a temple to Zeus the Deliverer and instituted a gymnastic contest with a crown for a prize. A public burial place is shown of those who died in the battle'.

(22) DIO CHRYSOSTOM, 2, p. 85. (Text, Reiske) Circa 100 A.D.

An incidental reference in the second oration mentions the sword of Mardonius among the spoils of Athens, and characterizes it as a far nobler offering than the Propylaea or the Olympieum.

(23) PLUTARCH, *Aristides* 1, 5, 10-21, 23.

Themistocles 16.

Camillus 19.

Cimon 13.

Morals 230 E F, 349 F, 350 B, 412 A B, 414 A, 628 F, 814 C, 864 A, 868 F, 870 D to 871 B, 871 E to 874 B. (Texts, Sintenis and Bernardakis)

75-125 A.D.

In the extant writings of Plutarch there are many references to the Campaign of Plataea. In the *Aristides* the story of the battle is given with greater detail than in any other existing document except Herodotus. Three other biographies, the *Themistocles*, *Camillus*, and *Cimon*, contain isolated references. Six of the treatises comprised in the *Morals* contain allusions: (1) *The Laconic Apophthegms*, (2) *Whether the Athenians were more renowned for*

their Warlike Achievements or their Learning, (3) Why the Oracles fail to give Answers, (4) The Symposiacs, (5) Political Precepts, and (6) the tract, the authenticity of which has been doubted, *Concerning the Malice of Herodotus*. Both the *Lives* and *Morals* can be referred with reasonable certainty to the years 75-125 A.D.

(a) *The details of the Campaign of Plataea Aristides 10-21*. A complete and accessible analysis of these chapters will be found in Perrin's *Plutarch's Themistocles and Aristides*. Chapter 19 has the following dedicatory epigram from the altar of Zeus the Deliverer:

τόνδε ποθ' Ἕλληνες νίκας κράτει, ἔργῳ Ἀρης,
Πέρσας ἐξελάσαντες ἐλευθέρῃ Ἑλλάδι κοινὸν
ἰδρύσαντο Διὸς βωμὸν ἐλευθερίου.

Chapter 20 contains the epitaph of Euchidas:

Εὐχίδας Πυθῶδε θρέξας ἦλθε τᾷδ' αὐθημερόν.

(b) *Aristides elected archon after Plataea because of his successes there Arist. 1. 5*. This is given on the authority of Idomeneus and Demetrius of Phalerum. It is also stated that in the official records Mardonius was defeated in the archonship of Xanthippides.

(c) *Size of the Persian army at Plataea Them. 16*. When speaking of the successful ruse by which Themistocles compelled Xerxes to retire after Salamis, Plutarch remarks that the result was that the Greeks fought at Plataea with a very small part (πολλοστημωρίῳ) of the king's army.

(d) *Pausanias, victor at Plataea Them. 21*. In the famous attack on Themistocles by Timocreon of Rhodes quoted by Plutarch in this passage Pausanias is contrasted with Xanthippus and Leutichidas. The two latter generals were in command at Mycale. It is apparent that Timocreon means to designate Pausanias as worthy of praise for the victory at Plataea.

(e) *Date of the battle Camillus 19; Mor. 349 F*. The battle of Plataea is said to have been fought on the third of Boëdromion.

(f) *Plataea compared with Cimon's victory at the Eurymedon Cimon 13*.

(g) *Reflections of Pausanias on the victory Mor. 230 E F*. One, certainly, and probably both of the *Laconic Apophthegms* ascribed to Pausanias son of Cleombrotus refer to Plataea. The first represents Pausanias viewing the spoils of the barbarians and reproving those who admired the costliness of their garments with these words: 'It had been better if they had been men of much worth rather than acquired things of much worth.' In the second, Pausanias bids his officers set before him after the victory the Persian feast already

prepared. On noting the extravagance he remarks: 'The Persian must have been a greedy fellow, if when he had this fare he came for our barley-cakes' (*μαῖζαν*).

(h) *The Plataicus of Hyperides* 350 B. It is asserted that the victory of Aristides at Plataea was really more honorable than the oration of Hyperides which commemorated it.

(i) *Death of Mardonius foretold by a dream* 412 A B.

(j) *Troops sent by Megara to Plataea* 414 A. Plutarch laments the scarcity of fighting men in Greece in his day. The country can scarcely muster 3,000 hoplites, the number sent by Megara alone to Plataea.

(k) *Distinction gained by the tribe Aeantis at Plataea* 628 F. The last question of the first book of *Symposiacs* is 'Why at Athens the chorus of the tribe Aeantis was never determined to be last.' The glorious achievements of the tribe are enumerated including the fact that at the battle of Plataea it won the greatest honor of any, and hence, in obedience to the oracle, offered sacrifice to the Sphragitic nymphs at the city's expense.

(l) *Plataea classed with Marathon and the Eurymedon as a glorious victory* 814 C. The *Political Precepts* in which this reference occurs is addressed to Menemachus who is about to enter public life. Plutarch urges the young man to remember that the land is under Roman sway; he should act his part as a subject, and thus escape the axe; he must not urge the Greeks to emulate the deeds of their ancestors which would not be suitable for the present times of subjection; therefore 'the fights at Marathon, Eurymedon, and Plataea and whatever examples vainly puff up and heighten the multitude should be left to the school of the Sophisters' (trans. Goodwin).

(m) *Criticism of the Herodotean account of Plataea* 864 A, 868 F, 870 D to 871 B, 871 E to 874 B. As stated above, doubt has been cast on the authenticity of this tract, but whoever the writer may have been he was certainly familiar with the Plutarchean conception of Plataea, for his remarks supplement admirably and never contradict the passages of the *Aristides*. The most malicious statements of Herodotus are quoted and answered as follows:

1. Argives medized willingly. *Ans.* Why then did they not hinder the Spartans from going with so great an army to Plataea? 864 A.

2. The Phocians medized. *Ans.* This is contradicted by Herodotus himself 868 F.

3. The Corinthians were cowards. *Ans.* The Athenians made no objection to having the name of the Corinthians third on the trophy. Furthermore this epigram of Simonides for the Corinthian women attests the patriotism of the people:

αἶδ' ὑπὲρ Ἑλλάνων τε καὶ ἰθυμάχων πολιητῶν

ἑστάθεν εὐξάμεναι Κύπριδι δαιμόνιᾳ.

οὐ γὰρ τοξοφόροισιν ἐμήδετο δὴ Ἀφροδίτᾳ

Μήδοις Ἑλλάνων ἀκρόπολιν προδόμεν. 870 D to 871 B.

4. The Spartans pursued a selfish policy in remaining in Peloponnesus. *Ans.* Why then did they finally send 5,000 men with seven helots apiece? If it be replied that Chileus of Tegea advised them to go, think what would have been the fate of Greece had he remained at home detained by important business on that morning! 871 E F.

5. The Spartans yielded their wing to the Athenians in fear. *Ans.* It is ridiculous to suppose that troops would refuse to fight unless accustomed to their opponents 872 A B.

6. The allies of the Greeks fled to Plataea. They were disobedient and cowardly. The Spartans, Athenians, and Tegeans alone fought. *Ans.* The epitaph of Simonides proves that the Corinthians at least fought bravely:

μέσσοι δ' οἱ τ' Ἐφυραν πολυπίδακα ναιετάοντες,

παντοίης ἀρετῆς ἱδρὶς ἐν πολέμῳ,

οἱ τε πόλιν Γλαύκοιο, Κορίνθιον ἄστυ, νέμοντες,

οἱ * * κάλλιστον μάρτυν ἔθεντο πόνων

χρυσοῦ τιμηέντος ἐν αἰθέρι· καὶ σφιν ἀέξει

αὐτῶν τ' εὐρείαν κληδῶνα καὶ πατέρων. 872 C-E.

7. Empty tombs were thrown up. *Ans.* Herodotus was the only man who ever heard of it. It is refuted by the inscriptions on the trophies, to which all parties agreed 872 F.

8. A tomb was thrown up by Cleades for the Aeginetans. *Ans.* It is indeed remarkable if the Athenians contested with the Lacedaemonians about a trophy, and then let cowards divide the spoils and inscribe names. Why did they set up an altar to Zeus with the inscription? [quoted in full here as in *Aristides* 19 except that here verse 2, *εὐστόλμῳ ψυχῆς λήματι πειθόμενοι*, is given for the first time]. Did Cleades write this? Why dig up earth for empty tombs if names were on the trophy? Pausanias' inscription [quoted in full here as in *Thuc.* 1. 132] gave glory for the victory to all the Greeks whose general he said he was. But the Greeks disliked it, and at the command of Delphi the Lacedaemonians erased it and inscribed the names of the cities. Why should the Greeks have been angry at Pausanias if they really did desert; and why should the Lacedaemonians have erased the name of their general to put in the names of deserters? 873 A-E.

9. The allies sat still at Plataea and did not know of the battle. *Ans.* Forsooth, probably the Persians and Greeks agreed to fight silently! 873 F.

10. The Lacedaemonians did not excel the barbarians in valor but in arms. *Ans.* If we take this view, there is nothing left of the battle 873 F-874 A.

(24) JUSTIN, 2. 13. 1-4, 14. 1-6 (Text, Jeep) 150-200 A.D.

We should be glad to regard Justin's epitome of the history of Pompeius Trogus as an accurate outline of that writer's work and assign it to the Augustan age, but unfortunately Justin's introduction shows that the transcriber took liberties with the text (*Praefatio* 4), and hence as a document it must be rated as second century A.D. evidence. Justin's outline of the battle is as follows:

(a) After Salamis Mardonius urges the king to return to Asia to put down possible sedition, and to leave him with 300,000 chosen troops to subjugate Greece; even in case of defeat, he asserts, the king will receive no injury 2. 13. 1-3.

(b) Xerxes gives Mardonius an army and retreats with the rest of his troops 2. 13. 4.

(c) While the king is on the way to Asia, Mardonius reduces Olynthus 2. 14. 1.

(d) He tries to win over the Athenians by the promise of restoring their city in greater magnificence 2. 14. 2.

(e) Nothing will bribe the Athenians; so he burns the buildings which they had begun to raise and retires to Boeotia 2. 14. 3.

(f) The Greek army, 100,000 strong, follows him thither and a battle takes place 2. 14. 4.

(g) Mardonius is defeated and escapes with a few, as if from a shipwreck 2. 14. 5.

(h) The Persian camp is full of booty. The division of this booty among the Greeks was the beginning of their luxurious mode of life 2. 14. 6.

(25) PAUSANIAS, I. 1. 5, 13. 4, 27. 1, 40. 2, 43. 3, 44. 4.

3. 4, 9, 4, 10, 5. 1, 8. 2, 11. 3, 11. 6-7, 14. 1, 17. 7.

5. 23. 1-3.

6. 3. 8, 10. 6, 14. 13.

7. 6. 4, 10. 2, 25. 6.

8. 6. 1, 52. 2.

9. 1. 3, 2. 2, 2. 5-6, 4. 2, 4. 3, 6. 1, 23. 6.

10. 2. 1, 13. 9, 15. 1, 19. 4, 35. 2. (Text, Schubart)

150-180 A.D.

Pausanias' *Description of Greece*, which records the personal impressions of its author emanating from an extended trip in Greece

during the last half of the second century A.D. and also from voluminous reading in literature, contains much material of value in a study of Plataea. The references are of two kinds, (1) descriptions of monumental evidence which was still extant in Pausanias' day, (2) incidental allusions to the literary tradition. The monumental references have already been enumerated and discussed (see pp. 30-35). The following is a list of allusions to the literary tradition:

- (a) The advance of the Persians to Megara 1. 40. 2.
- (b) The episode of the Coan concubine 3. 4. 9.
- (c) Inhuman proposal of Lampon the Aeginetan 3. 4. 10.
- (d) Pausanias, general at Plataea 1. 13. 4, 3. 5. 1.
- (e) Tisamenus' prophecy of victory for the Greeks 3. 11. 6-7, 6. 14. 13.
- (f) Date of battle was seventy-fifth Olympiad (Pausanias combats a tradition that Oebotas fought in the Greek army at Plataea) 6. 3. 8.
- (g) Achaeans absent from the battle, hence their names were not inscribed on the Zeus statue at Olympia 7. 6. 4.
- (h) Attaginus and Timagenides, leaders of the medizing party in Thebes 7. 10. 2.
- (i) Alexander of Macedon sent by Mardonius to the Athenians 7. 25. 6.
- (j) Arcadians on the Greek side at Plataea 8. 6. 1.
- (k) Aristides and Pausanias, generals at Plataea. Pausanias forfeited the title of benefactor of Greece by his subsequent crimes 8. 52. 2.
- (l) Defense of the Plataeans against Mardonius 9. 1. 3.
- (m) Disappearance of the corpse of Mardonius after the battle. Gifts to Dionysophanes of Ephesus and several Ionians who claimed to have buried it, from Artontes son of Mardonius 9. 2. 2.
- (n) Spring of Gargaphia filled up by the Persian cavalry 9. 4. 3.
- (o) Medizing Thebans defeated by the Athenians 9. 6. 1.
- (p) Reply in Carian tongue given to Mys at the shrine of Ptoan Apollo 9. 23. 6.
- (q) Phocians deserted from Persians, and fought with Greeks at Plataea 10. 2. 1.
- (r) Greek temples destroyed by Persians left in ruins as memorials of the impiety of the enemy 10. 35. 2.

(26) POLYAENUS, 5. 30, 7. 23. (Text, Wölfflin-Melber)

Second Century A.D.

In the *Stratagems* of Polyaeus there are three references to events connected with Plataea: (1) the advice of Chileus to the Spartans (5. 30), (2) the ruse of Timoxenus at Potidaea (7. 33), (3) the

ruse by which Artabazus escaped to Asia after the battle (7. 33). All are simply reproductions of Herodotus.

(27) AELIUS ARISTIDES, Vol. 1, pp. 232-238, 240, 241.

Vol. 2, pp. 232-233, 261, 285, 286-7.

(Text, Dindorf) *Second Century A.D.*

In the *Panathenaicus* of Aelius Aristides, written in imitation of the work with a similar name by Isocrates, is a somewhat extended description of several features of the campaign. In the same writer's oration *On behalf of the Four*, which is a eulogy of Themistocles, Miltiades, Pericles, and Cimon, there are incidental allusions in a comparison of Miltiades with Pausanias. An analysis of these references follows:

(a) *The attempt of Mardonius to bribe the Athenians.* After Salamis, Mardonius, who knows that he is responsible for the expedition, is left behind with the best of the king's land forces. Athens then wins a victory as great as Salamis in refusing the bribe of the king, who sends because told by the oracle at Delphi that victory is his if he can win over the Athenians. The king sent Alexander of Macedon and promised the Athenians their city and country and the rest of Greece, as well as wealth untold and his alliance. This shows his fear of the Athenians. The latter did not use violence on Alexander, because he was a guest-friend; but they warned him to depart from the limits of Attica before sunset, and threatened him with death if he came again. Guides conducted him out of the country to prevent violence on him, or intercourse with him. Themistocles caused the rejection of the king's proposals. In the second attempt, a councillor and his family were stoned to death for favoring the proposals I. 232-234, 2. 286-287.

(b) *The embassy of the Lacedaemonians.* This gave Athens a chance to show her magnanimity; for she rejected the offer of protection for her households from Sparta between Salamis and Plataea I. 235-236.

(c) *The shift of places in the line of battle.* The Lacedaemonians yielded to the Athenians their position opposite the Persians. Mardonius made a similar shift since he preferred to fight Lacedaemonians who die well, rather than Athenians who conquer easily I. 237.

(d) *Cavalry battle.* The Athenians decided the battle by destroying the leader of the enemy's cavalry I. 237.

(e) *Siege work.* The Greeks were forced to undertake siege work, and in this the Athenians excelled I. 237.

(f) *Results of the battle.* Many of the barbarians died; others, escaping as if from a shipwreck, without arms and order, preferring night to day, reduced to a few, had good reason to remember the Athenians I. 237.

(g) *Solemn dedications after the battle.* Thanksgivings were held, an altar was raised to Zeus the Deliverer, the temple at Delphi was adorned with memorials, the booty was divided among the leaders 1. 240-241.

(h) *Aristides and Pausanias were the generals at Plataea* 2. 232.

(i) *The superiority of Miltiades to Pausanias.* Pausanias had the example of Marathon before him. He was aided by the Athenians and other Greeks. He was insolent. Miltiades had no advantages or defects 2. 232-234. Pausanias conquered a lieutenant only at Plataea, not the king himself 2. 261.

(j) *The Lacedaemonians alone are worthy to be compared with the Athenians at Plataea* 2. 285.

(28) ARISTODEMUS, 2. 1-5, 3. 1, 3, 4, 9. (Text, Müller, *F.H.G.*, Vol. 5, pp. 4 ff.)

The compendium of Aristodemus dealing with the history of Greece during the Persian war and the Pentekontaetia cannot be definitely dated. It is regarded by some as a literary fraud but contains an account of Plataea which must not be overlooked. The analysis is as follows:

(a) After Salamis, Mardonius persuades Xerxes that his defeat was due to the great size of his army and obtains permission to stay behind with 300,000 troops on the promise of subjugating Greece 2. 1.

(b) Mardonius sends Alexander of Macedon to the Athenians promising 10,000 talents and whatever of Greece they wish, as well as liberty and autonomy, if they will remain by themselves and not join the other Greeks. The Athenians will not listen, and dismiss Alexander 2. 2.

(c) Mardonius advances to Athens and burns what is left of the city 2. 3.

(d) He then proceeds to Thebes and encamps 2. 3.

(e) The Greeks encamp at Plataea, eighty stades away 2. 3.

(f) Mardonius is joined by 40,000 Boeotians 2. 3.

(g) In the Persian army the Persians hold the right wing under Mardonius, the medizing Greeks the left. In the Greek army the Athenians hold the right and the Lacedaemonians the left. The latter change places with the Athenians; but Mardonius makes a counter-move, so the Lacedaemonians finally face the Persians unwillingly 2. 4.

(h) Pausanias leads the Lacedaemonians; Aristides the Just, the Athenians 2. 4.

(i) When battle is joined, the Athenians come to the aid of the Lacedaemonians and win the victory 2. 4.

(j) Mardonius, going into battle bareheaded, is killed by Aeimnestus, a Spartan 2. 5.

(k) Aristodemus, the survivor of Thermopylae, called 'turncoat' distinguishes himself most of all in the battle but gets no honors because of his previous actions at Thermopylae 2. 5.

(l) At the death of Mardonius the Persians flee to Thebes. The Greeks slay 120,000; and the remaining 60,000 returning home are destroyed by Alexander of Macedon, an act which restored him to favor with the Greeks 3. 1.

(m) After the battle the Greeks institute the Eleutheria, erect a trophy, and decimate the Thebans 3. 3.

(n) The action of Pausanias with reference to the tripod at Delphi is given in full and the epigram (cf. Thuc. I. 132. 3) is quoted 4.

(o) When later on the Greeks were trying to decide which of the allies should receive the greatest honor, the Lacedaemonians devised a discus on which the names of the states who fought against the Persians were inscribed as in a round-robin 9.

(29) ATHENAEUS, 138 B C D, 148 E, 536 A, 573 C D. (Text, Kaibel)
Third Century A.D.

In Athenaeus are several scattered allusions to the tradition of Plataea. In 138 B C D, Herodotus' story (9. 82) of Pausanias' two feasts in the tent of Mardonius is quoted in full. In 148 E Clitarchus is quoted as referring in the first book of his history of Alexander to the feast of Attaginus to Mardonius and the fifty Persians. In 536 A Nymphis is quoted as referring in the sixth book of his work *On the Fatherland* to Pausanias victor at Plataea. In 573 C D Theopompus and Timaeus are quoted as alluding to the commemorative epigram by Simonides for the Corinthian women [already quoted under Plut. *Mor.* 870].

(30) AELIAN, *Varia Historia*, 2. 25, 3. 47. (Text, Hercher)
Third Century A.D.

In enumerating the different noteworthy events which have happened on the sixth of Thargelion, Aelian (2. 25) cites the battle of Plataea in which the Greeks conquered. He also remarks (3. 47) that although Pausanias won the battle it was of no avail to him later.

(31) HELLADIUS-INSCRIPTION IN MEGARIS. (Text, Wilhelm in Hicks and Hill, *Greek Historical Inscriptions*, p. 20)
400-500 A.D.

This inscription, bearing the name of Simonides, was restored in the fourth or fifth century A.D. by Helladius the 'High Priest'

[probably of Apollo]. It professes to be a dedicatory epigram to the Megarians who fell in the Persian wars. Lines 11-12 refer directly to Plataea. The entire inscription is as follows:

Heading drawn up by Helladius.

Τὸ ἐπίγραμμα τῶν ἐν τῷ Περσικῷ πολέμῳ ἀποθανόντων καὶ
κειμένῳ[ν] | ἐνταῦθα ἡρώων, ἀπολόμενον δὲ τῷ χρόνῳ, Ἑλλάδιος ὁ
ἀρχιερεὺς ἐπιγρ[α] | φῆναι ἐποίησεν ἰς τειμὴν τῶν κειμένων καὶ τῆς
πόλεως. Σιμωνίδης | ἐποίησε

Epigram.

- 5 Ἑλλάδι καὶ Μεγαρεῦσιν ἐλευθέρων ἅμαρ ἀέξιν
λέμενοι θανάτου μοῖραν (ι) ἐδεξάμεθα ·
τοὶ μὲν ὑπ' Εὐβοίᾳ καὶ Παλῳ, ξυθα καλεῖτε
ἀγνᾶς Ἀρτέμιδος τοξοφόρου τέμενος,
τοὶ δ' ἐν ὄρει Μοικάλας, τοὶ δ' ἐνπροσθε Σαλαμείνους,
10 [νηῶν Φοινισσῶν ἐξολέσαντες Ἀρῇ],
τοὶ δὲ καὶ ἐν παιδίῳ Βοιωτίῳ, οἵτινες ἔτλαν
χεῖρας ἐπ' ἀνθρώπους ἱππομάχους ἰένε ·
ἀστοὶ δὲ ἄμμι τόδε [Μεγαρῆς ?] γέρας ὀμφαλῷ ἀμφὶς
Νεισέων ἔπορον λαοδόκων ἀγορῇ.

Note by Helladius.

- 15 Μέχρις ἐφ' ἡμῶν δὲ ἡ πόλις ταῦρον ἐνάγισεν.

- (32) AELIUS THEON, 2. (Text, Spengel, *Rhet. Graec.*, Vol. 2,
p. 67) Fifth Century A.D.

In the second chapter of his *Progymnasmata* or *Preparatory Exercises* Theon cites Theopompus, who is said to assert in the twenty-fifth book of his *Philippics* that the oath which the Athenians are said to have sworn to the Greeks before the battle of Plataea, is a forgery.

- (33) PHOTIUS, *Analysis of Ctesias' Persica Bks. 12-17.* (Text, Müller in Didot's *Herodotus*) Ninth Century A.D.

In the *Library* of Photius, patriarch of Constantinople, which consists of excerpts and descriptions of about 280 different works to which that scholar had access, is a summary of the contents of the *Persica* of Ctesias, the court physician of king Artaxerxes of Persia. According to Photius who read the entire work of Ctesias, the *Persica* was written to contradict Herodotus whom Ctesias regarded as a fabricator. Ctesias affirmed that he was an eye-witness of much that he wrote, or else had learned it from Persian eye-witnesses. The approximate date of Ctesias is 415-398 B.C. The fragment which relates to Plataea is 29. 25 in Müller's collection. It runs as follows:

(a) After Thermopylae Xerxes again sends an army against the Plataeans consisting of 120,000 men under Mardonius.

(b) The Thebans excite Xerxes against the Plataeans.

(c) Pausanias the Lacedaemonian with 300 Spartans, 1,000 perioeci and 6,000 allies opposes Mardonius.

(d) The Persian army is utterly vanquished and Mardonius flees wounded.

(e) Mardonius is sent to plunder a temple of Apollo but is killed by a heavy fall of hail.

(f) Xerxes is greatly grieved, but sets out to Athens with his troops and fights Salamis, which closes the war.

(34) PALATINE ANTHOLOGY 6.2, 7.257. (Text, Stadtmüller)

Circa 900 A.D.

The *Palatine Anthology*, begun by Constantinus Cephalas, contains in its sixth division, which is devoted to dedicatory epigrams, an epigram, ascribed to Simonides, on the arrows dedicated in the temple of Athena, which reads as follows:

τῶξα τάδε πτολέμοιο πεπαυμένα δακρυβέντος
νηῶ 'Αθηναίης κείται ὑπωρόφια,
πολλάκι δὴ στονόεντα κατὰ κλόνον ἐν δατ φωτῶν
Περσῶν ἱππομάχων αἵματι λουσάμενα.

Bergk (*P.L.G.*, Vol. 3, [3d edit.], p. 1172) associates this with the Athenian bowmen at Plataea (*Hdt.* 9. 20-25, 60). In the seventh section of the same collection is the following epitaph:

παῖδες 'Αθηναίων Περσῶν στρατὸν ἐξολέσαντες
ἤρκεσαν ἀργαλήν πατρίδι δουλοσύνην.

Bergk (*ibid.*, p. 1151) regards this as the couplet on the Athenian tomb at Plataea (*Paus.* 9. 2. 5-6). Hiller refers it to Marathon.

(35) THE LEXICOGRAPHERS AND SCHOLIASTS.

The references in the Lexicographers and Scholiasts to Plataea are of varying worth. Only the most important are here given:

Schol. Aristophanes, Knights 1334. In commenting on a reference to Marathon the scholiast remarks that the Athenians alone conquered the barbarians at Marathon, but that Salamis and Plataea seemed to be the common work of all the Greeks.

Schol. Pindar Olym. 13. 32. Theopompus is quoted as referring to the prayer of the Corinthian women (see *Plut. Mor.*, 870).

Pollux B. 37. Under the discussion of κεφαλὴ Pollux refers to the human skull with no seam found on the battlefield after the carnage of Plataea.

Harpocration, s. v. Ἀλέξανδρος. Demosthenes is quoted as stating in the third *Philippic* that Alexander was sent by Mardonius to demand earth and water of the Athenians. They threatened him and let him go.

Schol. Theocritus 12. 27. The scholiast calls attention to the fact that Simonides also praises the Megarians.

Schol. Aelius Aristides, Vol. 3, pp. 191, 195 *Dind.* The scholiast affirms that it was Themistocles who patriotically replied to Alexander that Athens could not be bought (p. 191). He also argues that Aelius Aristides is mistaken in giving credit for the victory of Plataea to Athens. The Lacedaemonians won through Pausanias (p. 195).

Suidas, s. v. Πανσάβας. A brief account of the life of Pausanias is given with the story of the dedication of the tripod. The inscription is given in full (as in Thuc. i. 132. 3).

APPENDIX B

MODERN CRITICAL DISCUSSIONS OF THE CAMPAIGN

When the interpretation of facts and manœuvres as given by the ancient authorities is manifestly inaccurate or inadequate, recourse must be had to conjecture based upon comparative study of history and tactics. For the earlier stages of the tradition of the Campaign of Plataea, Thucydides, Ephorus, and Plutarch will often be found, in spite of their limitations, to suggest interpretations deserving of careful consideration. They are the first three higher critics of the Herodotean narrative, and had access to documents no longer extant. Besides this manifest advantage, they wrote from the standpoint of the Greek. It must always be a matter of no little concern to the modern theorist that his conjecture of what took place may be perfectly plausible from the standpoint of twentieth century tactics and yet at the same time be utterly false to the methods and ideals of the Greeks; and thus, while it is possible from one standpoint, it may be highly improbable from another. Modern historians of antiquity can often be shown to be as thoroughly saturated with the spirit of their day, and as unconsciously the reproducers of the nineteenth or twentieth centuries A.D. under the garb of the fifth century B.C., as Ephorus was of the age of Isocrates, or Plutarch, of the age of individualization. No safer check can be found than Thucydides; and all his contributions, as those of the first, and perhaps the greatest, scientific historian, are the starting point in every discussion. But unfortunately, because of the incidental nature of his references, he furnishes very little help.

Outside of Thucydides, Ephorus, and Plutarch, no historian is of value in the study of the campaign (except for the consideration of isolated details) until we reach the era of modern historical criticism of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. So far as any one writer controlled the tradition of Plataea during the intervening years, it was Plutarch whose theory, as given in his life of Aristides, was accessible in several English and French translations. This will be found to be true of the first modern history of antiquity, that of Rollin (1730-1738). In his account of Plataea, Rollin merely reproduced Plutarch and introduced no other philosophy than religious moralization. (Cf. *Ancient History* [1st Am. Ed.], Bk. 6, Sect. 9, pp. 226-229.)

With Mitford's *History of Greece* (1785) came the first contribution of modern scholarship to the interpretation of the campaign.

The writers to whom I have had access, beginning with Mitford, are here given. The order in which the names follow is that in which the first editions appeared.

- (1) MITFORD, *History of Greece*—Dublin, 1785—Vol. 1, pp. 530-571—a mere uncritical blend of the three accounts of Herodotus, Diodorus, and Plutarch—antiquated.
- (2) THIRLWALL, *History of Greece* (in the Cabinet Cyclopaedia)—London, 1836—Vol. 2, pp. 311-355—discredits Plutarch—notes the Athenian coloring of the tradition—contains much sound criticism which is still of value.
- (3) GROTE, *History of Greece* (American reprint from the London edition of 1846 on)—New York, 1870—Vol. 5, pp. 137-190—defends the account of Herodotus—is not, however, blind to the bias of the writer—has thorough control of sources.
- (4) NIEBUHR, *Lectures on Ancient History* (Originally delivered at Bonn in 1826, 1829-30. First published in Germany 1847-51. Translated by Schmitz)—Philadelphia, 1852—Vol. 1, pp. 394-397—entirely destructive—assumes that nothing is certain except the fact of the battle.
- (5) DUNCKER, *Geschichte des Alterthums* (First edition 1856)—Fifth edition, Leipzig, 1882—Vol. 7, pp. 291-356—discredits the account of Herodotus—strongly prejudiced against Pausanias and the Spartans—this prejudice unfortunately controls many of the ingenious conjectures which have, however, made this book a force to be reckoned with in any discussion of the campaign.
- (6) CURTIUS, *History of Greece* (First German edition 1857. Translated by Ward. Revised by Packard)—New York, 1871—Vol. 2, pp. 327-346—a blend from a conservative critical study of Herodotus and Plutarch.
- (7) RAWLINSON, *The History of Herodotus*—London, 1858—Vol. 4, pp. 345-458—notes on the account of Plataea in Herodotus.
- (8) STEIN, *Herodotus Vol. V* (First edition 1862)—Fifth edition, Berlin, 1893—pp. 78-199—notes on the account of Plataea in Herodotus.
- (9) NITZSCH, 'Ueber Herodots Quellen für die Geschichte der Perserkriege'—*Rhein. Mus.*, 1872—Vol. 27, pp. 226-268—includes an attempt to prove that Herodotus' account of Plataea is a composite, made up of Athenian and Spartan traditions which will not blend and hence contradict—pp. 258 ff. first established the relations between the Greek land and sea forces during the campaign.
- (10) WECKLEIN, 'Ueber die Tradition der Perserkriege' (*Separat-abdruck aus den Sitzungsberichten der K. Akad. der Wissen-*

- schaften*)—Munich, 1876—pp. 1-76—the various prejudices of the tradition which Herodotus employed are discussed in turn, and illustrated from his treatment of different events in the campaign.
- (11) BAUER, 'Die Benutzung Herodots durch Ephorus bei Diodor'—*Jahrbücher für Classische Philologie*, 1878-9—Supp. Vol. 10, pp. 315-325—summarizes Ephorus' agreements with, and divergences from, Herodotus' account of Plataea.
- (12) VON RANKE, *Weltgeschichte* (First edition 1880)—Third edition, Leipzig, 1883—Pt. 1, pp. 235-240—an outline of the campaign forming part of a history of the world—brief and, in general, judicious—without source references.
- (13) DELBRÜCK, *Die Perserkriege und die Bergunderkriege*—Berlin, 1887—pp. 91-165—discredits the military sense of Herodotus—shows how the campaign might have been fought on the basis of correct military principles as illustrated by a modern war—upholds the generalship of Pausanias and the courage of the Spartan troops—like Duncker (No. 5) one of the important discussions which must be reckoned with.
- (14) BUSOLT, *Griechische Geschichte* (First edition 1888)—Second edition, Gotha, 1895—Vol. 2, pp. 708-742—a conservative estimate of the historical residuum, supported by source references and references to modern critical discussions—invaluable as a tool.
- (15) HOLM, *History of Greece* (First German edition 1888)—English edition, London, 1895—Vol. 2, pp. 58-77—an attempt to present the popular tradition of the Greeks—yet critical, in that popular tradition is generally so designated.
- (16) HUNT, 'Notes on the Battlefield of Plataia'—*Papers of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens*, Boston, 1892—Vol. 5, pp. 271-283—an attempt to reconcile the account of Herodotus with personal topographical investigations of the battleground—presupposes the accuracy of Herodotus—contains an excellent brief analysis of the Herodotean account.
- (17) ABBOTT, *History of Greece*—New York and London, 1892—Pt. 2, pp. 193-235—conservative—popular.
- (18) BELOCH, *Griechische Geschichte*—Strassburg, 1893—Vol. 1, pp. 376-379—valuable for economic phases of the campaign.
- (19) HAUETTE, *Hérodote, Historien des Guerres Médiques*—Paris, 1894—pp. 425-483—an attempt to vindicate Herodotus against the attacks of Duncker (No. 5) and Delbrück (No. 13)—admiration for Herodotus leads the author 'to attempt to realize the apocryphal' in many generally rejected parts of the tradition of Plataea—numerous valuable conjectures.

- (20) GRUNDY, *The Topography of the Battle of Plataea—The City of Plataea—The Field of Leuctra*—London, 1894—pp. 1-51—the preliminary topographical studies for No. 30—this article first advanced the conjecture of the three phases of the second position taken by the Greeks, and argued that in taking this position Pausanias was on the offensive, with Thebes as his objective—references to Grundy throughout the book are to No. 30, which includes all the important points of this article in revised form.
- (21) AWDRY 'Criticism of Grundy's Plataea'—*Annual of the British School at Athens*—London, 1894-5—Vol. 1, pp. 90-98—opposes Grundy's (No. 20) theory of an offensive campaign by Pausanias with Thebes as the objective on the grounds (1) of normal strategy in the war, (2) of Spartan character, (3) of sound generalship.
- (22) RUDOLPH, 'Die Schlacht von Platäa und deren Überlieferung' (*Programm des Vitzthumschen Gymnasiums*)—Dresden, 1895—No. 34, pp. 3-32—critical discussions of the accounts of Herodotus, Ctesias, Ephorus, and Plutarch in turn, summarizing the inconsistencies and prejudices of each writer—concludes that the account of Herodotus in spite of its deficiencies is alone of value.
- (23) PÖHLMAN, *Grundriss der Griechischen Geschichte* (Iwan von Müller's *Handbuch*)—Munich, 1896—pp. 93-97—a safe residuum with a brief evaluation of sources.
- (24) WOODHOUSE, 'The Greeks at Plataia'—*Journal of Hellenic Studies*, London, 1898—Vol. 18, pp. 33-59—discredits all parts of Herodotus which show evidence of Athenian bias—is perhaps over-harsh to Athenian tradition—rehabilitates the Greek center—was inspired by Grundy's discussion (No. 20)—very suggestive.
- (25) MEYER, *Forschungen zur Alten Geschichte*—Halle, 1899—Vol. 2, pp. 196 ff.—establishes the fact of the Periclean redaction of Herodotus' account of the campaign.
- (26) DELBRÜCK, *Geschichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen der politischen Geschichte*—Berlin, 1900—Pt. 1 (Das Alterthum), pp. 80-88—a repetition of the views expressed in *Die Perserkriege* (No. 13) and an answer to Hauvette (No. 19).
- (27) BURY, *History of Greece*—London, 1900—pp. 282-295—a vigorous and rational popular account—follows Grundy (No. 20) and lays special emphasis on the Athenian misrepresentations of the tradition of the battle.
- (28) PERRIN, *Plutarch's Themistocles and Aristides*—New York, 1901—pp. 282-317—summarizes Plutarch's agreements with,


and divergences from, Herodotus' account of Plataea—does for Plutarch what Bauer (No. 11) does for Ephorus.

- (29) MEYER, *Geschichte des Alterthums*—Stuttgart, 1901—Vol. 3, pp. 392-397, 400-414—brilliant, bold, and generally convincing—thoroughly independent of Herodotean bias.
- (30) GRUNDY, *The Great Persian War*—New York, 1901—pp. 408-521—an elaborate attempt to reconcile the account of Herodotus with a thoroughly scientific investigation of the topography of the battlefield (No. 20)—indispensable and in general thoroughly satisfactory on the topographical side.
- (31) REUTHER, *Pausanias, Sohn des Kleombrotos, Führer der Griechen in den Kämpfen gegen die Perser von der Schlacht bei Platäa bis zur Eroberung von Byzanz*—Bonn, 1902—pp. 1-71—an attempt to prove that Pausanias was a revolutionist rather than a traitor—pp. 5-16 contain a justification of his generalship at Plataea.
- (32) OLSEN, 'Die Schlacht bei Plataeae' (*Jahresbericht über das Städtische Gymnasium*) Greifswald, 1903—pp. 3-16—an answer to Delbrück's theory of the battle as advanced in No. 26—contends that the Persian army was superior to the Greeks in numbers, that it is not necessary to read into Plataea the tactics of Marathon, and that there are but few contradictions in the Herodotean account.
- (33) MUNRO, 'Some Observations on the Persian Wars: 3. The Campaign of Plataea'—*Journal of Hellenic Studies*, London, 1904—Vol. 24, pp. 144-165—accepts Woodhouse's (No. 24) estimate of the Athenians and Grundy's (No. 20) conjectured offensive movement of Pausanias—credits the Spartans with courage and devotion to the common cause, but is uncertain regarding the generalship of Pausanias.

A bibliography of the discussions of the topography of the battlefield extending to the year 1898 will be found in Frazer, *Pausanias's Description of Greece*, Vol. 5, p. 15. The following topographical discussions have appeared since that date: Woodhouse in *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, Vol. 18 (1898), pp. 33-59 (*passim*); Grundy in *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, Vol. 18 (1898), pp. 235 f.; Grundy in *Classical Review*, Vol. 12 (April, 1898), pp. 161-162; Frazer in *Classical Review*, Vol. 12 (May, 1898), pp. 206-207; Grundy, *The Great Persian War*, Chapter 11 (*passim*); Munro in *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, Vol. 24 (1904), pp. 144-165 (*passim*).



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